ELEMENTS

OF

MORAL SCIENCE

BY JAMES BEATTIE, LL.D.

THE FIRST VOLUME.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THESE Volumes contain an Abridgement, and for the most part a very brief one, of a Series of Discourses delivered in Marischall College, on Moral Philosophy and Logic.

It has long been the Author's practice, with a view to assist the memory of his hearers, to make them write Notes of each discourse. But as that was necessarily done in haste, inaccuracy was unavoidable; and many of them have expressed their wishes that he would put it in their power to procure correct copies of the whole Summary, a little enlarged in the doctrinal parts, and with the addition of a few illustrative examples. This is one of his motives to the present Publication; which some are disposed to think has been too long delayed; and which is become the more excusable, as hundreds of manuscript copies of the *Notes*, many of them incomplete as well as

incorrect, are now extant; and as ſeveral extracts from them have got, he knows not how, into print, with more imperfections, it may be, than could reaſonably be imputed to the author. He begs leave to add, as another reaſon for making theſe papers public, that he has been adviſed to it by many perſons, whoſe judgement and love of good learning intitle them at all times to his moſt reſpectful attention.

It will no doubt be obſerved, that ſome of the following topics, though brevity has been aimed at in all, are treated more compendiouſly than others. This could, he thinks, be accounted for; but not without much egotiſm, and a detail of particulars neither neceſſary nor intereſting.

No body, he preſumes, will be offended, if in theſe papers there be found, as there certainly will, numberleſs thoughts and arguments which may be found elſewhere. It will be conſidered, that, as a profeſſor's province is generally aſſigned him by public authority, his buſineſs is rather to collect and arrange his materials, than to invent or make them. In his *illuſtrations*,

[illegible] in order to render what he teaches as perspicuous and entertaining as possible, he may give ample scope to his inventive genius; but, in proposing a discovery of his principles, he will be more solicitous to make a collection of useful truths, however old, than to surprise his readers with paradox, and theories of his own contrivance.—And let it be considered further, that as all the practical, and most of the speculative parts of Moral Science, have been frequently and fully explained by the ablest writers, he would, if he should affect novelty in those matters, neither do justice to his subject, nor easily clear himself from the charge of ostentation.

Of such of the author's Lectures as have already, under the name of *Essays*, been published in the same form in which they were at first composed, particularly those on Language, Memory, and Imagination, he has made this abridgement as brief as was consistent with any degree of perspicuity. Some may think, that he ought to have left out those parts; and he once thought

thought so himself. But it occurred to him, that many persons, into whose hands this book would perhaps come, may have never seen those printed lectures, and possibly never would see them;—that he could not with a good grace recommend it to any body to purchase the volumes in which they are to be found;—and that, if those parts should be wholly omitted, his System, as exhibited in this epitome, would have a mutilated appearance, and be still more imperfect than it is.

The remaining part of this work, containing ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (strictly so called), which comprehends ETHICS, ECONOMICS, and POLITICS; and of LOGIC (including RHETORIC); will be put to the press, as soon as the author shall have found leisure to revise and transcribe it.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. HUMAN knowledge has been divided into Hiſtory, Philoſophy, Mathematics, and Poetry or Fable *. Hiſtory records the actions of men, and the other appearances of the viſible univerſe. Poetry or Fable is an imitation of hiſtory, according to probability, and exhibits things, not as they are, but as we might ſuppoſe them to be. Philoſophy inveſtigates the laws of nature, with a view to the regulation of human conduct, and the enlargement of human power. The Mathematical Sciences aſcertain relations and proportions in quantity and number.—Hiſtory and Philoſophy are founded in the knowledge of real things. Mathematical truths reſult from the nature of the quantities or numbers compared together. Poetical repreſentations are approved of, if they re-

* Bacon conſiders Poetry as a part of Human Knowledge, and Mathematics as an appendage to Natural Philoſophy.

ſemble real things, and are themſelves agreeable.

2. Theſe parts of knowledge are not always kept diſtinct or ſeparate. Philoſophical inveſtigation may find a place in hiſtory, and hiſtorical narrative is often neceſſary in philoſophy. Many things in Natural philoſophy are aſcertained and illuſtrated by mathematical reaſoning. Poetical deſcription may contribute to the embelliſhment of hiſtory; as may be ſeen in many paſſages of Livy, Tacitus, and other great hiſtorians. And true narrative and ſound reaſoning may in poetry be both ornamental and uſeful, as we ſee in many parts of *Paradiſe Loſt*.

3. Hiſtory is referred to Memory, becauſe it records what is paſt, whereof without memory men would have no knowledge. Poetry is the work of Fancy or Imagination, that is, of the inventive powers of man; which however muſt be regulated by the knowledge of nature. Philoſophy and Mathematics are improved and proſecuted by a right uſe of reaſon: but there is this difference between them, that

to

to the discovery of mathematical truth reason is alone sufficient; whereas, to form a philosopher, reason and knowledge of nature are both necessary. Mathematics, therefore, though an instrument of philosophy, and an appendage to it, cannot with propriety be called a part of it.

4. Of Philosophy different definitions and descriptions have been given, according to the different views which have been taken of it. As improved by Bacon, Boyle, Newton, and other great men, it may now be defined, The knowledge of nature applied to practical and useful purposes. It is useful in these four respects: first, because it exercises, and consequently improves, the rational powers of man: secondly, because it gives pleasure by gratifying curiosity: thirdly, because it regulates the opinions of men, and directs their actions: and fourthly, because it enables us to discover in part the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being, the Creator of all things, who has established those general principles, which are called the laws

of nature, and according to which all the phenomena of the univerſe are produced.

5. Without ſome acquaintance with nature, we could not act at all, either in purſuing good, or in avoiding evil; we ſhould not know that fire would burn or food nouriſh us. In brutes, whoſe experience, compared with ours, is very limited, the want of this knowledge is ſupplied, as far as may be neceſſary for them or beneficial to us, by natural inſtinct.—We diſcover cauſes by comparing things together, and obſerving the relations, reſemblances, and connections that take place among them, and the effects produced by their being applied to one another. And, by comparing ſeveral cauſes together, we may ſometimes trace them up to one common cauſe, or general principle; as Newton reſolved the laws of motion into the *vis inertiæ* of matter.

6. As all philoſophy is founded in the knowledge of nature, that is, of the things that really exiſt; and as all the things that really exiſt, as far as we are concerned in them and capable of obſerving them, are either

either Bodies or Spirits, Philoſophy conſiſts of two parts, the Philoſophy of body, and the Philoſophy of ſpirit or mind. The latter, which is our preſent buſineſs, has been ſometimes called the Abſtract philoſophy, becauſe it treats of things abſtracted or diſtinguiſhed from matter; and ſometimes it is called Moral philoſophy, on account of its influence on life and manners. It conſiſts, like every other branch of ſcience, of a Speculative and a Practical part: the former being employed in aſcertaining the appearances, and tracing out the laws, of nature; the latter, in applying this knowledge to practical and uſeful purpoſes. But to keep theſe two parts always, and entirely, diſtinct, would, if at all practicable, occaſion no little inconvenience.

7. The Speculative part of the philoſophy of mind has been called Pneumatology. It inquires into the nature of thoſe ſpirits or minds, whereof we may have certain knowledge, and wherewith it concerns us to be acquainted; and thoſe are the Deity and the Human Mind. Of other

ther ſpirits, as good and evil angels, and the vital principle of brutes, (if this may be called ſpirit), though we know that ſuch things exiſt, we have not from the light of nature any certain knowledge, nor is it neceſſary that we ſhould. Pneumatology, therefore, conſiſts of two parts, firſt, Natural Theology, which evinces the being and attributes of the Deity, as far as theſe are diſcoverable by a right uſe of reaſon; and, ſecondly, the Philoſophy of the human mind, which ſome writers have termed Pſychology. We begin with the latter, becauſe it is more immediately the object of our experience.—An Appendix will be ſubjoined, concerning the immortality and incorporeal nature of the human ſoul.

8. The mind of man may be improved, in reſpect, firſt of action, and ſecondly, of knowledge. The Practical part, therefore, of this Abſtract Philoſophy conſiſts of two parts, Moral Philoſophy (ſtrictly ſo called), which treats of the improvement of our active or moral powers; and

Logic,

Logic, which treats of the improvement of our intellectual faculties. Thus we ſee that the moral ſciences may be reduced to four, PSYCHOLOGY, NATURAL THEOLOGY, MORAL PHILOSOPHY *, and LOGIC. Theſe, with their ſeveral diviſions and ſubdiviſions, I ſhall conſider in that order which may be found the moſt convenient.

* See the concluſion of the preceding Advertiſement.

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ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE.

PART FIRST.

PSYCHOLOGY.

9. THIS ſcience explains the nature of the ſeveral powers or faculties of the human mind. By the *faculties* of the mind, I underſtand thoſe capacities which it has of exerting itſelf in perceiving, thinking, remembering, imagining, &c.; and by the *mind* itſelf, or *ſoul*, or *ſpirit**,

* Theſe words are not ſtrictly ſynonymous; but it is needleſs to be more explicit in this place.

of man, I mean that part of the human conſtitution which is capable of perceiving, thinking, and beginning motion, and without which our body would be a ſenſeleſs, motionleſs, and lifeleſs thing. Theſe faculties were long ago divided into thoſe of PERCEPTION and thoſe of VOLITION; and the diviſion, though not accurate, may be adopted here. By the perceptive powers we are ſuppoſed to acquire knowledge; and by the powers of volition, or will, we are ſaid to exert ourſelves in action.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERCEPTIVE FACULTIES.

10. THeſe may perhaps be reduced to nine. 1. External Senſation, by which we acquire the knowledge of bodies and their qualities. 2. Conſciouſneſs, by which

which we attend to the thoughts of our minds, and which is alſo called Reflection. 3. Memory. 4. Imagination. 5. Dreaming. 6. The faculty of ſpeech, whereby we diſcover what is paſſing in the minds of one another. 7. Abſtraction, a thing to be explained by and by. 8. Reaſon, judgement, or underſtanding, by which we perceive the difference between truth and falſehood. 9. Conſcience, or the Moral Faculty, whereby we diſtinguiſh between virtue and vice, between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.

11. Whether this diſtribution of our perceptive powers be accurate, or ſufficiently comprehenſive, will perhaps appear afterwards; at preſent we need not ſtop to inquire. I ſhall conſider them, not in the order in which I have juſt now named them, but in that order that ſhall ſeem the moſt convenient. And I begin with the faculty of ſpeech: that ſubject being connected with ſome others that my hearers are already acquainted with, and therefore likely to be attended with little difficulty,

even to thoſe who are not much accuſtomed to abſtract inquiry; to which it will, for that reaſon, ſerve as a proper and eaſy introduction. But, before I proceed to it, a few remarks muſt be premiſed for the purpoſe of explaining ſome words which will frequently occur in the courſe of theſe inquiries.

SECTION I.

Some words explained.

12. THAT we exiſt, and are continually employed about a variety of things, is certain and ſelf-evident. Sometimes we perceive things themſelves; and this happens when they are ſo far preſent with us as to affect our organs or powers of ſenſation: thus we juſt now perceive light, and the other things around us. Sometimes we think of things when they are not in this ſenſe preſent with us. Thus at midnight, or when our eyes are ſhut, we can think

think of light, and the other things we have ſeen or heard during the day. When we thus think of that which we do not *perceive*, that is, which does not affect our powers of ſenſation or perception, we are ſaid, in the language of modern philoſophy, to have an *idea* or a *notion* of it. *Habere notionem rei alicujus*, is a Latin phraſe of like import.

13. The word *idea* has been applied to many purpoſes; and, from the inaccurate manner in which ſome writers have uſed it, has proved the occaſion of many errors. It has been uſed to denote *opinion*, as when we ſpeak of the *ideas* of Ariſtotle, meaning his opinions or doctrines: but this ſenſe of the word is rather French than Engliſh. Sometimes it means one's particular way of conceiving or comprehending a thing; as when we ſay, The Epicurean philoſophy, according to Cicero's *idea* of it, was very unfriendly to virtue. It was long uſed to ſignify an imaginary thing, by the intervention of which we were ſuppoſed to perceive external things, or bodies. For many ancient and modern philoſophers fancied,

fancied, that the ſoul could perceive nothing but what was contiguous to it, or in the ſame place with it; and, as the bodies we perceive *without* us are not in the ſame place with the ſoul, (for, if they were, they would all be *within* the human body), it was ſaid that we did not perceive thoſe bodies themſelves, but only *ideas* or unſubſtantial images of them, which proceeded from them, and, penetrating the human body, might be in the ſame place with the ſoul, or contiguous to it. All this is not only fiction, but unintelligible. We perceive *bodies themſelves;* and can as eaſily underſtand how the ſoul ſhould perceive what is diſtant, as how it ſhould perceive what is contiguous or near.

14. In the Platonick, and perhaps too in the Pythagorean philoſophy, *ideas* are thoſe external, ſelf-exiſtent, and uncreated models, prototypes, or patterns, according to which the Deity made all things of an eternal and uncreated matter; and which, while he employs himſelf in creation, he continually *looks upon:* whence it is ſuppoſed that the word ἰδέα (from εἶδον to ſee, or behold)

behold) is derived. Cicero gives two Latin terms corresponding to *idea*, in this ſenſe of the word; and thoſe are *ſpecies* and *forma*. The firſt (derived from the old Latin verb *Specio*, I behold) is more according to analogy; but is inconvenient, becauſe thoſe oblique caſes in the plural *ſpecierum* and *ſpeciebus* cannot be admitted into good Latin; and therefore our author prefers the other word *forma*, to whoſe plural caſes there can be no objection. Of theſe ſelf-exiſtent ideas Plato was, as Cicero ſays, marvellouſly fond; ſuppoſing that there was ſomething divine in their nature. The word *idea*, in this ſenſe of it, we ſhall not often have occaſion to repeat.

15. The ſame word has ſtill another meaning among philoſophers; having been uſed to denote a thought of the mind, which may be expreſſed by a general term, or common appellative, that is, by a noun which is not a proper name. The words *man*, *horſe*, *mountain*, &c. are ſignificant of *ideas* in this ſenſe of the term, and are general names or common appellatives, becauſe they belong equally to every man,

every

every horſe, every mountain. That this may be the better underſtood, and in order to prepare my hearers for ſome things that will immediately follow, it is proper to introduce here a few remarks on that faculty of our nature, which ſome have called abſtraction, or the power of forming general ideas by arranging things in claſſes; a faculty, which the brutes probably have not, and without which both language and ſcience would be impoſſible.

16. All the things in nature are *individual* things: that is, every thing is itſelf and one, and not another or more than one. But when a number of individual things are obſerved to reſemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a claſs, tribe, or *ſpecies*, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to every thing comprehended in the ſpecies. Thus, all animals of a certain form reſemble each other in having four feet; and therefore we conſider them as in this reſpect of the ſame ſpecies, to which we give the name *quadruped*; and this name belongs equally to every individual

dividual of the ſpecies; from the elephant, one of the greateſt, to the mouſe, one of the leaſt.

17. Again, Obſerving ſeveral ſpecies to reſemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a higher claſs, called a *genus*, to which we give a name; which name belongs equally to every ſpecies comprehended in the genus, and to every individual comprehended in the ſeveral ſpecies. Thus all the tribes of living things reſemble each other in this reſpect, that they have life; whence we refer them to a *genus* called *animal;* and this name belongs equally to every *ſpecies* of animals, to men, beaſts, fiſhes, fowls, and inſects, and to each *individual* man, beaſt, fiſh, fowl, and inſect.

18. Further, All things animated and inanimate reſemble each other in this reſpect, that they are created; whence we refer them to a genus ſtill higher, which may be called *creature:* a name which belongs equally to every *genus* and *ſpecies* of created things, and to each *individual* thing that is created. Further ſtill, All beings

whatever exiſt, or *are*, and in this reſpect may be ſaid to reſemble each other: in which view we refer them to a genus ſtill higher, called *Being*, which is the higheſt poſſible genus.

19. The Engliſh word *kind* is ſaid to have been originally of the ſame import with *genus*, and *ſort* the ſame with *ſpecies*. But the words *kind* and *ſort* have long been confounded by our beſt writers; and hence, when we would ſpeak accurately on this ſubject, we are obliged to take the words *genus* and *ſpecies* from another language. All thoſe thoughts or conceptions of the mind, which we expreſs by names ſignificant of *genera* and *ſpecies*, may be called *General Ideas*, and have been by ſome philoſophers called *Ideas* ſimply. And thoſe thoughts or conceptions, which we expreſs by proper names, or by general names ſo qualified by pronouns as to denote individual things or perſons, may be called *Singular* or *Particular Ideas*, and were by ſome Engliſh writers of the laſt century termed *Notions*. In this ſenſe of the words, one has a *notion* of *Socrates*, *Etna*, *this town*,

town, that houſe; and an *idea* of *man, mountain, houſe, town.* It were to be wiſhed, that the words *idea* and *notion* had been ſtill thus diſtinguiſhed; but they have long been applied to other purpoſes. And now *idea* ſeems to expreſs a clearer, and *notion* a fainter, conception.

20. Of the manner in which the mind forms general ideas, ſo much has been ſaid by metaphyſical writers, that without great expence of time, not even an abridgement of it could be given: and I apprehend it would not be eaſy to make ſuch an abridgement uſeful, or even intelligible. It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts muſt be ſo too. A thought therefore is ſtill but one thought; and cannot, as ſuch, have that univerſality in its appearance, which a general term has in its ſignification. In ſhort, as I underſtand the words, to have general ideas, or general conceptions, is nothing more, than to know the meaning and uſe of general terms, or common appellatives. Proper names occur in language much more ſeldom than general terms. And there-

fore, if we had not this faculty of arranging things according to their *genera* and *ſpecies*, general terms would not be underſtood, and conſequently language (as already obſerved) would be impoſſible.

21. There is another ſort of abſtraction, which affects both our thinking and our ſpeaking; and takes place, when we conſider any quality of a thing ſeparately from the thing itſelf, and ſpeak and think of it as if it were itſelf a thing, and capable of being characteriſed by qualities. Thus from *beautiful animal*, *moving animal*, *cruel animal*, ſeparate the qualities, and make nouns of them, and they become *beauty*, *motion*, *cruelty*; which are called in grammar *abſtract nouns*; and which, as if they ſtood for real things, may be characteriſed by qualities, *great beauty*, *ſwift motion*, *barbarous cruelty*. Theſe qualities, too, may be abſtracted and changed into nouns, *greatneſs*, *ſwiftneſs*, *barbarity*, &c. Of theſe abſtract nouns there are multitudes in every language.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Faculty of Speech.

22. THE philoſophy of ſpeech is an important and curious part of ſcience. In treating of it, I ſhall, firſt, explain the origin and general nature of ſpeech; and, ſecondly, conſider the Eſſentials of Language, by ſhowing how many ſorts of words are neceſſary for expreſſing all the varieties of human thought, and what is the nature and uſe of each particular ſort.

ORIGIN AND GENERAL NATURE OF SPEECH.

23. MAN is the only animal that can ſpeak. For ſpeech implies the arrangement and ſeparation of our thoughts; and this is the work of reaſon and reflection. Articulate ſounds reſembling ſpeech may be uttered by parrots, by ravens, and even by machines;

machines; but this is not ſpeech, becauſe it implies neither reflection, nor reaſon, nor any ſeparation of ſucceſſive thoughts; becauſe, in a word, the machine or parrot does not, and cannot, underſtand the meaning of what it is thus made to utter.

24. The *natural* voices of brute animals are not, however, without meaning. But they differ from ſpeech in theſe three reſpects. Firſt, Man ſpeaks by art and imitation; whereas brutes utter their voices without being taught, that is, by the inſtinct of their nature. Secondly, The voices of brutes are not ſeparable into ſimple elementary ſounds, as the ſpeech of man is; nor do they admit of that amazing variety whereof our articulate voices are ſuſceptible. And, thirdly, They ſeem to expreſs, not ſeparate thoughts or ideas, but ſuch feelings, pleaſant or painful, as it may be neceſſary, for the good of thoſe animals, or for the benefit of man, that they ſhould have the power of uttering.

25. We learn to ſpeak, by imitating the ſpeech of others; ſo that he who is born quite deaf, and continues ſo, muſt of neceſſity

ceſſity be dumb. Inſtances there have been of perſons, who had heard in the beginning of life and afterwards became deaf, uſing a ſtrange ſort of language, made up partly of words they had learned, and partly of other words they had invented. Such perſons could gueſs at the meaning of what was ſpoken to them in their own dialect, by looking the ſpeaker in the face, and obſerving the lips, and thoſe other parts of the face, which are put in motion by ſpeaking.

26. We ſpeak, in order to make our thoughts known to others. Now thoughts themſelves are not viſible, nor can they be perceived by any outward ſenſe. If therefore I make my thoughts perceptible to another man, it muſt be by means of ſigns, which he and I underſtand in the ſame ſenſe. The ſigns, that expreſs human thought ſo as to make it known to others, are of two ſorts, Natural and Artificial.

27. The Natural Signs of thought are thoſe outward appearances in the eyes, complexion, features, geſture, and voice, which accompany certain emotions of the mind,

mind, and which, being common to all men, are univerſally underſtood. For example, uplifted hands and eyes, with bended knees, are in every part of the world known to ſignify earneſt entreaty; fiery eyes, wrinkled brows, quick motions, and loud voice, betoken anger; paleneſs and trembling are ſigns of fear, tears of ſorrow, laughter of merriment, &c. Compared with the multitude of our thoughts, theſe natural ſigns are but few, and therefore inſufficient for the purpoſes of ſpeech. Hence Artificial Signs have been univerſally adopted, which derive their meaning from human contrivance, and are not underſtood except by thoſe who have been taught the uſe of them.

28. Theſe artificial ſigns may be divided into Viſible and Audible. The former are uſed by dumb men; by ſhips that ſail in company; and ſometimes by people at land, who, by means of fire and other ſignals, communicate intelligence from one place to another: but for the ordinary purpoſes of life ſuch contrivances would be inconvenient and inſufficient. And therefore

fore audible ſigns, performed by the human voice, are in all nations uſed in order to communicate thought. For the human voice has an endleſs variety of expreſſion, and is in all its varieties eaſily managed, and diſtinctly perceptible by the human ear, in darkneſs, as well as in light.

29. Human voice is air ſent out from the lungs, and by the windpipe conveyed through the aperture of the larynx, where the breath operates upon the membranous lips of that aperture, ſo as to produce diſtinct and audible ſound; in a way reſembling that in which the lips of the reed of a hautboy produce muſical ſound when one blows into them. We may indeed breathe ſtrongly, without uttering what is called voice: and, in order to transform our breath into vocal ſound, it ſeems neceſſary, that, by an act of our will, which long practice has rendered habitual, we ſhould convey a ſort of tenſeneſs to the parts through which the breath paſſes. New-born infants do this inſtinctively; which changes their breathing, when ſtronger than uſual, into crying. And

perſons in great pain do the ſame; which transforms their breathing into groans.

30. The aperture of the larynx is called the *glottis*, and, when we ſwallow food or drink, is covered with a lid called the *epiglottis*. As our voice riſes in its tone, the glottis becomes narrower, and wider as the voice becomes more grave or deep. Now any ordinary human voice may ſound a great variety of tones; and each variety of tone is occaſioned by a variation in the diameter of the glottis. And therefore, the muſcles and fibres, that miniſter to the motion of theſe parts, muſt be exceedingly minute and delicate.

31. One may uſe one's voice without articulation; as when one ſings a tune without applying ſyllables to it: in which caſe the vocal organs perform no other part than that of a wind inſtrument of muſic. But ſpeech is made up of *articulate voices*: and articulation is performed by thoſe parts of the throat and mouth, which the voice paſſes through in its way from the larynx to the open air; namely, by the tongue, palate, throat, lips, and noſtrils,

noſtrils. Speech is articulated voice: whiſpering is articulated breath.

32. Of vocal articulate ſounds the ſimpleſt are thoſe which proceed through an open mouth, and which are called Vowel Sounds. In tranſmitting theſe, the opening of the mouth may be pretty large, or ſomewhat ſmaller, or very ſmall; and thus three different vowel ſounds may be formed, each of which may admit of three varieties, according as the voice, in its paſſage through the inſide of the mouth, is acted upon by the lips, the tongue, or the throat. In this way, nine ſimple vowel ſounds may be produced. There are ten in the Engliſh tongue, though we have not a vowel letter for each. Indeed our alphabet of vowels is very imperfect. In other languages there may be vowel ſounds different from any we have: that of the French *u* is one.

33. When the voice in its paſſage thro' the mouth is *totally intercepted* by the articulating organs coming together, or *ſtrongly compreſſed* by their near approach to one another, there is formed another ſort of

articulation, which in writing is marked by a character called a conſonant. Now ſilence is the effect of a total interception of the voice, and indiſtinctneſs of ſound is produced by a ſtrong compreſſion of it. And therefore a conſonant can have no diſtinct ſound, unleſs it be preceded or followed by a vowel, or opening of the mouth.

34. The variety of conſonants, formed by a total interception of the voice, may be thus accounted for. The voice, in its paſſage through the inſide of the mouth, may be *totally intercepted* by the lips, or by the tongue and palate, or by the tongue and throat; and each of theſe interceptions may happen, when the voice is directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the noſe only, or partly by the mouth and partly by the noſe. In this way we form nine primitive conſonants; which are divided into Mutes, P, T, K; Semimutes, B, D, and G as ſounded in *egg;* and Semivowels, M, N, and that ſound of NG which is heard in *king*, and which, though we mark it by two letters, is as ſimple a ſound as any other. The Mutes are ſo called, becauſe

becauſe their ſound inſtantly and totally ceaſes on bringing the organs together; the Semimutes, becauſe a little faint ſound is heard in the noſtrils, or roof of the mouth, after the organs intercept the voice; and the Semivowels, becauſe their ſound, eſcaping through the noſtrils, may be continued for a conſiderable time after the voice is intercepted.

35. When the voice, directed to go out by the mouth only, or by the mouth and noſe jointly, is not totally intercepted, but *ſtrongly compreſſed*, in its paſſage, there is formed another claſs of conſonants, which are the aſpirations of the mutes and ſemimutes. Thus P is changed into F; B into V; T into that ſound of TH which is heard in *thing*; D into that ſound of TH which is heard in *this*, *that*, *thine*. The Semivowels do not admit of aſpiration, or at leaſt are not aſpirated in our language. And we have ſome irregular conſonants, that cannot be accounted for according to this mode of arrangement, as L and R, S, and SH; and in other tongues there may

be

be conſonant as well as vowel ſounds, with which we are not acquainted.

36. In Engliſh the ſimple elementary ſounds are thirty-two or thirty-three; namely, ten vowels, and twenty-two or twenty-three conſonants. Our alphabet, therefore, if it were perfect, would conſiſt of thirty-two or thirty-three letters. But, like other alphabets, it is imperfect, having ſeveral unneceſſary letters, and wanting ſome which it ought to have. Our ſpelling is equally imperfect; for many of our words have letters which are not ſounded at all; and the ſame letter has not in every word the ſame ſound. Hence ſome ingenious men have thought of reforming our alphabet, by introducing new letters; and our ſpelling, by ſtriking off ſuch as are unneceſſary, and writing as we ſpeak. But both ſchemes are unwiſe, becauſe they would involve our laws and literature in confuſion; and impracticable, becauſe pronunciation is liable to change, and no two provinces in the Britiſh empire have exactly the ſame pronunciation.

37. By

37. By attending to thoſe motions of the articulating organs, whereby the elementary ſounds of ſpeech are formed, an art has been invented, of teaching thoſe to ſpeak who do not hear. But it is moſt laborious, and by no means uſeful; for the articulation of ſuch perſons is ſo uncouth, as to give horror rather than pleaſure to the hearer. The time, therefore, that is employed in this ſtudy, might be laid out to better purpoſe, in teaching thoſe unfortunate perſons the uſe of written language, the art of drawing, and a convenient ſyſtem of viſible ſigns for the communication of thought. Every neceſſary letter of the alphabet might be ſignified by pointing to a certain joint of the fingers, or to ſome other part of the hand; and the more common words, by other viſible ſigns of the ſame nature: and ſuch a contrivance, when a dumb man becomes expert in it, and has learned to read and ſpell, would be of very great uſe to him.

38. By combining conſonants with conſonants, and with vowels and diphthongs,

thongs, an endleſs variety of ſyllables, and conſequently of words, may be formed. In Engliſh, excluſive of proper names and of words derived from them, the number of words does not amount to fifty thouſand; but moſt of them have ſeveral and ſome of them many ſignifications. Two vowels coaleſcing in one ſyllable, ſo as to form a double vowel ſound, make what is called a diphthong, as *ou* in *round*, *ui* in *juice*; and ſometimes a diphthongal ſound is expreſſed by a ſingle vowel letter, as *u* in *muſe*, *i* in *mind*, and ſometimes by three vowel letters, as *eau* in *beauty*, *ieu* in *lieu*.

39. As much ſpeech as we pronounce with one effort of the articulating organs, is called a Syllable. It may be, a ſingle vowel, as, *a*, *o*; or a diphthong, as *oi*; or either of theſe modified by one, or more conſonants, placed before it, or after it, or on both ſides of it; as *to*, *of*, *toy*, *oyl*, *top*, *cup*, *boil*, *broils*, *ſwift*, *ſtrength*, &c. The leaſt part of language that has a meaning is a word; and words derive their meaning from common uſe: and it is both

both our intereſt and our duty, to uſe them in the common acceptation.

40. Some words are long, and others ſhort. Thoſe that are in continual uſe, as articles, pronouns, auxiliary words, prepoſitions, and conjunctions, ought to be ſhort, and generally are ſo. Primitive words are in moſt languages ſhort; which proves, that thoſe authors are miſtaken who affirm, on the authority of ſome travellers, that barbarous languages abound in long words. Such travellers probably miſtook a deſcription or circumlocution for a ſingle word; and as the voice in ſpeaking does not make a pauſe at the end of each word, it is not unnatural for thoſe, who hear what they do not underſtand, to miſtake two or more ſucceſſive words for one. Short words do not make ſtyle inharmonious, or inſipid, unleſs they be in themſelves harſh, or of little meaning.

41. Words alone do not conſtitute ſpeech: *Emphaſis* and *Accent* belong to all languages. The former is of two ſorts; the emphaſis of words, and the emphaſis of ſyllables. The firſt is a ſtronger exer-

tion of the voice laid upon ſome words, in order to diſtinguiſh the more ſignificant parts of a ſentence. The laſt is an energy of the voice laid upon ſome ſyllables of a word more than upon others, becauſe cuſtom has ſo determined.

42. The firſt, which may be called the rhetorical emphaſis, is neceſſary to make ſpoken language perfectly intelligible. For if the ſpeaker or reader miſapply the emphaſis, by laying the force of his voice upon the leſs ſignificant, or not laying it on the more ſignificant, words, the hearer muſt in many caſes miſtake the meaning. And no perſon in reading can apply the emphaſis properly, unleſs he read ſlowly, be continually attentive, and underſtand the full import of every word he utters. Children therefore, while learning to read, ought to read nothing but what they perfectly underſtand. The emphaſis of ſpeech is by moſt grammarians called *accent*; but accent is quite a different thing.

43. Accent is the *tone* with which one ſpeaks. For, in ſpeaking, the voice of every man is ſometimes more grave in the ſound,

ſound, and at other times more acute or ſhrill. Accent is related to muſic or ſong; as appears in the formation of the Latin word, from *ad* and *cantus*, and in that of the correſpondent Greek term προσωδια, from προς and ωδη. Many people are inſenſible of the tone with which themſelves and their neighbours ſpeak; but all perceive the tone of a ſtranger who comes from a conſiderable diſtance: and if his tone ſeem in any degree uncouth or unpleaſant to them, theirs it is likely is equally ſo to him. This at leaſt is true of provincial accents. That accent, and that pronunciation, is generally in every country accounted the beſt, which is uſed in the metropolis by the moſt polite and learned perſons.

44. The Greeks uſed in writing certain marks called accents, in order to make the tones of their language of more eaſy acquiſition to foreigners: and thoſe ſtill remain in their books; but we can make no uſe of them, becauſe we know not in what way they regulated the voice. Every language, and almoſt every provincial dialect,

is diſtinguiſhed by peculiarities of tone; and nothing is more difficult than to acquire thoſe tones of language that one has not learned in early life: ſo that the native country, and even the native province, of a ſtranger, may be known by his accent; which in both public and private life is frequently an advantage.

45. We learn to ſpeak, when our organs are moſt flexible, and our powers of imitation moſt active; that is, when we are infants: and, even then, this is no eaſy acquiſition; being the effect of conſtant practice continued every day, for ſome years, from morning to night. Were we never to attempt ſpeech, till grown up, there is reaſon to think, that we ſhould never learn to ſpeak at all. And therefore, if there ever was a time when all mankind were dumb, *mutum et turpe pecus*, as Epicurus taught, all mankind muſt, in the ordinary courſe of things, have continued dumb to this day. For ſpeech could not be *neceſſary* to animals who were ſuppoſed to have exiſted for ages without it; and among ſuch animals the invention of unneceſſary

neceſſary and difficult arts, whereof they ſaw no example in the world around them, was not to be expected. And ſpeech, if invented at all by them, muſt have been invented, either by dumb infants who were incapable of invention, or by dumb men who were incapable of ſpeech. Mankind, therefore, muſt have ſpoken in all ages; the young conſtantly learning to ſpeak by imitating thoſe who were older. And if ſo, our firſt parents muſt have received this art, as well as ſome others, by inſpiration.

46. Moſes informs us, that the firſt language continued to be ſpoken by all mankind, till the building of Babel, that is, for about two thouſand years. But, on that occaſion, a miraculous confuſion of languages took place; which muſt have immediately divided the human race into tribes or nations, as they only would chooſe to keep together who underſtood one another; and which accounts for the great variety of primitive tongues now in the world. By primitive tongues I mean thoſe, which, having no reſemblance to any

any other tongue in the ſound of their words, are not ſuppoſed to be derived from any other. Greek and Latin reſemble one another not a little; whence it is probable, that both were derived from ſome primitive tongue more ancient than either. The modern languages of France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal reſemble one another very much; and we know they are in a great meaſure derived from the ancient Latin.

47. But there is no reaſon to think, that at Babel any other material alteration was introduced into human nature. And as men ever ſince have had the ſame faculties, and been placed in the ſame or in ſimilar circumſtances, it may be preſumed, that the modes of human thought muſt have been much the ſame from that time forward; and, conſequently, as ſpeech ariſes from thought, that all languages muſt have ſome reſemblance, in ſtructure at leaſt, if not in ſound. Thoſe particulars in which all languages reſemble one another, muſt be eſſential to language. The *Eſſentials of Language* I ſhall proceed to conſider,

conſider, when I have made a remark or two on ſpeech made viſible by writing.

48. A word is an audible and articulate ſign of thought: a letter is a viſible ſign of an articulate ſound. Every man can ſpeak who hears, and men have ſpoken in all ages; but in many nations the art of writing is ſtill unknown. For before men can invent writing, they muſt divide their ſpeech into words, and ſubdivide their words into ſimple elementary ſounds, aſſigning to each ſound a particular viſible ſymbol: which, though eaſy to us, becauſe we know the art, is never thought of by ſavages, and has been overlooked, or not ſufficiently attended to, by ſome nations of very long ſtanding. By means of writing, human thoughts may be made more durable than any other work of man; may be circulated in all nations; and may be ſo corrected, compared, and compounded, as to exhibit within a moderate compaſs the accumulated wiſdom of many ages. It is therefore needleſs to enlarge upon the uſefulneſs of this art, as the means of aſcertaining, methodizing, preſerving,

preſerving, and extending human knowledge.

49. There is reaſon to think, that this art muſt have been in the world from very early times, and that the uſe of an alphabet was known before the hieroglyphicks of Egypt were invented. Theſe laſt were probably contrived for the purpoſe of expreſſing myſteries of religion and government in a way not intelligible to the vulgar. For a hieroglyphick is a ſort of riddle addreſſed to the eye; as if the figure of a circle were carved on a pillar, in order to repreſent eternity; a lamp, to denote life; an eye on the top of a ſceptre, to ſignify a ſovereign. Such conceits imply refinement rather than ſimplicity, and the diſguiſe rather than the exhibition of thought; and therefore ſeem to have been the contrivance of men, who were in queſt not of a neceſſary, but of a myſterious, art; who had leiſure to be witty and allegorical; who *could* expreſs their thoughts plainly, but did not chooſe to do it.

50. In China they underſtand writing and

and printing too, and have done ſo, we are told, for many ages: but to this day they have not invented an alphabet, at leaſt their men of learning uſe none. They are ſaid to have a diſtinct character for each of their words, about fourſcore thouſand in all; which makes it impoſſible for a foreigner, and extremely difficult to a native, to underſtand their written language. In very early times, men wrote, by engraving on ſtone; afterwards, by tracing out figures with a coloured liquid upon wood, the bark of trees, the Egyptian papyrus manufactured into a ſort of paper, the ſkins of goats, ſheep, and calves made into parchment: in a word, different contrivances have been adopted in different ages, and by different nations. Pens, ink, and paper, as we uſe them, are ſaid to have been introduced into theſe parts of the world about ſix hundred years ago.

51. The firſt printing known in Europe was, like that of the Chineſe, (from whom, however, our printers did not borrow it), by blocks of wood, whereon were engra-

ved all the characters of every page. This art is ſuppoſed to have been invented in Germany, or in Flanders, about the year 1420. Printing with moveable types was found out about thirty years later, and is a very great improvement upon the former method. By means of this wonderful art, books are multiplied to ſuch a degree, that every family (I had almoſt ſaid every perſon) may now have a Bible; which, when manuſcripts only were in uſe, every pariſh could hardly afford to have; as the expence of writing out ſo great a book would be at leaſt equal to that of building an ordinary country church. This one example may ſuggeſt a hint for eſtimating the importance of the art of printing.

52. Within leſs than a century after it was invented, Printing was brought to perfection in France, by the illuſtrious Robert Stephen and his ſon Henry; who were not only the greateſt of printers, but alſo the moſt learned men of modern times; and to whom, for their beautiful and correct editions of the Claſſicks, and for their

Dictionaries

Dictionaries of the Greek and Latin tongues, every modern ſcholar is under very great obligations.

SECT. III.

Eſſentials of Language.

53. HOW many ſorts of words are neceſſary in language? And what is the nature and uſe of each particular ſort? When we have anſwered theſe two queſtions, we may be ſuppoſed to have diſcuſſed the preſent ſubject. In Engliſh, there are ten ſorts of words; which are all found in the following ſhort ſentence: "I "now ſee the good man coming, but a-"las! he walks with difficulty." *I* and *He* are pronouns; *now* is an adverb; *ſee* and *walks* are verbs; *the* is an article; *good*, an adjective; *man* and *difficulty* are nouns, the former ſubſtantive, the latter abſtract; *coming* is a participle; *but*, a conjunction; *alas*, an interjection; *with*, a prepoſition. That no other ſorts of words are neceſſary

in language, will appear, when we have ſeen in what reſpects theſe are neceſſary.

54. Of Nouns. A Noun, or, as it is leſs properly called, a Subſtantive, is the name of the thing ſpoken of. Without this ſort of word, men could not ſpeak of one another or of any thing elſe. Nouns, therefore, there muſt be in all languages. Thoſe which denote a genus, as *animal*, or a ſpecies, as *man*, may be applied either to one or to many things, and muſt therefore be ſo contrived as to expreſs both unity and plurality. But a noun which is applicable to one individual only, and which is commonly called a Proper name, cannot, where language is ſuited to the nature of things, have a plural. Proper names, therefore, when they take a plural as well as a ſingular form, ceaſe to be proper names, and become the names of *claſſes* or *tribes* of beings: ſo that, when one ſays *duodecim Cæſares*, the twelve Ceſars, the noun is uſed as an appellative common to twelve perſons. Two numbers, the ſingular and plural, are all that are neceſſary in language. Some ancient tongues, however,

ever, as the Hebrew, the Celtick, and the Attick and Poetick dialects of the Greek, have alſo a dual number to expreſs two; but this is ſuperfluous. And ſome nouns there are, in every language perhaps, that have no ſingular, and ſome that have no plural, even when there is nothing in their ſignification to hinder it: this is irregular and accidental.

55. Another thing eſſential to nouns is *Gender*, to ſignify *Sex*. All things are either male, or female, or both, or neither. Duplicity of ſex being uncommon and doubtful, language has no expreſſion for it in the ſtructure of nouns, but conſiders all things, and all the names of things, as maſculine or feminine, or as neuter; which laſt word denotes *neither* feminine nor maſculine. Of all things without ſex the names in ſome languages, particularly Engliſh, are, or may be, neuter: in Latin and Greek, and many other tongues, the gender of nouns denoting things without ſex is fixed by the termination of the noun, or by its declenſion, or by ſome other circumſtances too minute to be here ſpecified.

56. Things

56. Things without ſex have ſometimes maſculine or feminine names from a ſuppoſed analogy which they ſeem to bear to things that have ſex. Thus, on account of his great power, Death is maſculine in Greek, and in Engliſh has been called the *king* of terrors. But this does not hold univerſally. In Latin, and many other languages, Death is feminine; and in German, and ſome other nothern tongues, the ſun is feminine, and the moon maſculine. Sometimes the name of an animal ſpecies is both maſculine and feminine; which, however, implies nothing like duplicity of ſex, and means no more than that the name belongs to every individual of the ſpecies, whether male or female.

57. When the ſex of animals is obvious, and material to be known, one name is ſometimes given to the male, and another to the female; as king, queen; ſon, daughter; man, woman, &c. When the ſex is leſs obvious, or leſs important, as in inſects, fiſhes, and many ſorts of birds, one name ſerves for both ſexes, and is maſculine or feminine according to the cuſtom of

of the language. And here let it be remarked, once for all, that in what relates to the gender of nouns, and indeed in almoſt every part of the grammar of every language, certain arbitrary rules have been eſtabliſhed, which cannot be accounted for philoſophically, from the nature of the thing; which therefore it belongs not to Univerſal Grammar to conſider; and for which no other reaſon can be given, than that ſuch is the law of the language as cuſtom has ſettled it.

58. Of Pronouns. The name given to this claſs of words ſufficiently declares their nature; they being in all languages put *pro nominibus*, in the place of nouns or of names. Perſons converſing together may be ignorant of one another's names, and may have occaſion to ſpeak of things or perſons, abſent or preſent, whoſe names they either do not know, or do not care to be always repeating. Words therefore there muſt be, to be uſed inſtead of ſuch names; and withal to aſcertain the gender, ſituation, and ſome other obvious and general circumſtances of the things or perſons

ſons ſpoken of. Theſe words are called Pronouns. Some of them may introduce a ſentence, and are therefore called Prepoſitive, as *I*, *Thou*, *He*, *She*, *This*, *That*, &c. Others are termed Subjunctive or Relative, becauſe they ſubjoin a clauſe or ſentence to ſomething previous, as *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*, *who*, *which*, *that*. This ſort of pronoun has the import of both a pronoun and a copulative conjunction, and may be reſolved into *et ille*, *et illa*, *et illud*.

59. In converſation, the perſon who ſpeaks is firſt and chiefly attended to, and the perſon ſpoken to is next. Hence *Ego*, *I*, is called the pronoun of the firſt perſon; *Tu*, *Thou*, of the ſecond; and, as diſtinguiſhed from theſe, *He*, *She*, and *It* are called pronouns of the third perſon. Thoſe of the firſt and ſecond need no diſtinction of gender, as the ſex of the ſpeakers is obvious to each other from the voice, dreſs, &c. But the pronoun of the third perſon muſt have gender, *ille*, *illa*, *illud*, *he*, *ſhe*, *it*; becauſe what is ſpoken of may be abſent, and conſequently its ſex not obvious; or may be not a perſon, but a thing,

and

and conſequently of neither ſex. The pronouns of all the three perſons muſt have number; becauſe the ſpeaker, the hearer, or the thing or perſon ſpoken of, may be either one or more than one.—Pronouns are not numerous in any language, very few being ſufficient for all occaſions on which they become neceſſary. The different claſſes of them are well enough diſtinguiſhed in the common grammars.

60. Of Attributives. Theſe are words which denote the attributes, qualities, and operations, of things and perſons. They form a very numerous claſs, and were by the ancient grammarians called ῥηματα, *verba*, whatever may be ſaid or affirmed concerning perſons or things. Thus of a man it may be ſaid, that he is *good*, that he *ſpeaks*, or that he is *walking*. Attributives are of three ſorts, Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles. An Adjective, or Epithet, denotes a quality and nothing more; as *good*, *bad*, *black*, *white*. Verbs and Participles denote qualities too, but with the addition of ſomething elſe, as will appear by and by.

61. It is ſtrange, that in all the common grammars the adjective ſhould be conſidered as a noun. It is no more a noun, than it is a verb. Nay verbs and adjectives are of nearer affinity than nouns and adjectives. For the verb and adjective agree in this, that both expreſs qualities or attributes; whereas the noun is the name of the thing to which qualities or attributes belong. And therefore the term *adjective-noun* is as improper as if we were to ſay *participle-noun*, or *verb-noun*.

62. In many languages it is a rule, that the adjective muſt agree with its noun in gender, number, and caſe: and where adjectives have gender, number, and caſe, the rule is reaſonable and natural. But it is not ſo in all languages. Engliſh adjectives have neither gender nor number; but, like indeclinable Latin adjectives, (as *frugi*, *centum*, *nequam*), are invariably the ſame. We ſay, a good man, a good woman, a good thing; good men, good women, good things; without making any change in the adjective: and in this ſyntax we feel no

no inconvenience. And the ſame thing is true of Engliſh participles.

63. One variation, however, thoſe Engliſh adjectives require, which in their ſignification admit of the diſtinctions of *more* and *leſs*. This paper is white, and ſnow is white, but ſnow is whiter than this paper. Solon was wiſe, Socrates wiſer, Solomon the wiſeſt of men. The degrees are innumerable in which different things may poſſeſs the ſame quality: it is impoſſible to ſay with preciſion, how much wiſer Solomon was than Socrates, or by how many degrees ſnow is whiter than this paper. But in human art there is no infinity; and therefore we cannot in language have degrees of compariſon to expreſs all poſſible varieties of more and leſs.

64. Two degrees of compariſon, the Comparative and Superlative, are all that ſeem to be neceſſary; and, for expreſſing theſe, different nations may have different contrivances:—what is called the Poſitive degree is the ſimple form of the adjective, and expreſſes neither degree nor compariſon. Participles admit not of the variation

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we ſpeak of: when they ſeem to aſſume it, as when we ſay *doctus*, *doctior*, *doctiſſimus*, they ceaſe to be participles, and become adjectives. Some adverbs admit of this variety, as *diu*, *diutius*, *diutiſſime*. Verbs too may expreſs degrees of compariſon, but do it by means of auxiliary adverbs; as, *magis amat*, *vehementiſſime amat*.

65. The comparative degree denotes ſuperiority, and implies a compariſon of one, or more, perſons, or things, with another, or with others, that is, or are, ſet in oppoſition: Solomon was wiſer than Socrates; the Athenians were more learned than the Thebans; he is more intelligent than all his teachers. There are two Superlatives; one implying compariſon, and each denoting eminence or ſuperiority. We uſe the former when we ſay, Solomon was the wiſeſt of men; where Solomon is compared to a ſpecies of beings of whom he is ſaid to be one. We uſe the latter, when we ſay, Solomon was a very wiſe, or a moſt wiſe man. In theſe laſt ſentences, compariſon, though remotely inſinuated, is not, as in the former example, expreſsly aſſerted.

66. Of

66. Of Verbs. Man is endowed, not only with ſenſes to perceive, and memory to retain, but alſo with judgement, whereby we compare things and thoughts together, ſo as to make affirmations concerning them. When we ſay, Solomon wiſe, we affirm nothing, and the words are not a ſentence. But when we ſay, Solomon is wiſe, we utter a complete ſentence, expreſſing a judgement and an affirmation, founded on a compariſon of a certain man *Solomon*, with a certain quality *wiſe*. The judgement of the mind is here expreſſed by the affirmative word *is*; and this word is a verb. A verb, therefore, ſeems to be "a word expreſſing affirmation, and ne-"ceſſary to form a complete ſentence or "propoſition."

67. Here obſerve, that every propoſition affirms or denies ſomething; as, Snow is white, Riches are not permanent. Obſerve further, that the thing concerning which we affirm or deny is called the *ſubject* of the propoſition, namely, *Snow* in the one example, and *Riches* in the other; that what is affirmed or denied concerning the

ſubject

ſubject is called the *predicate* of the propoſition, namely, *white* in the one example, and *permanent* in the other; and that the words whereby we affirm or deny, are called the *copula* of the propoſition, namely, *is* in the one example, and *are not* in the other.—It was ſaid, that every propoſition either affirms or denies. Now denial implies affirmation; to deny that a thing is, is to affirm that it is not. In every ſentence or propoſition, therefore, there is affirmation, and a verb is that which expreſſes it. Conſequently, a verb "is neceſſary in every ſentence, and every "verb expreſſes affirmation."

68. Some affirmations have no dependence on time, with reſpect to their truth or falſehood. That God is good, that two and two are four, and that malevolence is not to be commended, always was, will, and muſt be, true. For expreſſing theſe, and the like affirmations, thoſe verbs alone are neceſſary, which the Latins call *ſubſtantive*, and the Greeks more properly *verbs of exiſtence*; as *ſum*, *fio*, *exiſto*, εἰμι, γινομαι, &c. But innumerable affirmations are

are neceſſarily connected with time: I may affirm, that a thing *was* done, *is* done, or *will be* done. In verbs, therefore, there muſt be a contrivance for expreſſing *time*. Moreover, affirmations have a neceſſary connection with a perſon or with perſons: *I*, *thou*, *he*, may affirm; *we*, *ye*, or *they* may affirm. In a verb, therefore, "affir-" mation is expreſſed, together with *time*, " *number*, and *perſon*."

69. Further: Our thoughts ſhift with great rapidity; and it is natural for us to wiſh to ſpeak as faſt as we think. No wonder then, that we ſhould often, where it can be done conveniently, expreſs two or three thoughts by one word; and particularly, that we ſhould by one word expreſs both the attribute, and the affirmation which connects that attribute with ſome perſon or thing. In this way, and partly for this reaſon, we ſay *Scribo*, I write, inſtead of *Ego ſum ſcribens*, I am writing. And thus our idea of a verb is completed. And we may now define it, " A word neceſſary in every ſentence, and " ſignifying affirmation with reſpect to " ſome

" ſome attribute, together with the deſig-
" nation of time, number, and perſon."
Thus *Scribo*, I am writing, is a complete ſentence, and comprehends theſe four things; firſt, *I* the *perſon*, and *one* perſon; ſecondly, *am* the *affirmation*; thirdly, *writing*, the *attribute*; and fourthly, *now* or preſent time.

70. But the verbs of all languages are not ſo complex: and this definition applies rather to Greek and Latin verbs, than to thoſe of the modern tongues. For we expreſs a great deal of the meaning of our verbs by auxiliary words: whereas the Greeks and Romans generally varied the meaning of theirs by *inflection*, that is, by changing the form of the word. We muſt ſay, *He might have written*, where a Roman needed only to ſay *Scripſiſſet*. Some auxiliary words indeed there are in Greek and Latin verbs, but not near ſo many as in ours. In Engliſh, French, Italian, and other modern tongues, the paſſive verb (or paſſive voice, as it is called) is entirely made up of auxiliary words introducing the paſſive participle; as, I am taught, they

they were taught, thou wilt be taught, &c.

71. This peculiarity in the ſtructure of modern verbs is to be imputed to thoſe northern nations who overturned the Roman empire, eſtabliſhing themſelves and their government in the conquered provinces; and who, being an unlettered race of men, and not caring either to learn the Latin tongue, or teach their own to thoſe whom they had conquered, formed in time a mixed language, made up partly of Latin words and partly of idioms of their own; with a great number of auxiliary words, to ſupply the want of thoſe Latin inflections, which they would not give themſelves the trouble to learn. It is not wholly improbable, that, originally, the Greek and Latin inflections were alſo auxiliary words; which came to be, by the accidental pronunciation of ſucceſſive ages, gradually incorporated with the radical part of the verbs and nouns to which they belong. This, however, is only conjecture; but it derives ſome plauſibility from the nature of the inflections of the Hebrew

tongue, many of which may be accounted for in the way here hinted at.

72. The attributes expreſſed by the verb may be reduced to four; firſt, *Being*, as *Sum, I am;* ſecondly, *Action*, as *vulnero, I wound;* thirdly, *Being acted upon*, as *vulneror, I am wounded;* and fourthly, *Being at reſt*, as *Sedeo, I ſit, habito, I dwell.* Now, without a reference to time, not one of theſe attributes can be conceived; for exiſtence, action, ſuffering, and reſt, do all imply time, and may all be referred to different parts of time. Hence the origin of the *Times* of verbs, commonly, though improperly, called the *Tenſes.* Time is paſt, preſent, or future.

73. The Tenſes are in ſome languages reckoned five. But, if we conſider the exact meaning of the ſeveral parts of the verb, we ſhall find, that, in the languages moſt familiar to us, there are eight or nine tenſes; though each may not have a particular form of the verb adapted to it. In other languages there may perhaps be more: and in ſome, the Hebrew for example, there are not near ſo many; two tenſes, the

the paſt and the future, being all that the Hebrew grammarian acknowledges; tho', as may be reaſonably imagined, means are not wanting for expreſſing in his language the import of other neceſſary tenſes.

74. Tenſes may be divided; firſt, into thoſe that are *definite with reſpect to time*, and thoſe that *with reſpect to time are indefinite or aoriſt:* ſecondly, into thoſe that *in reſpect of action are perfect*, and thoſe which *are imperfect in reſpect of action:* thirdly, into *ſimple* tenſes, expreſſive of *one time*, and *compound* tenſes, expreſſive of *more times than one.* My examples on this ſubject I take from active verbs, they being the fulleſt and moſt complete of any.

75. Tenſes *definite in reſpect of time* are, 1. The *Definite Preſent*, *Scribo*, *I write*; which refers to the preſent point of time, and to no other. 2. The *Preterperfect*, *I have written*, which generally refers to paſt time ending in or near the preſent. For this tenſe the Greeks have a particular form γεγραφα; but the Latins have not; for *Scripſi* ſignifies not only *I have written*, but alſo *I wrote* and *I did write*, which laſt are aoriſts

riſts of the paſt, as will appear preſently. 3. The *Paulo-poſt-future*, *Scripturus ſum*, *I am about to write*, which implies future time that is juſt going to commence.

76. Tenſes *indefinite in time*, or *aoriſt*, are 1. The *Indefinite preſent*, which appears in ſentences like the following; God *is* good; two and two *are* four; a wiſe ſon *makes* a glad father, &c.; in which no particular preſent time is referred to, becauſe theſe affirmations may be made with truth at all times. In Hebrew and in Erſe the import of this tenſe is expreſſed by the future; which ſometimes happens in Engliſh: for whether we ſay, A wiſe ſon *makes* a glad father, or *will make* a glad father, the ſenſe is the ſame. 2. The *aoriſt of the paſt*, ἔγραψα, *I wrote*, or *did write*; which refers to paſt time, but to no particular part of paſt time. 3. The *indefinite future*, γραψω, *Scribam*, *I ſhall write*; which in like manner refers to future time, but to no particular part of time future.

77. Tenſes *perfect or complete in reſpect of action* are, 1. The *Preterperfect*, γεγραφα, *I have written*. 2. The *aoriſt of the paſt*, ἔγραψα,

εγραψα, *I wrote.* 3. The *Pluſquamperfect*, εγεγραφειν, *Scripſeram, I had written.* 4. The *Future perfect*, *Scripſero, I ſhall have written*, or *I ſhall have done writing;* a tenſe, which the Greeks cannot expreſs in one word; and which is commonly, though very improperly, called *the future of the ſubjunctive. Scripſero* in Greek would be εσομαι γεγραφως. It is as truly of the indicative mood as *ſcribam*, or *ſcriptus ero.*

78. Tenſes *imperfect*, or *incomplete with reſpect to action*, are, 1. The *imperfect preterit* εγραφον, *Scribebam, I was writing.* 2. The *indefinite future*, *Scribam, I ſhall write.* 3. The *paulo-poſt-future*, *Scripturus ſum, I am about to write*, which in Greek is μελλω γραφειν. Obſerve, that the Greek paulo-poſt-future (ſo called in the grammars), as expreſſed by a ſingle word, is found only in the paſſive verb; γεγραψομαι, I am about to be written. Obſerve alſo, that the *imperfect preterit* often denotes in Latin cuſtomary actions; *dicebat*, he was wont to ſay, the ſame as *ſolebat dicere.*

79. *Compound* tenſes, which unite two or more times in one tenſe, are, 1. The *preterperfect*,

preterperfect, which generally, though not always, (at leaſt in Engliſh), unites the paſt with the preſent, *I have written*; where obſerve, that the auxiliary verb *I have* is of the preſent tenſe, and the participle *written* ſignifies complete action, and implies paſt time. 2. The *Pluſquamperfect*, *Scripſeram*, *I had written*, which unites paſt time with paſt time, and intimates that a certain action was finiſhed before another action which is alſo paſt. He came to deſire me not to write, but *I had written* before he came. 3. The *future perfect*, *Scripſero*, *I ſhall have done writing;* which unites preſent and paſt time with future; and intimates, that when a certain time now future ſhall come to be preſent I ſhall then have finiſhed a certain action. *Cras mane hora decima ſcripſero has literas.* To-morrow morning at ten I ſhall have finiſhed the writing of this letter. 4. The *Paulo-poſt-future*, which unites preſent with future time, as plainly appears in the Latin way of expreſſing it; *Scripturus* the participle being future, and *ſum* the auxiliary preſent.

80. Tenſes *expreſſive of one time* are, 1. The *Definite preſent*; 2. The *aoriſt of the paſt*; 3. The *indefinite future*; 4. The *imperfect preterit*; which have all been deſcribed under other characters.—In this analyſis of the tenſes, I have made their number nine. 1. The Definite preſent. 2. The Indefinite preſent. 3. The imperfect. 4. The aoriſt of the paſt. 5. The Preterperfect. 6. The Pluſquamperfect. 7. The indefinite future. 8. The paulo-poſt-future. 9. The perfect future. All theſe tenſes are not neceſſary in language; but, in moſt of the languages we know, the full import of each of them may in one way or other be expreſſed.

81. The *moods* of verbs expreſs not only our thoughts, but alſo ſomething of the intention or ſtate of mind with which we utter them. If we affirm abſolutely, we uſe the Indicative or Declarative mood; if relatively, conditionally, or dependently on ſomething elſe, it is the Subjunctive. If we declare our meaning in the form of a wiſh, it is called the Optative; if in the form of a command or requeſt, it is the Imperative.

Imperative. And if we affirm concerning what might be done, or ought to be done, it has been called the Potential. But there is no need of diſtinguiſhing moods ſo nicely.

82. They may be all reduced to two, the Indicative, which affirms abſolutely, and the Subjunctive, which affirms relatively, or with a dependence on ſomething elſe. For the Imperative is only an elliptical way of expreſſing the indicative; *go thou* being the ſame with *I entreat* or *I command* thee to go: the Potential is always either Indicative or Subjunctive: the Greek Optative is a form of the Subjunctive, and has much the ſame import: and the Infinitive is neither a mood, nor a part of the verb, becauſe it expreſſes no affirmation, and has no reference to any one perſon or number more than any other. The Infinitive expreſſes abſtractly the ſimple meaning of the verb, and does therefore in its nature reſemble an indeclinable abſtract noun; and in fact is often uſed as ſuch in moſt languages: as *Cupio diſcere*, *Studere delectat me*, *Reddas dulce loqui*, *reddas ridere decorum*.

83. Verbs

83. Verbs are divided into Active, Paſſive, and Neuter. An active verb denotes acting, as *verbero*, I beat: a paſſive verb denotes being acted upon, as *verberor*, I am beaten: a neuter verb denotes *neither* the one nor the other, and only ſignifies the ſtate or condition of the thing or perſon concerning which the affirmation is made; as *ſedeo*, I ſit, *ſto* I ſtand, *dormit* he ſleeps. Active verbs are ſubdivided into Tranſitive and Intranſitive. In the former, the action paſſes, *tranſit*, from the agent towards ſome other perſon or thing, as I *build* a houſe, I *break* a ſtone, I *ſee* a man. The latter denote action which does not paſs from the agent towards any thing elſe, as *I run*, *I walk*. This ſort of verb, when ſtrictly intranſitive, cannot aſſume a paſſive form; for where action does not paſs from the agent, there is nothing that can be ſaid to be acted upon. Nor do neuter verbs take a paſſive, becauſe nothing is acted upon where there is no action.

84. When a thing or perſon acts upon itſelf, as *Cato ſlew himſelf*, the Greeks in very early times are ſaid to have made uſe

of the *middle* verb, or middle voice; which the grammarians endeavour to prove by quoting three or four examples from Homer. The Hebrews had a like contrivance. But in moſt of the Greek books now extant the middle voice has a ſignification purely active. The verbs called Deponent, Deſiderative, Frequentative, Inceptive, &c. need not be conſidered here, being found in ſome languages only, and therefore not eſſential to ſpeech. The *imperſonal* verb is ſo called, becauſe the nominative, expreſſed or underſtood, on which it depends, is always a thing, and *never a perſon*. The nature of this ſort of verb is well enough explained in the common grammars.

85. Of Adverbs. It is the nature of the adverb, as the name imports, to give ſome additional meaning to the verb, that is, to the attributive (ſee § 60.)—to the adjective, as *valde bonus*; to the participle, as *graviter vulneratus*; to the verb, as *fortiter pugnavit*. Adverbs are alſo joined to adverbs, as *magis fortiter*, *ſat cito ſi ſat bene*; and ſometimes even to nouns; but when this is the caſe, the noun will be found to comprehend the meaning of an attributive, as

as *admodum puella*, which occurs in Livy, and ſignifies that the young woman was *very young*. Hence adverbs have been called *ſecondary attributives*, or words denoting the attributes of attributes.

86. But many of them are not of this character, and ſeem to have been contrived for no other purpoſe, but in order to expreſs, by one indeclinable word, what would otherwiſe have required two or three words, as well as a more artful ſyntax. Thus *ubi* ſignifies, *in quo loco*; *quo*, *in quem locum*; *huc*, *in hunc locum*; *diu*, *per longum tempus*, &c. Adverbs therefore, if not eſſential to ſpeech, are at leaſt very uſeful, and all languages have them, and ſome in a very great number. Too many of them, however, have in writing a bad effect, and make a ſtyle harſh and unwieldy; and the ſame thing is true of attributives in general. The ſtrength of language lies in its nouns or ſubſtantives.

87. Of Participles. The common definition of a participle is, "A word deri-" ved from a verb, and ſignifying a qua-" lity with time." This is indeed true of

the future participle active, but not of the others. *Scribens*, writing, and *ſcriptus*, written, do not of themſelves expreſs time at all, and may apply to any time, even as an adjective may do, according to the tenſe of the verb with which they are connected: I *was writing* yeſterday, I *am writing* to-day, and *ſhall be writing* to-morrow; the letter *was written*, *is written*, *will be written*. As to the future participle paſſive (as it is called) of the Latins, it generally denotes rather neceſſity or duty, than future time: *Dicit literas a ſe ſcribendas eſſe*, He ſays that a letter muſt be written by him; *Dicit literas a ſe ſcriptum iri*, He ſays that a letter will be written by him. When Cato in the ſenate ſaid *Delenda eſt Carthago*, he did not utter a prophecy of what *was to be done*, but recommended what in his opinion *ought to be done*.

88. *Written* is a paſſive participle, and denotes complete action; the letter is *written*. *Writing* is an active participle, and denotes action continuing; I *am writing* now, I *was writing* yeſterday, &c. If then it be aſked, in what reſpect the participle

ticiple differs from the verb, it may be anſwered, that the participle does not imply affirmation, which to the verb is eſſential. If again it be aſked, what diſtinguiſhes the participle from the adjective, the anſwer is this: The adjective denotes a quality ſimply, and is not neceſſarily derived from a verb; the participle is always derived from a verb, and denotes a quality or attribute, together with ſome other conſiderations relating to the continuance, completion, and futurity, of action or condition.

89. Of Interjections. Theſe words are found in all languages, though perhaps it cannot be ſaid that they are neceſſary. They are *thrown into* diſcourſe, *interjecta*, in order to intimate ſome ſudden feeling or emotion of the mind; and any one of them may comprehend the import of an entire ſentence: *alas*, I am ſorry; *ſtrange*, I am ſurpriſed; *fye*, I hate it, I diſlike it. They are well enough deſcribed and divided in any common grammar; but a little more minutely perhaps than was requiſite. Laughter is not ſpeech, but a *natural* and *inarticulate*

culate convulſion *univerſally underſtood*; and therefore, that mark in writing which denotes it can be no part of ſpeech. And as to interjections of *imprecation*, I cannot admit that in language they are either neceſſary or uſeful.—The Greeks referred interjections to the claſs of adverbs; but they are of a nature totally different; and therefore the Latins did better in making them a ſeparate part of ſpeech.—To expreſs our feelings by interjections is often natural: but too many of them, either in ſpeech or writing, have a bad effect.

90. All the ſorts of words hitherto conſidered have each of them ſome meaning, even when taken ſeparate. But there are other words, as *From*, *But*; *A*, *The*; which taken ſeparately ſignify nothing. The two firſt of theſe are neceſſary in language; the other two are rather uſeful than neceſſary: the former are called *Connectives*; the latter, *Articles* or *Definitives*. Connectives are of two ſorts, Prepoſitions, which connect words, and Conjunctions, which connect ſentences.

91. Of Prepositions. A Prepoſition

is

is a ſort of word, which of itſelf has no ſignification, but which has the power of uniting ſuch words, as the rules of a language, or the nature of things, would not allow to be united in any other way. When Prepoſitions are thus employed in uniting words, they have ſignification: like cyphers in arithmetic, which taken ſeparately mean nothing, but when joined to numbers have a very important meaning. And the ſame thing is true of Conjunctions and Articles. If I ſay, *he came town*, I join two words, which the rules of our language will not permit to unite ſo as to make ſenſe. But if I take a prepoſition and ſay, *he came to town*, or *he came from town*, I ſpeak good ſenſe and good grammar.

92. Every body has ſeen a liſt of Prepoſitions, and knows how they are uſed in ſyntax. They all expreſs ſome circumſtance relating to *place*, as *at*, *with*, *by*, *from*, *before*, *behind*, *beyond*, *over*, *under*, &c.: but in a figurative ſenſe moſt of them are alſo uſed to expreſs other relations than thoſe of place. Thus we ſay, He rules

over

over the people, He ſerves *under* ſuch a commander, He will do nothing *beneath* his character, Gratitude *beyond* expreſſion, &c. They are ſometimes prefixed to a word, ſo as to form a part of it; in which caſe they often, but not always, give it ſomething of their own ſignification. Thus, to *undervalue* is to rate a thing under or within its value; to *overcome* is to ſubdue, for men muſt be ſubdued before they allow others to go or come over them: but *to underſtand* does not mean *to ſtand under*, but *to comprehend mentally*; *to undergo* means, not *to go under*, but *to bear*, or *ſuffer*.—An Engliſh prepoſition often changes the meaning of a verb by being put after it. *To caſt*, is *to throw*; but *to caſt up* may ſignify, *to calculate*: *to give*, is *to beſtow*, but *to give over*, *to ceaſe* or *abandon*: *to give up*, *to reſign*: *to give out*, *to publiſh*, or *proclaim*, &c.

93. Some Prepoſitions appear in the beginning of words, but never ſtand by themſelves, and are therefore called *Inſeparable*. Of theſe there are five or ſix in Latin, and about twice as many in Engliſh.

Separable

Separable Prepoſitions are not a numerous claſs of words. In Latin there are about forty-five; in Greek eighteen; and in Engliſh between thirty and forty. But ſome prepoſitions have many different meanings. The Engliſh *of* has upwards of twelve; *from* has at leaſt twenty; and *for* has no fewer than thirty. See Johnſon's Dictionary.

94. In the modern languages of Europe, prepoſitions prefixed to nouns ſupply the want of *caſes; of man, to man, with man,* being the ſame with *hominis, homini, homine.* The Engliſh genitive is ſometimes diſtinguiſhed by ſubjoining *s* to the noun, as *mans life, hominis vita;* and ſome of our pronouns have an oblique caſe, as *I* which has *me, thou* which has *thee, ſhe* which has *her,* &c. With theſe and a few other exceptions, we may affirm that there are no caſes in the Engliſh tongue; and the ſame thing is true of ſome other tongues. Hence we infer, that caſes, though in Greek and Latin very important and a ſource of much elegance, are not eſſential to language.

95. Of Conjunctions. A conjunction unites two or more ſentences in one, and ſometimes marks the dependence of one ſentence upon another. If I ſay, He is good *and* he is wiſe, I unite two ſentences in one: if I ſay, He is good *becauſe* he is wiſe, I unite two ſentences as before, and alſo mark the dependence of the one, as a cauſe, upon the other, as an effect. Conjunctions ſometimes ſeem to unite ſingle words; but, when that is the caſe, each of the words ſo united will be found to have the import of a ſentence. When it is ſaid, Peter *and* John went to the temple, there is the full meaning of two ſentences, becauſe there are two affirmations, Peter went to the temple, John went to the temple.

96. Some conjunctions, while they connect ſentences, do alſo connect their meanings, making one as it were a continuation of the other; as, he went *becauſe* he was ordered: theſe are called *Conjunctive*. Others, termed *Disjunctive*, connect ſentences, while they ſeem to disjoin their meanings, and ſet, as it were, one part of a ſentence in oppoſition to another: as, Socra-

tes

tes was wiſe, *but* Alcibiades was not. Each ſort admits of ſubdiviſions, which are ſufficiently explained in the common Latin grammars.

97. OF THE ARTICLE. When a thing occurs, which has no proper name, or whoſe proper name we know not or do not chooſe to mention, we, in ſpeaking of it, refer it to its ſpecies, and call it *man*, *horſe*, *tree*, &c. or to its genus, and call it *animal*, *quadruped*, *vegetable*, &c. But the thing itſelf is neither a genus nor a ſpecies, but an individual. To ſhow, therefore, that it is an individual, we prefix an article, and call it *a man*, *a horſe*, *a tree*, &c. If this individual be unknown, or perceived now for the firſt time, or if we chooſe to ſpeak of it as unknown, we prefix what is called the *Indefinite article*, and ſay, Here comes *a* man, I ſee *an* ox: and this article coincides nearly in ſignification with the word *one*. The French, and many other nations, have a like contrivance. But, in the caſe now ſuppoſed, the Greeks would prefix no article: *a man comes* is in Greek ἀνὴρ ἔρχεται. If the individual be known to us, or if we

chooſe to ſpeak of it ſo as to intimate ſome previous acquaintance with it, we prefix the *Definite article*, *The*, as the Greeks did their ὁ ἡ τὸ; *the man comes*, ὁ ανηρ ερχεται. A correſpondent article is found in French, Italian, Hebrew, and moſt other cultivated languages, the Latin excepted.

98. That which is very eminent is ſuppoſed to be generally known: which is alſo the caſe with thoſe things and perſons, whether eminent or not, which are nearly connected with us, or which we frequently ſee: and therefore to the names of ſuch things or perſons we ſometimes prefix the ſame definite article. *A king* is any king; but *the king* is the perſon whom we acknowledge for our ſovereign. They who live in or near a town, even though it be a very ſmall one, ſpeak of it when at home by the name of *the town*.

99. Thoſe words only take the article, which are capable of being made more definite with it than they are without it. *I*, *thou*, and *he*, are as definite as they can be, and therefore never take the article. Names that denote genera and ſpecies may be

be more or leſs definite, and may therefore take the article; *a man*, *the man*, *an animal*, *the animal*. Proper names too may take it when they become common appellatives; as *the Ceſars*, *the Catos*. The proper names of ſome great natural objects, as mountains and rivers, take in Engliſh the definite article; as *the Alps*, *the Grampians*, *the Thames*. But one ſingle mountain, however great, if it have a proper name, does not take it: we ſay, Etna, Atlas, Lebanon, Olympus; not *the Etna*, &c. The Greeks ſometimes prefix their article to the proper name of a man or woman; in order, perhaps, to mark the gender of the name, or to make the expreſſion more emphatical, or merely to improve the ſound of the ſentence. This is not uſual in other languages. But the Italians ſometimes prefix their definite article to proper names of favourite poets, ſingers, and fidlers, and no doubt think that by ſo doing they give energy to the expreſſion.

100. So far is the indefinite article from being neceſſary in language, that the Greeks have nothing like it; and in Engliſh we never

never prefix it to the plural number. By the Greek poets the article is more frequently omitted than uſed; and it is alſo frequently omitted in the proſe of the Attick dialect. Sometimes we may put the one article for the other without changing the ſenſe: as, *the* proverb ſays, or *a* proverb ſays, that nothing violent laſts long. Theſe things ſeem to ſhow that articles are not very neceſſary. At other times, however, and for the moſt part, the two articles differ widely in ſignification. Thus, inſtead of, Nathan ſaid unto David, Thou art *the* man, if we were to ſay, Thou art *a* man, we ſhould entirely change the meaning of the paſſage.

101. In Latin, there is no article; its place, when it is neceſſary, being ſupplied by a pronoun, as *ille* and *ipſe*. And this ſeems to be ſufficient. The laſt example, tranſlated thus, *Dixit Nathan Davidi, Tu es ille homo*, or *Tu es ille*, is as ſignificant in Latin as in Engliſh. Sometimes, by prefixing the definite article to a noun, we beſtow a peculiar ſignification upon it. In Greek, ἀνθρωπος is *a man*, but ὁ ἀνθρωπος is, in the

the Attick dialect, the public executioner. In Engliſh, *a ſpeaker* is any perſon who ſpeaks; but *the ſpeaker* is he who preſides in the Houſe of Commons.

162. And now it appears, that in Latin there are nine ſorts of words, the Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Interjection, Prepoſition, and Conjunction. In Greek, Hebrew, Engliſh, and many other languages, there is alſo an article, and conſequently there are ten parts of ſpeech. The Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Participle, Prepoſition, and Conjunction, ſeem to be eſſential to language; the Article, Interjection, and moſt of the Adverbs, are rather uſeful than neceſſary. So much for the Faculty of Speech, and Univerſal Grammar.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Perception or External Senſation.

103. AS this ſubject is connected with Natural Philoſophy, I ſhall make but a few ſlight remarks upon it; with a view chiefly to ſome things that are to follow.—The ſoul, uſing the body as its inſtrument, perceives external things, that is, bodies and their qualities. All animals have this faculty in a greater or leſs degree, and all complete animals in that preciſe degree which is neceſſary to their life and well-being. Corporeal things, when within the ſphere of our perceptive powers, and attended to by us, affect our organs of ſenſe in a certain manner, and ſo are perceived by the ſoul or mind. We know that this is the fact, but cannot explain it, or trace the connection that there is between our minds and impreſſions made on our bodily organs; being ignorant of the nature of that union which ſubſiſts between

tween the ſoul and its body. Our perception of bodies is accompanied with a belief, that they exiſt and are what they appear to be, and that we perceive the bodies themſelves: and this belief is unavoidable, and amounts to abſolute certainty. We cannot prove by argument, that bodies exiſt, or that we ourſelves exiſt; nor is it neceſſary that we ſhould: for the thing is ſelf-evident, and the conſtitution of our nature makes it impoſſible for us to entertain any doubt concerning this matter.

104. It would be a taſk equally tedious and unprofitable, to explain the notions of philoſophers with reſpect to the manner in which the mind has been ſuppoſed to perceive things external. Ariſtotle fancied, that, by means of our ſenſes, outward things communicate to the mind their form without their matter; as the ſeal imparts to the wax the figures carved on it, without the ſubſtance. Theſe forms of things, in their firſt appearance to the mind, he calls *ſenſible ſpecies*; which, as retained by the memory, or exhibited in the imagination, he terms *Phantaſms*. And theſe phantaſms,

when by the operation of the intellect they are refined into general ideas, he calls *intelligible ſpecies*. For example: I ſee a man; this perception is the ſenſible ſpecies. I afterwards remember his appearance; or perhaps his appearance occurs to my mind, without my remembering, or conſidering that I had perceived it before: this is a phantaſm. Laſtly, my intellect, taking away from this phantaſm every thing that diſtinguiſhes it from others, and retaining ſo much of it only as it has in common with a kind or ſort, (ſee § 19.), transforms it into an intelligible ſpecies, or general idea, which we expreſs by the common appellative *man*. All this ſeems to imply, that a thought of the mind has ſomething of body in it, and conſiſts of parts that may be ſeparated: which to me is inconceivable.

105. Moſt modern philoſophers give an account of this matter in words that are indeed different, but ſeem to amount to the ſame thing. They will not admit that the mind can perceive any thing which is not in the mind itſelf, or at leaſt in the ſame

ſame place with it. Now the ſun, moon, and ſtars, and the other things external to us, are neither in the mind, nor in the ſame place with it; for if they were, they would be in the inſide of the human body. External things themſelves, therefore, our mind, we are told, does not perceive at all; but it perceives *ideas* of them, which ideas are actually in the ſame place with the mind; either in the brain, or in ſomething which has got the name of *ſenſorium*, in which the percipient being called the ſoul, or mind, is ſuppoſed to have its reſidence. See § 13.

106. When it was objected, That, on the ſuppoſition of our perceiving, not outward things themſelves, but only ideas of them, we cannot be certain that outward things exiſt, the ſame philoſophers, or rather their ſucceſſors in the ſame ſchool, admitted the objection; and came at laſt to affirm, that the ſoul perceives nothing but its own ideas; and that the ſun and moon, the ſea and the mountains, the men and other animals, and, in a word, the whole univerſe which we ſee around us, has no ex-

iſtence but in the mind that perceives it. Never were reaſon and language more abuſed than by this extravagant theory; which, inſtead of illuſtrating any thing, involves a plain fact in utter darkneſs; and, by teaching that our ſenſes are fallacious faculties, leads, as will appear hereafter, to the final ſubverſion of all human knowledge.—The doctrine already laid down muſt therefore remain as it is. We perceive outward things themſelves, and believe that they exiſt, and are what they appear to be. This is the language of common ſenſe, and the belief of all mankind. This we muſt believe whether we will or not: and this even thoſe who deny it muſt take for granted; otherwiſe they could not know how to act on any one emergence of life. And that the mind may perceive things at a diſtance, is as intelligible to us, as that it can perceive its own ideas.

107. The powers, by which the ſoul, uſing the body as its inſtrument, perceives outward things and their qualities, are called Senſes, and commonly reckoned five. Taſtes or reliſhes are referred to the ſenſe

of Taſting, and perceived by means of the tongue. Odours are referred to Smelling, the organ of which is the inner part of the noſe. Sounds are perceived by the ſenſe of Hearing, the organ whereof is the inner part of the ear. By means of the eye we perceive light and colours. All other bodily ſenſations are referred to Touch, the organs whereof are diffuſed over the whole body.

108. Taſtes and ſmells, as perceived by the mind, bear no reſemblance to the bodies that produce them; nor is there always a likeneſs between the taſtes and ſmells of ſimilar bodies; for ſalt and ſugar may be very like in appearance, and yet are very unlike in other reſpects. The nature, therefore, of any particular taſte or ſmell is known by experience only. Taſtes and ſmells are innumerable; yet we have but few words to expreſs them by, as *ſour*, *ſweet*, *bitter*, *acid*, *muſty*, &c.; and ſome of theſe words are applied both to taſtes and to ſmells: a proof, that theſe two ſenſes are kindred faculties, and that the ſenſations we receive by them are ſomewhat ſimilar;

ſimilar; which alſo appears from the poſition of the organs, and from this well-known fact, that thoſe perſons who have no ſmell have never an acute taſte.

109. On applying a body to our tongue and noſtrils, we diſcover its taſte and ſmell; the mind being, in conſequence of this application, affected in a certain manner, by means of nerves or other minute organs. But what connects theſe organs with the mind, or why one body thus applied ſhould convey to the mind the ſenſation of ſweetneſs, and another that of ſalt or acid, it is impoſſible for man to explain.—Theſe two ſenſes are neceſſary to life, becauſe they direct us in the choice of what is fit to be eaten and drank; and the form and ſituation of their organs are the beſt that can be for this purpoſe. They are alſo inſtruments of pleaſure, in a low degree indeed, but ſtill in ſome degree. And they enlarge the ſphere of our knowledge, by making us acquainted with two copious claſſes of ſenſible things diſcoverable by no other faculty. To many animals ſmell is neceſſary to lead them to their prey or food;

food; and to man it sometimes gives notice of fire and wild beasts, and other dangerous things, which could not otherwise have been discovered till it was too late. And it recommends cleanliness, whereby both health of body and delicacy of mind are greatly promoted.

110. The word *taste*, as the name of an external sense or of a quality of body, has three different significations, which must be carefully distinguished. It means, first, a quality of body which exists in the body whether perceived or not: thus we speak of the *taste* of an apple. Secondly, it denotes a faculty in the mind, which faculty is exerted by means of the tongue, and which is always in the mind whether it be exerted or not; for no man imagines, that when he tastes nothing he has lost the power or faculty of tasting. In this sense we use the word when we say, I have lost my smell by a cold, and therefore my *taste* is not so acute as usual. Thirdly, it signifies a sensation as perceived by the mind, and which exists only in the mind that perceives it, and no longer than while it is perceived:

perceived: in this ſenſe we ſometimes uſe the word when we ſpeak of a ſweet or bitter *taſte*, a pleaſant or unpleaſant *taſte*, an agreeable or diſagreeable *taſte*. The ſame threefold ſignification belongs to the words *ſmell*, *ſight*, and ſeveral others; which are uſed to denote an external thing, the faculty which perceives that thing, and the perception itſelf as it affects the mind.

111. Natural Philoſophy teaches, that all ſounding bodies are tremulous, and convey to the air an undulatory motion, which, if continued till it enter the inner part of the ear, raiſes in the mind a ſenſation called *ſound*; which bears no reſemblance either to body or to motion; which is not perceived by any other ſenſe; and which, being a ſimple feeling, cannot be defined or deſcribed, and is known by experience only. By experience alſo we learn, that all ſounds proceed from bodies: and by attending to different ſounds, as proceeding from bodies different in kind or differently ſituated, we are, in many caſes, enabled to judge, on hearing a ſound, what the ſounding body is, and whether it

it be near or diſtant, on the right hand or on the left, before or behind us, above or under.

112. Sounds may be variouſly divided; into ſoft and loud; acute and grave; agreeable, diſagreeable, and indifferent. And each of theſe ſorts may be ſubdivided into Articulate and Inarticulate. Articulate ſounds conſtitute ſpeech, whereof we have treated already. Inarticulate ſounds may be divided into muſical ſound and noiſe. Of muſical ſounds and their effects upon the mind, I ſhall ſpeak hereafter; obſerving only at preſent, that their intervals are determined by the natural riſings and fallings of the human voice in ſinging; and that, when *we* call ſome of them high and others low, it ſeems to be with a view to the high or low ſituation of their correſpondent ſymbols in our muſical ſcale *.

Indeed

* It has been ſaid, that in forming a *grave* tone our breath or voice ſeems to riſe from the *lower* part of the throat, and from the *upper* part in forming an *acute* tone. This is no improbable account of the origin of the terms *high* and *low* as applied to muſical ſound. It may, however, be

Indeed moſt of the epithets, which we apply to ſound, are in that application *figurative*. *High* and *low*, *ſoft*, *acute*, *grave*, and *deep*, in their original and *proper* ſignification refer to objects, not of hearing, but of touch.

113. The ear is the great inlet to knowledge. Deaf men muſt always be very ignorant: but a man born blind, who hears, may learn many languages, and underſtand all ſciences except thoſe that relate to light and colours; and even of theſe he may in ſome meaſure comprehend the theory. The importance of this ſenſe to our preſervation is obvious. A deaf man in the company of thoſe who hear, and a blind man with thoſe who ſee, may live not uncomfortably: but, in order to judge of the value of a ſenſe, we ought to conſider what would be the conſequence, if

remarked, that the more antient Greek writers conſidered *grave* tones as *high*, and *acute* tones as *low*. See *Smith's Harmonicks*, *ſect.* 1. The antient Latin writers probably did the ſame. May not this have been owing to the ſituation of the ſtrings on ſome of their muſical inſtruments?

all

all mankind were to be deprived of it, or had never been endowed with it.

114. The eye is the organ of ſeeing, and its objects are light and colours. Bodies become viſible by means of light, of which, in order to viſion, ſome animals require more and others leſs, but all require ſome. The threefold ſignification of the word *ſight* was formerly hinted at: it means the thing ſeen, the faculty of ſeeing, and the ſenſation or act of ſeeing. This laſt we may put an end to, by ſhutting our eyes; but the viſible object exiſts, whether we ſee it or not; and the faculty of ſeeing remains in the mind when it is not exerted. No man imagines, that by ſhutting his eyes he annihilates light, or his power of ſeeing it; but every man knows, that by ſhutting his eyes he puts an end to the act of ſeeing, and renews it again when he opens them. When I ſay, My *ſight* is weak, the noun denotes the power or faculty of ſeeing: when I ſay, I ſee a ſtrange *ſight*, the ſame word denotes the thing ſeen: and when I add, that I have a confuſed or indiſtinct *ſight* of it, the word

ſignifies the ſenſation or act of ſeeing. What is neceſſary to diſtinct viſion muſt have been explained to you in Opticks, and needs not be repeated here.

115. Colours inhere not in the coloured body, but in the light that falls upon it: and a body preſents to our eye that colour which predominates in the rays of light reflected by it: and different bodies reflect different ſorts of rays, according to the texture and conſiſtency of their minute parts. Now the component parts of bodies, and the rays of light, are not in the mind; and therefore colours, as well as bodies, are things external: and the word *colour* denotes, always an external thing, and never a ſenſation in the mind.

116. The motion of the two eyes is nearly parallel; and yet the muſcles that move the one are not connected with thoſe that move the other. A picture of the viſible object is formed in the retina of each eye; and yet the mind ſees the object not double but ſingle. The images in the retina are both inverted; and yet the object is ſeen, not inverted, but erect.—Theſe facts

facts are by ſome writers ſo explained, as if we, at firſt, moved our eyes in different directions, and ſaw objects inverted and double; and afterwards, by the power of habit, came to ſee things as we now do, and to move our eyes as we now move them. But this theory is liable to unanſwerable objections; for which my hearers are referred to the latter part of Dr Reid's *Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common ſenſe*.—The motion of the eyes is parallel from the firſt; unleſs where there happens to be convulſion or diſeaſe. And it is probable, that, when an infant can with his eye take in all the parts of a viſible object, he ſees it, as we do, erect and ſingle. Nor is it more ſtrange, that the mind, by means of an inverted and double image, ſhould ſee an object erect and ſingle, than that it ſhould perceive a viſible thing by the intervention of an image, whereof it is not conſcious, which is not known to the greater part of mankind, which can only be diſcovered by very nice experiments, and which was never heard

heard of till Kepler found it out about the middle of the laſt century.

117. Every part of the body being an inſtrument of touch, we cannot pretend to enumerate the objects and organs of this ſenſe. Heat and cold, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, hunger and thirſt, the pain of wearineſs, and the pleaſure of reſt, and, in a word, all bodily ſenſations, are referred to touch, except thoſe of ſmell, taſte, ſound, colour, and light.—In modern philoſophy it has been made a queſtion, whether diſtance, magnitude, and figure, be perceived by ſight, by touch, or by both. The queſtion belongs to Opticks; and the truth ſeems to be this: Diſtance, Magnitude, and Figure, are originally *perceived*, not by ſight, but by touch; but we learn to *judge of them* from the informations of ſight, by having obſerved, that certain viſible appearances do always accompany and ſignify certain diſtances, magnitudes, and figures.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Of Conſciouſneſs or Reflection.

118. BY this faculty we attend to and perceive what paſſes in our own minds. It is peculiar to rational beings, for the brutes ſeem to have nothing of it. In exerting it, the mind makes no uſe of any bodily organ, ſo far as we know. It is true, that the body and mind do mutually operate on each other; that certain bodily diſorders hurt the mind; and that certain energies of the mind affect the body. This proves them to be intimately connected; but this does not prove, that any one bodily part is neceſſary to conſciouſneſs in the ſame manner as the eye, for example, is neceſſary to ſeeing.

119. Of the things perceived by this faculty, the chief is the mind itſelf. Every man is conſcious, that he has within him a thinking active principle called a ſoul or mind. And this belief ſeems to be univerſal;

verſal; ſo that if a man were to ſay, that he was not conſcious of any ſuch thing, the world would ſuſpect him of either falſehood or inſanity. Nay the general acknowledgement of the immortality of the ſoul, or of its exiſting after the diſſolution of the body, (an opinion which in one form or other is found in all nations), proves, that it is natural for mankind to conſider the human ſoul and body as ſubſtances ſo diſtinct, that the former may live, and be happy or miſerable, without the other.

120. Every man alſo believes, and holds himſelf to be abſolutely certain, that, whatever changes his body may undergo in this life, his ſoul always continues one and the ſame. A temporary ſuſpenſion of all our faculties may happen in deep ſleep, or in a ſwoon; but we are certain, when we awake or recover, that we are the ſame perſons we were before. In many things, both natural, as vegetable and animal bodies; and artificial, as ſhips and towns, the ſubſtance may be changed, and yet the thing be ſuppoſed to continue the ſame; becauſe called by the ſame name; ſituated

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in the ſame place; applied to the ſame purpoſe; or having its parts ſo united, that, though new ſubſtance may have been added from time to time, or ſome of the old taken away, there never was any change of the whole ſubſtance made at once. But the human ſoul is always the ſame; its ſubſtance being incorporeal, as will be ſhown hereafter, and conſequently indiviſible.

121. The things perceived by conſciouſneſs do as really exiſt, are as important, and may as well ſerve for the materials of ſcience, as external things and bodily qualities. What it is to think, to remember, to imagine, to be angry or ſorrowful, to believe or diſbelieve, to approve or diſapprove, we know by experience, as well as what it is to ſee and hear. And truth and falſehood, virtue and vice, are as real as ſounds and colours, and much more eſſential to human happineſs. Accordingly, in all cultivated languages, there are words to expreſs memory, imagination, reaſon, conſcience, true and falſe, juſt and unjuſt, right and wrong, &c.; which is a proof,

that in all nations, not utterly barbarous, ſuch things are attended to, and ſpoken of, as matters of importance. So much for conſciouſneſs in general. We are now to conſider more particularly the ſeveral faculties comprehended in it. And firſt of Memory.

SECT. VI.

Of Memory.

122. THIS is that faculty, by which we acquire experience and knowledge; and without which we ſhould at the end of the longeſt life be as ignorant as at its beginning. Memory preſents to us ideas or thoughts of what is paſt, accompanied with a perſuaſion that they were formerly real and preſent. What we diſtinctly remember to have ſeen we as firmly believe to have happened, as what is now preſent to our ſenſes.

123. A ſound ſtate of the brain is no doubt neceſſary to the right exerciſe of both

both memory and judgement. And hence perhaps it is, that ſome philoſophers have held, that all our perceptions and thoughts leave upon the brain certain marks or traces, which continue there for ſome time, and when attended to by the mind occaſion remembrance; but that, when the brain is diſordered by drunkenneſs, or any other diſeaſe, ſo as not to receive or retain ſuch marks, or ſo as to receive or retain them imperfectly, there is then no remembrance, or a confuſed one. But this is mere conjecture, incapable of proof, and indeed abſurd. For how thoughts of the mind, which are ſurely no corporeal things, ſhould leave upon the brain, which is corporeal, particular ſtamps, variouſly ſized and ſhaped according to the nature of the thoughts, and how the mind ſhould take notice of thoſe ſtamps, or remember by means of them, is altogether inconceivable. We know that we do remember; but of the immediate cauſe of remembrance we know nothing.

124. When we remember with little or no effort, it is called remembrance ſimply,

or memory, and ſometimes paſſive memory: when we endeavour to remember what does not immediately and (as it were) of itſelf occur, it is called active memory or Recollection. A ready recollection of our knowledge, at the moment when we have occaſion for it, is a talent of the greateſt importance. The man poſſeſſed of it is generally of good parts, and ſeldom fails to diſtinguiſh himſelf, whatever ſort of buſineſs he may be engaged in. But ſome perſons, who are remarkable for what is here called paſſive memory, and can remember all the words of a long diſcourſe on once hearing it, are in other reſpects of no great abilities. Brutes have memory, but of recollection they ſeem to be incapable; for this requires rationality, and the power of contemplating and arranging our thoughts. Great memory is perhaps neceſſary to form great genius, but is not always a proof of it.

125. The livelieſt remembrance is not ſo lively as the ſenſation that produced it; and ideas of memory do often, but not always, decay more and more, as the origi-

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nal ſenſation becomes more and more remote in time. Thoſe ſenſations, and thoſe thoughts, have a chance to be long remembered, which are lively at firſt; and thoſe are likely to be moſt lively, which are moſt attended to, or which are accompanied with pleaſure or pain, or with wonder, ſurpriſe, curioſity, merriment, and other lively paſſions.

126. The art of memory, therefore, is little more than the art of attention. What we wiſh to remember we ſhould attend to ſo as to underſtand it perfectly, fixing our view particularly upon its importance or ſingular nature; that it may raiſe within us ſome of the paſſions above mentioned: and we ſhould alſo beforehand diſengage our mind from other things, that we may the more effectually attend to the new object which we wiſh to remember; that being apt to be forgotten which occurs to us when we are taken up with other things. The memories of children ſhould be continually exerciſed; but to oblige them to get by heart what they do not underſtand, perverts their faculties, gives them a diſlike

to learning, and confirms them in habits of inattention, and inaccurate pronunciation.

127. A habit of ſtrictly attending to that, whatever it is, in which we happen to be engaged, and of doing only one thing at one time, is of great importance to intellectual improvement. It produces clearneſs and readineſs of comprehenſion, preſence of mind, accuracy of knowledge, and facility of expreſſion. Attention to our company is a principal part of politeneſs, and renders their converſation and behaviour both amuſing and inſtructive to us. We ought therefore to be conſtantly on our guard againſt contracting any of thoſe habits of indolence, or a wandering mind, which, when long perſiſted in, form what is called an abſent man.

128. Our thoughts have for the moſt part a connection; ſo that the thought which is juſt now in the mind, depends partly upon that which went before, and partly ſerves to introduce that which follows. Hence we remember beſt thoſe things whoſe parts are methodically diſpo-

ſed,

ſed, and mutually connected. A regular diſcourſe makes a more laſting impreſſion upon the hearer than a parcel of detached ſentences, and gives to his rational powers a more ſalutary exerciſe: and this may ſhow us the propriety of conducting our ſtudies, and all our affairs, according to a regular plan or method. When this is not done, our thoughts and our buſineſs, eſpecially if in any degree complex, ſoon run into confuſion.

129. The Greek and Roman orators, who ſometimes had occaſion to deliver very long orations, and all from memory, took pains to fix in their minds a ſeries of objects or places naturally connected, ſuch as the contiguous houſes in a ſtreet, or the contiguous apartments in a houſe. By long habit, theſe places were ſo arranged in their memory, that when the firſt place occurred to them, it introduced the idea of the ſecond, and the ſecond the third, and ſo forward; even as when the firſt letter of the alphabet, or the beginning of a well-known tune, occurs to the mind, it introduces the ſubſequent letters and notes

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in the proper order. Then the orator connected the firſt head of his diſcourſe with the firſt of theſe places, the ſecond with the ſecond, &c. by thinking of both at the ſame time. And thus they were enabled to recollect, without confuſion, all the parts of the longeſt diſcourſe. This was called the Artificial Memory. Cicero and Quintilian both ſpeak of it, but neither of them ſo minutely as to make it perfectly intelligible, at leaſt to me: nor do I know that any modern orator has ever made uſe of it. It ſeems indeed to have been a laborious way of improving memory; as Quintilian himſelf acknowledges. In alluſion to it, we ſtill call the parts of a diſcourſe *places* or *topicks*, and ſay, *In the firſt place*, *In the ſecond place*, &c.

130. What we perceive by two ſenſes at once has a good chance to be remembered. Hence to read aloud, ſlowly, and with propriety, when one is accuſtomed to it, contributes greatly to remembrance. And that which we write in a good hand, without contractions, with dark-coloured ink, exactly pointed and ſpelled, in ſtrait lines with

with a moderate ſpace between them, and properly ſubdivided into paragraphs as the ſubject may require, is better remembered than what we throw together in confuſion. For, by all theſe circumſtances, attention is fixed, and the writing, being better underſtood, makes a deeper impreſſion. Thoſe things alſo, which are related in two or more reſpects, are more eaſily remembered than ſuch as are related in one reſpect only. Hence, by moſt people, verſe is more eaſily remembered than proſe, becauſe the words are related in meaſure as well as in ſenſe; and rime than blank verſe, becauſe the words are related not only in ſenſe and meaſure, but alſo by ſimilar ſounds at the end of the lines. And, in general, elegant and harmonious language is better remembered, than what is harſh and incorrect.

131. Memories differ greatly both in kind and in degree. One man remembers beſt one ſort of things, and another another; which may in part be owing to habits contracted of attending to one ſort of things more than to another: and this may be aſſigned as one cauſe of the varieties of genius that are obſervable

ſervable among mankind. In the early part of life, memory is commonly ſtrong; for then the mind is diſengaged, curioſity active, the ſpirits high, and the agreeable paſſions predominant. Infants eaſily remember, and as eaſily forget. A child of ſix years, going into a foreign country, acquires the new language, and forgets his own, in a few months. Moſt things are eaſily learned in the firſt part of life, eſpecially languages. In mature age, curioſity is abated, and the ſpirits leſs lively than in youth: but men are then more capable of ſtrict attention, and both the memory and the judgement muſt be conſiderably improved by experience and long exerciſe. In old age, curioſity is ſtill more abated, and few things yield amuſement, or are much attended to; and therefore memory is for the moſt part weak, except in regard to tranſactions long ſince paſt, or peculiarly ſuited to the preſent diſpoſition.

132. To improve this faculty, we muſt, as already obſerved, cultivate habits of ſtrict attention, not only when we read books, or hear diſcourſes, but alſo in converſation, and in every part of our daily buſineſs.

buſineſs. It will alſo be prudent to ſtudy according to a plan, to diſpoſe our affairs methodically, and to ſtudy nothing but what may be uſeful. To read a great variety of books is not neceſſary; but thoſe we read ſhould all be good ones; and we ſhall do well to read them ſlowly and conſiderately, often recollecting what we have read and meditating upon it; and we ſhould never leave a good author till we be maſters of both his language and his doctrine. A liſt will be given hereafter of ſome of thoſe books in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh, that deſerve to be ſtudied in this accurate manner. For, as Bacon well obſerves, "ſome books are to be read only "in parts; others to be read, but not cu-"rioufly; and *ſome few* to be read whol-"ly, with diligence and attention." There is much good ſenſe in the following aphoriſm of the ſame great author: "Reading "makes a full man, writing an exact man, "and converſation a ready man."

133. It is hardly credible to what a degree both active and paſſive remembrance may be improved by long practice. There are clergymen who can get a ſermon by

heart in two hours, though their memory, when they began to exerciſe it, was rather weak than ſtrong. And pleaders, and other orators who ſpeak in public and *extempore*, often diſcover, in calling inſtantly to mind all the knowledge neceſſary on the preſent occaſion, and every thing of importance that may have been advanced in the courſe of a long debate, ſuch powers of retention and of recollection as, to the man who has never been obliged to exert himſelf in the ſame manner, are altogether aſtoniſhing.

134. Frequently to reviſe our knowledge; to talk about it when we have a convenient opportunity, that is, when we are in the company of thoſe who may wiſh to hear us talk about it; to teach it to others; to reduce it to practice as much as poſſible; and to ſet down in writing, not on looſe papers, but in books kept for the purpoſe, whatever may occur to us on any ſubject, would greatly improve both our memory and our judgement. To tranſcribe literally from books is of little uſe, or rather of none; for it employs much time, without improving any one of our faculties.

ties. But to write an abridgement of a good book may ſometimes be a very profitable exerciſe. In general, when we would preſerve the doctrines, ſentiments, or facts, that occur in reading, it will be prudent to lay the book aſide, and put them in writing in our own words. This practice will give accuracy to our knowledge, accuſtom us to recollection, improve us in the uſe of language, and enable us ſo thoroughly to comprehend the thoughts of other men as to make them in ſome meaſure our own.

135. The memory of brutes ſeems to ſerve them no further, than is neceſſary to the preſervation of them and their offſpring, and for making them uſeful to man. In ſome of them it is attended with extraordinary circumſtances. Bees, for example, can ſee but a very little way before them, as appears from the extreme convexity of their eyes: and yet find their way, from a long excurſion, to their reſpective homes, and ſeldom or never miſtake a neighbouring hive for their own. In this they muſt be guided, not only by memory, but alſo by ſmell, or rather by ſome other inſtinct whereof

whereof we have no conception. Yet, with all the helps that he derives from inſtinct, or from more acute organs of ſenſe, the memory of the moſt ſagacious brute is to that of men almoſt infinitely inferior. Many brutes are quite untractable; of ſuch the memory muſt be very limited. Thoſe that are docile ſoon reach the height of improvement; and the arts and habits which it is in our power to impreſs upon them are but few. Deſtitute of conſciouſneſs, of reaſon, of recollection, of converſation, and of the powers of invention and arrangement, the extent of their knowledge muſt be extremely ſmall, and their memory proportionable. Of abſtract notions in regard to truth and falſehood, virtue and vice, elegance and deformity, proportions in quantity and number, law, government, religion, commerce, and other ſciences and arts, which are the moſt important parts of human knowledge, they are utterly ignorant: nor can they ever know any thing of what has happened in time paſt, is likely to happen in the time to come, or is now happening at a diſtance.

136. But

136. But to the power of human memory, and to the poſſible extent of human knowledge, we can ſet no bounds. And what is very remarkable, the more real knowledge we acquire, the greater is our deſire of knowledge, and the greater our capacity of receiving it. In a word, we ſeem to be ſuſceptible of endleſs improvement: which is a proof, not only of the immenſe ſuperiority of our nature to that of other animals, but alſo that our ſouls are formed for endleſs duration.

SECT. VII.

Of Imagination.

137. I *Remember* to have ſeen a lion; I can *imagine* a griffin or a centaur though I never ſaw one:—he who uſes theſe words with underſtanding *knows* the difference between imagination and memory, though perhaps he may not be able to *explain* it. When we remember, we have a view to real exiſtence and paſt experience: when

when we *imagine*, we contemplate a notion or idea ſimply as it is in itſelf, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to paſt experience or to real exiſtence. Some writers limit the word *imagination* to the mental conception of *images* or things viſible; and this may perhaps have been the original meaning of the word: but the modern uſe of language will juſtify that more general application of the term which is here given. For it would be improper to ſay, that men born blind muſt be deſtitute of imagination: ſuch men may ſurely *invent* as well as *dream;* it is well known they can do both: and both invention and dreaming are referred to this faculty. Imagination employed in its more trivial exertions is often called Fancy. A ſublime poet is a man of vaſt imagination: a witty author is a perſon of lively fancy.

138. That we may ſee more particularly the nature of the faculty in queſtion, it is proper to obſerve here, that all things may be divided into *ſimple* and *complex*. The former do not ſeem to conſiſt of parts that can be ſeparated; and ſuch are our ſenſations

tions of heat, cold, hunger, thirſt, or of any particular ſound, or ſimple colour. Complex things conſiſt of parts, which may be ſeparated and conceived ſeparately: ſuch are all bodies. Now all our ſimple ideas, that is, all our notions of ſimple objects, are derived from experience: a man muſt have *ſeen* colour, and light, and *heard* ſound, and *felt* the pain of hunger, before he can conceive what thoſe things are. But complex ideas, or notions of complex objects, the mind can form for itſelf, by ſuppoſing a number of ſimple or complex notions or things combined together in one aſſemblage. When ſuch complex ideas are not derived from memory, we refer them to the imagination. No man ever ſaw a mountain of ivory; but he, who has ſeen ivory and a mountain, may eaſily *imagine* the ſubſtance of the one extended to the ſize and ſhape of the other, and thus form the idea of an ivory mountain.

139. Memory ſuggeſts nothing to us but what we have really perceived; ſo that a being endowed with memory, but deſtitute of imagination, could never invent

any thing: as all invention implies novelty, and that certain things or thoughts are put together which were never ſo put together before. Now this inventing power is aſcribed, as obſerved already, to the imagination or fancy, and, when regulated by good ſenſe and applied to uſeful purpoſes, is called *genius*. One may be learned who is not ingenious; in other words, one may have a good memory well ſtored with knowledge, and yet have little imagination or invention; as, on the other hand, one may be very ingenious with little learning. But genius and learning, when they meet in one perſon, are mutually and greatly aſſiſtant to each other; and, in the poetical art, Horace declares that either without the other can do little.

140. The ſucceſſion of our thoughts is often regulated by memory; as when we go over in our mind the particulars of a place we have ſeen, of a converſation we have heard, or of a book we have read. At other times, when our attention is not fixed on any one thing, a ſtate of mind called a *reverie*, we may obſerve, that our thoughts

thoughts are continually changing, ſo that in a little time our imagination wanders to ſomething very different from that which we were thinking of juſt before. Yet if we could remember every thing that paſſed through our mind during this reverie, we ſhould probably find, that there was ſome relation, connection, or bond of union, between thoſe thoughts that accompanied, or came next after, one another. The relations, or bonds of union, which thus determine the mind to aſſociate ideas, are various.

141. Firſt, *Reſemblance* is an aſſociating quality: that is, when we perceive, or think of, any thing, it is natural for us, at the ſame time, or immediately after, to think of ſomething that is *like* it. When we hear a ſtory, or ſee a perſon, we are apt to think of other *ſimilar* ſtories or perſons. Our diſcourſe we often embelliſh with metaphors, allegories, and thoſe other figures of ſpeech, that are founded in likeneſs. And when any powerful paſſion, as anger or ſorrow, takes hold of the mind, the thoughts that occur to us have generally a

reſemblance to that paſſion, and tend to encourage it.

142. *Contrariety* or *contraſt* is another aſſociating principle, eſpecially when the mind is in a diſagreeable ſtate. Great cold makes us think of heat, and wiſh for it. Hunger and thirſt put us in mind of eating and drinking. In poetry, and other works of fancy, we are ſometimes pleaſed when we find things of *oppoſite* natures ſucceeding each other; when, for example, the *hurry* of a *battle* is interrupted, as in Homer it often is, with a deſcriptive ſimilitude taken from *ſtill life* or *rural affairs*; or when, in the ſame fable, perſons appear of *oppoſite* characters, and the violent is oppoſed to the gentle, the cunning to the generous, and the raſh to the prudent.

143. Thirdly: When we think of any place which we are acquainted with, we are apt to think at the ſame time of the *neighbouring* places and perſons: here the aſſociating principle is *Contiguity* or *nearneſs of ſituation*. The ſight of a houſe, in which we have formerly been happy or unhappy, renews the agreeable or diſagreeable ideas that

that were formerly realiſed there. Hence in part ariſes that partiality which moſt people have for the town, province, or country, in which they paſſed their early years. Hence, on entering a church, even when no body is preſent, a conſiderate mind is apt to feel ſome of thoſe religious impreſſions which it has formerly experienced in ſuch places: and ſentiments of a different nature ariſe, when we go into playhouſes, ball-rooms, or apartments that we have ſeen appropriated to purpoſes of feſtivity.

144. Fourthly: Things related as *cauſe and effect* do mutually ſuggeſt each other to the mind. When we ſee a wound, we think of the weapon or the accident that cauſed it, and of the pain which is the effect of it. The idea of ſnow or of ice brings along with it that of cold; and we can hardly think of the ſun without thinking of light and heat at the ſame time. The aſſociations founded on this principle are equally ſtrong whether the cauſation be real or imaginary. He who believes, that darkneſs and ſolitude are the cauſe of the

appearance

appearance of ghoſts, will find, when he is in the dark and alone, that the idea of ſuch beings will occur to him as naturally, as if the one were really the cauſe of the other. It is true, that ſolitude and darkneſs may reaſonably produce ſome degree of fear; becauſe where we cannot ſee we muſt be in ſome danger; and, when every thing is ſilent about us, we muſt be at ſome diſtance from the protection and other comforts of ſociety. But ghoſts and apparitions have nothing more to do with darkneſs than with light: and the ſtories told of them will be found, on examination, to ariſe, either from imperfect ſenſations owing to the darkneſs, or from thoſe horrors which diſorder the imagination when one is very much afraid, or from the folly, credulity, or falſehood of them who circulate thoſe ſilly tales.

145. *Cuſtom* or *habit* is a very extenſive principle of aſſociation. Things and thoughts that have no other bond of union may, by appearing together, or being frequently joined together, become ſo cloſely related, that the one ſhall ever after introduce the other

other into the mind. Thus, in language written or ſpoken, the mind inſtantly paſſes from the word heard, or from the characters ſeen, to the thing ſignified; cuſtom having ſo aſſociated them that the one always reminds us of the other.—Upon aſſociations eſtabliſhed by cuſtom many of the pains and pleaſures of life depend. An indifferent thing may become very agreeable, or very much the contrary, according to the nature of the ideas thus connected with it; and, in like manner, in conſequence of ſome perverſe aſſociation, that which ought to make us ſerious may incline us to laughter.

146. Things ſolemn and ſacred, therefore, ſhould never be ſpoken of in terms of ridicule or levity; and places appropriated to the offices of religion ſhould never be made the ſcene of any thing ludicrous, trifling, or unſuitable. Where theſe rules are not attended to, important and frivolous thoughts may be ſo jumbled together in the mind, as that the former ſhall ſometimes, very unſeaſonably and indecently, ſuggeſt the latter. Let ſacred things be always

ways accompanied with ſerious language and ſolemn circumſtances: and let thoſe, who wiſh to retain the government of their paſſions and the command of their thoughts, be careful to check in the beginning every tendency to perverſe and impure aſſociations.

147. Dreſſes both ugly and inconvenient become faſhionable; and cuſtom reconciles us to the faſhion, though at firſt, perhaps, it might appear ridiculous: which is alſo owing to aſſociations founded in cuſtom. For when we have long ſeen a particular form of dreſs worn by perſons whom we love and eſteem, and on occaſions of the greateſt feſtivity or ſolemnity, it acquires in our mind a connection with a great number of pleaſing ideas; and whatever is ſo connected muſt itſelf be pleaſing. It will appear by and by, that, from aſſociations founded in habit, many, or perhaps moſt, of thoſe pleaſing emotions are derived, which accompany the perception of that which in things viſible is called *Beauty*.

148. This ſubject will often come in our way

way hereafter. But before we leave it now, it may be proper to remark, that ſome people contract ſtrange habits of what may be termed External Aſſociation, of joining together two actions that have no natural connection, and appear very awkward when they are ſo joined. You may have ſeen a boy button and unbutton his coat all the while he is repeating his catechiſm; and we have heard of a lawyer, who could not go on with his pleading, unleſs he was continually winding a piece of packthread about his finger. It ſhould be our care to guard againſt theſe and the like abſurd habits, and to be very thankful to thoſe who caution us againſt them; for the eyes of a friend are, in a matter of this kind, much more to be depended on than our own.

149. It was already obſerved, that the talent of invention applied to uſeful purpoſes is called *genius*: but it requires experience and good ſenſe to enable one ſo to apply it. Every perſon is not a man of genius, nor is it neceſſary that he ſhould. For in human ſociety, as in an army, tho' there muſt be a few to contrive and com-

mand, far the greater number have nothing to do but to obey; and the efforts of the multitude are neceſſary to public good, as well as the contrivance of thoſe who direct them. Beſides, if every man were a man of genius, there would be ſo much ambition in the world, and ſo many projectors, and ſuch a multiplicity of oppoſite intereſts, as would confound the order of human affairs. To the perfection of genius, learning and application are neceſſary, as well as natural talents. It is true, that ſome men of great genius have had little learning; but this was their misfortune: and it can hardly be doubted, that with a better education they would have made a better figure. Without induſtry and attention, genius is good for nothing.

150. Many are the degrees, and the varieties, of human genius. One man has a genius in mechanics; another, in architecture; a third, in the conduct of military affairs; or in painting, geometry, muſic, poetry, eloquence, &c.; and one man may make great progreſs and contrive many improvements in one art, who could

not

not have been ſo ſucceſsful in another. And ſome men there are, of talents ſo univerſal, as to diſcover genius in every thing to which they apply themſelves. It is not eaſy, nor perhaps poſſible, to account for theſe peculiarities and varieties of intellectual character. They may be partly owing to habits contracted in early years; and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to that particular conſtitution of mind, by which, as well as by his face and other bodily peculiarities, one man is diſtinguiſhed from another.

151. But, though we may be at a loſs to explain the *efficient cauſe* of this variety, it is eaſy to ſee its *final cauſe*, that is, the intention of Providence in appointing it. It is this that makes men take to different purſuits and employments; which renders them mutually uſeful to one another, and prevents too violent oppoſitions of intereſt. And hence mankind enjoy a variety of conveniencies; arts and ſciences are invented and improved; and many ſources are opened of commerce and friendly intercourſe, whereby the circulation of truth is

promoted, and the bounds of ſocial virtue enlarged.

152. When one takes a view of the arts that flouriſh in ſociety, one is apt to wonder at two things; firſt, their vaſt number and mutual ſubſerviency; and ſecondly, that men ſhould be found who voluntarily make choice of one or other of all the employments neceſſary in civiliſed life. This conſideration affords a proof of the extreme pliableneſs of the human mind, as well as of the goodneſs of Providence. For, though ſome profeſſions and trades are of low eſteem, we find, that in every condition honeſt induſtry, with contentment, may be happy. Let us therefore learn to ſet a proper value on all the uſeful arts of life, and on all thoſe who practiſe them with integrity and induſtry.

153. The imagination is ſubject to certain diſorders, which may be comprehended under the oppoſite extremes of Levity and Melancholy. Levity produces thoughtleſſneſs, vanity, and contempt of others. Whatever therefore tends to make men conſiderate and humble may be propoſed

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as a remedy for this diſeaſe, or rather as a means of preventing it. Habits of conſideration may be acquired by ſtudying hiſtory, geometry, and thoſe parts of philoſophy which lead to the obſervation of life and manners.—Perſons in danger from this diſeaſe ſhould be kept at a diſtance from flattery and novels, and taught, that honeſty and attention to buſineſs are in every ſtation reſpectable, and that contempt and miſery never fail to attend a life of idleneſs or fantaſtic ambition. The company of thoſe who are wiſer and better than they, will alſo be of great and peculiar benefit to perſons of this character: and ſome experience of adverſity may be very ſerviceable in promoting that knowledge of one's ſelf, and that fellow-feeling for others, which repreſs vanity, by producing conſideration and a lowly mind.

154. The practice of turning every thing into joke and ridicule is a dangerous levity of imagination. Wit and humour, when natural, are very uſeful and very pleaſing. But that ſtudied and habitual jocularity, which I here ſpeak of, and which ſome people

people affect, makes one a diſagreeable and tireſome companion. It generally ariſes from vanity; it renders converſation unprofitable, and too often immoral; and it gradually perverts the underſtanding, both of thoſe who practiſe it, and of thoſe who take pleaſure in hearing it. Our ſerious concerns demand our firſt attention: wit, humour, and merriment, may be uſed in the way of relaxation, but are not the buſineſs for which we were ſent into this world.

155. An imagination diſordered by Melancholy is one of the greateſt calamities incident to human nature. In order to prevent it, we ought by all means to avoid idleneſs, and lead an active life; to be temperate and ſocial; to cheriſh every chearful affection, as good nature, good humour, patience, forgiveneſs, piety, humility, and benevolence, by all which the health of both the mind and body is effectually promoted; and to check the gloomy paſſions of anger, revenge, pride, ſuſpicion, jealouſy, miſanthropy, exceſſive anxiety, and immoderate ſorrow, which are all productive

ductive of miſery and diſeaſe both mental and corporeal. They, who are in danger from a melancholy imagination, will do well to ſtudy nothing but what is amuſing and practical; to abſtain from tragical narratives, controverſy, and law-ſuits, which wear out the ſpirits to no purpoſe; to uſe moderation in ſtudy, as in every thing elſe; and to have recourſe every day, more or leſs according to circumſtances, to bodily exerciſe, innocent amuſement, freſh air, and chearful company. To guard againſt ſuperſtition and enthuſiaſm, by forming right notions of God's adorable nature and providence; and to avoid, as one would the peſtilence, all books and all converſations that are likely to infuſe impious, irreligious, or immoral opinions, is the duty, not of thoſe only whoſe minds are oppreſſed with melancholy, but of all mankind without exception.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Of Dreaming.

156. THAT may be very uſeful, of which we cannot diſcover the uſe: and Dreams, though we know little of their nature, may yet be of great importance in our conſtitution. Moſt of the few unconnected remarks that follow are offered as mere conjecture; for it would be vain to attempt to treat this ſubject in a ſcientific manner.—Moſt men dream, but all do not; and ſometimes we dream more than at other times. In dreams we miſtake ideas of imagination for real things. But when awake, and in our perfect mind, we never miſtake a reality for a dream. Realities are perceived intuitively. We cannot prove by argument, that we are now awake; for we know of nothing more evident to prove it by: and it is eſſential to every proof to be clearer than that which is to be proved. But it is impoſſible for us to doubt of our being

being awake: ſuch is the law of our nature. And our experience of the deluſions of dreaming never affects, and is not ſuppoſed to affect, the certainty of human knowledge.

157. In good health we often dream of our ordinary buſineſs; which however is conſiderably diſguiſed by imaginary circumſtances. Such dreams partake of the nature of allegory: they reſemble common life, and yet they differ from it. This the poets attend to; and, when they have occaſion to deſcribe any perſon's dream, they generally make it contain ſome ſhadowy repreſentation of what is ſuppoſed to be in his mind when awake; and this we approve of, becauſe we know it is natural. Diſagreeable dreams accompany certain bodily diſorders; and when there is any tendency to fever in the human frame, they are very fatiguing and tireſome: whence a man of prudence, who is free from ſuperſtition, may make diſcoveries concerning his health, and learn from his dreams to live more temperately than uſual, or take more or leſs exerciſe, or have recourſe

to other means, in order to avert the impending evil.

158. Dreams may ſometimes be uſeful, as fables are, for conveying moral inſtruction. If, for example, we dream that we are in violent anger, and ſtrike a blow which kills a man, the horror we feel on the occaſion may diſpoſe us, when awake, to form reſolutions againſt violent anger, leſt it ſhould at one time or other prompt us to a like perpetration. In the *Tatler* (Numb. 117.) there is an account of a dream that conveys a ſublime and inſtructive leſſon of morality.—Dreams are a ſtriking inſtance of the activity of the human ſoul, and of its power of creating, as it were, without the help of the ſenſes, ideas that give it amuſement, and command its whole attention. Sometimes, however, in ſleep, our memory, and ſometimes our judgement, ſeem to have forſaken us: we believe the wildeſt abſurdities, and forget the moſt remarkable events of our life. It is at leaſt poſſible, that this temporary ſuſpenſion of our faculties may make the ſoul act more vigorouſly at other times, even as

our

our bodily powers derive refreſhment from reſt.

159. Dreams may in other reſpects be friendly to our intellectual nature. To think too long, or too intenſely, on any one ſubject, is hurtful to health, and ſometimes even to reaſon. They may therefore be uſeful in giving variety to our thoughts, and forcing the mind to exert itſelf, for a while, in a new direction. And perſons who dream moſt frequently may perhaps, from their conſtitution, have more need, than others have, of this ſort of amuſement; which is the more probable, becauſe it is found in fact, that thoſe people are moſt apt to dream who are moſt addicted to intenſe thinking. In this view, even diſagreeable dreams are uſeful: as a life of violent activity, of hardſhip, and even of danger, is recommended, and known to give relief, to perſons oppreſſed with melancholy, and other mental diſorders.

160. In antient times, the dreams of ſome men were prophetical; but, as we are not prophets, we have no reaſon to think that ours are of that ſort. It may

happen indeed, in the revolution of chances, that a dream ſhall reſemble a future event. But this is rare; and, when it happens, not more wonderful, than that an irregular clock ſhould now and then point at the right hour. Nor can it be admitted, that dreams are ſuggeſted by inviſible beings; as they are for the moſt part mere trifles, and depend ſo much on the ſtate of our mind and body. The ſoul in herſelf ſeems to poſſeſs vivacity ſufficient to account for all the odd appearances that occur in ſleep. For even when we are awake, and in health, very ſtrange thoughts will ſometimes ariſe in the mind. And, in certain diſeaſes, waking thoughts are often as extravagant as the wildeſt dreams.

161. Our dreams are exceedingly various; but that they ſhould be ſo, is not at all ſurpriſing. A very ſlight impreſſion made on our organs of ſenſe in ſleep; a ſound heard imperfectly; a greater or leſs degree of heat; our breathing in any reſpect interrupted, by the ſtate of the ſtomach and bowels, by an awkward poſition of the head, or by external things affecting

fecting our organs of reſpiration; the temperature of the air in general, or that of our bedchamber in particular;—theſe, and the like caſualties, as well as the tenor of our thoughts through the day, the ſtate of our health, and the paſſions that may happen to predominate in our mind, have all conſiderable influence in giving variety to our nocturnal imaginations. Uncommon dreams, therefore, ſhould give us no concern. In theſe viſionary appearances, uniformity would be more wonderful, than the greateſt variety. Some people, it is true, often find the ſame dream recur upon them. Poſſibly this may be in part owing to habit; they dream the ſame thing a third or a fourth time, becauſe they have talked or thought of it more than of other dreams. Hence, with reſpect to diſagreeable dreams, we may learn a caution; which is, to baniſh them from our thoughts as ſoon as poſſible, and never ſpeak of them at all. It is indeed a vulgar obſervation, but there is truth in it, that they who ſeldom talk of dreams are not often troubled with them.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

Of ſome Secondary Senſations.

162. OF the *perceptive* powers of man there ſtill remain to be conſidered, Conſcience, whereby we diſtinguiſh between vice and virtue; and Reaſon, whereby we perceive the difference between truth and falſehood. Theſe, to prevent unneceſſary repetition, we paſs by at preſent, as they will come in our way hereafter, the former in Moral Philoſophy, the latter in Logic.—If I had not wiſhed to avoid troubling my hearers with too many diviſions and ſubdiviſions in the beginning, I would have divided Senſation into Primary and Secondary. The former has been ſpoken of already. The latter I now enter upon; and indeed could hardly bring it in ſooner; what has been ſaid on the ſubject of imagination being neceſſary as an introduction to it. Theſe ſecondary faculties of ſenſation have by ſome writers been called

called Internal Senſes, by others Emotions. The name is of little importance: the nature of the thing will ſoon appear.

163. We perceive colours and figures by the eye; we alſo perceive that ſome colours and figures are *beautiful*, and others not. This power of perceiving Beauty, which the brutes have not though they *ſee* as well as we, I call a ſecondary ſenſe. We perceive ſounds by the ear; we alſo perceive, that certain combinations of ſound have *harmony*, and that others are diſſonant. This power of perceiving harmony, called in common language a muſical ear, is another ſecondary ſenſe, which the brutes have not, and of which many men who hear well enough are utterly deſtitute. Of theſe ſecondary ſenſes there are no doubt many in the human conſtitution. I confine myſelf to thoſe of Novelty, Sublimity, Beauty, Imitation, Harmony, and Ridicule; which, together with Sympathy, which I ſhall alſo deſcribe, form what is commonly called *good taſte*. The pleaſures received by the Secondary ſenſes are, by Addiſon, in the ſixth volume of the *Spectator*,

tator, and by Akenſide, in the title of a poem which he wrote on the ſubject, termed *Pleaſures of Imagination*.

164. Of Novelty. Things in themſelves indifferent, or even diſagreeable, may be agreeable when new; and Novelty in general has a charm in it, of which every rational, or every human being at leaſt, is ſenſible. Hence our paſſion for variety, for amuſement, for news, for ſtrange ſights, and for knowledge in general. The pleaſure we take in new things ariſes from the active nature of man. We are never happy unleſs employed about ſomething; and when we have nothing to do in the way of buſineſs or amuſement, the mind becomes languid and of courſe uneaſy. Yet into this ſtate we are apt to fall, when there is nothing to rouſe our attention, or give play to our faculties. For when we have long been converſant about one ſet of objects, the mind comprehends them ſo eaſily, that they give it no exerciſe. In this caſe, a new object occurring gives an impulſe to the mind, and puts it upon exerting itſelf; and the exertion, if moderate, is agreeable.

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If the new object occaſion ſurpriſe, or any other lively and pleaſing emotion, its novelty will be ſtill more intereſting, becauſe it will convey to the mind a more ſprightly and perhaps a more permanent impulſe.

165. Some things are more diſagreeable at firſt, than they come to be afterwards; which may be owing to one or other of theſe two cauſes. Either the new object may have required, in order to its being comprehended, a violent and painful exertion of the faculties; as in the caſe of one entering upon a new ſtudy, or a new courſe of life: or we may have fixed our firſt attention on what ſeemed diſagreeable in the new object; not diſcovering its agreeable qualities till we were better acquainted with it. Hence let us learn, that a good courſe of life, though ſomewhat unpleaſant at firſt, ought not on that account to be relinquiſhed; for we may be aſſured it will in time become pleaſant, if perſiſted in.—It is remarkable, that men ſometimes contract a moſt violent liking to certain taſtes that were at firſt extremely offenſive, as thoſe of tobacco and ſtrong liquors. This

depends on cauſes in which the mind has little concern. It may be, that, by the conſtant uſe of ſuch things, the ſtomach or the palate, and of courſe the animal ſpirits, are reduced to ſuch a ſtate as to be uneaſy in the want of them. The part of prudence therefore is, to abſtain from ſuch things altogether, which requires no effort; rather than to hazard the acquiſition of a habit which it may be almoſt impoſſible to overcome. Unnatural pleaſures of this ſort it is no evil to be without, but it may be a fatal evil to acquire a reliſh for.

166. In all the arts that miniſter to rational pleaſure, variety is ſtudied, that the mind may be refreſhed with a ſucceſſion of novelties. The proſe-writer, where it can be done conveniently, varies the length, the ſound, and the ſyntax, of contiguous clauſes and ſentences; and amuſes the reader's fancy with metaphors, ſimilitudes, and other appoſite figures of ſpeech. The poet varies the ſtructure of contiguous verſes; and, in framing his fable, is careful to bring in events that are both probable and unexpected, and perſons who differ from each

each other in character, appearance, and adventures. So in the other fine arts. In the works of nature there is great uniformity, and at the ſame time the moſt unbounded variety: ſo that he who ſtudies them is continually delighted with new and wonderful diſcoveries; and yet is never perplexed by their multiplicity, becauſe order, proportion, and fitneſs, prevail through the whole ſyſtem.

167. The taſte for novelty is an important part of the human conſtitution. It is the ſource of much amuſement, and prompts men to labour in the acquiſition of knowledge. It is, beſides, one of our firſt paſſions. You cannot gratify a child more, than by ſhowing him ſomething new, or telling him a wonderful ſtory. The ſame novelties are not equally captivating to all. Some ſeek after new attainments in ſcience; ſome wander through the world to viſit different nations; ſome explore the wonders of inanimate nature, and ſome the characters of men; ſome read hiſtory, ſome ſtudy the fine arts, ſome are curious in whatever relates to mechaniſm, and ſome

mind little more than the news of the day; ſome amuſe themſelves with collecting pictures, prints, manuſcripts, medals, ſhells, minerals; and ſome are fond of old, and others of new books. Thus men take to different purſuits and employments, and every part of knowledge is cultivated.

168. Of Sublimity. Things of great magnitude, as a large building, a high mountain, a broad river, a wide proſpect, the ocean, the ſky, &c. fill the mind of the beholder with admiration and pleaſing aſtoniſhment, and with reſpect to this ſenſation are called Sublime. Great height and depth, and great number too, as an army, a navy, a long ſucceſſion of years, eternity, &c. are ſublime objects, becauſe they fill our minds with the ſame pleaſing aſtoniſhment. In contemplating ſuch things, we are conſcious of ſomething like an expanſion or elevation of our faculties, as if we were exerting our whole capacity to comprehend the vaſtneſs of the object.

169. Whatever it be that raiſes in us this pleaſurable aſtoniſhment, is accounted ſublime, whether connected with quantity

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or number, or not. Hence loud ſounds, like thoſe of thunder, cannon, a full organ, a ſtorm; hence thoſe fictions in poetry, that produce an imaginary, and not painful, terror; hence any uncommon degree of virtue, of genius, or even of bodily ſtrength; and hence thoſe affections which elevate the ſoul, as fortitude, devotion, and univerſal benevolence, or which are, in their objects, cauſes, or effects, connected with great number or great quantity; are all denominated ſublime, and fill our minds with the ſame delightful aſtoniſhment and admiration.

170. The Deity,—the ſource of happineſs and the ſtandard of perfection; who creates, preſerves, pervades, and governs all things; whoſe power is omnipotent, whoſe wiſdom is perfect, whoſe goodneſs is unbounded, whoſe greatneſs is incomprehenſible; who was from all eternity, and of whoſe dominion there can be no end;—He is undoubtedly, and, beyond all compariſon, the moſt ſublime object which it is poſſible to conceive or to contemplate: and of all created ſublimity (if I may ſo ſpeak)

ſpeak) his works exhibit the moſt perfect and moſt aſtoniſhing examples. There are, no doubt, ſublime operations of human art, as ſhips of war, cathedral-churches, palaces, mounds for repelling the ſea, &c. But, in reſpect of greatneſs, theſe are nothing, when we compare them with mountains, volcanoes, the ocean, the expanſe of heaven, clouds and ſtorms, thunder and lightning, the ſun and moon, the ſolar ſyſtem, the univerſe.

171. Poetry, Painting, and Muſic, are called Fine arts; becauſe, though not neceſſary to life, they are highly ornamental. Architecture is alſo a fine art; for it improves building to a degree far beyond what is neceſſary. And by each of theſe arts the ſublime is attainable. That is ſublime muſic which inſpires ſublime affections, as courage and devotion; or which by its ſonorous harmonies overwhelms the mind with a pleaſing aſtoniſhment. Architecture is ſublime, when it is large, lofty, and durable, and at the ſame time ſo ſimple and well-proportioned as that the eye can take in all its greatneſs at once.

once. For a number of little parts and ornaments take away from the ſublimity of a great building, though they may ſometimes add to its beauty. Painting is ſublime, when it exhibits men inveſted with great qualities, ſuch as bodily ſtrength; or actuated by ſublime paſſions, as devotion or valour; or when it ſucceſsfully imitates great viſible objects, artificial or natural, as mountains, precipices, palaces, ſtorms, cataracts, volcanoes, and the like.

172. Poetry is ſublime; firſt, when it elevates the mind, and makes it, as it were, ſuperior to the cares and troubles of this world: ſecondly, when it infuſes any ſublime affection, as devotion, valour, univerſal benevolence, the love of virtue and of our country: thirdly, when it affects the mind with an awful and imaginary, but not unpleaſing horror: fourthly, when it deſcribes the ſentiments or actions of thoſe perſons whoſe character is ſublime: and fifthly, when it conveys a lively idea of any grand appearance, natural, artificial, or imaginary. That ſtyle is ſublime, which makes us readily conceive any great object

or

or ſentiment in a lively manner; and this is often done when the words are very plain and ſimple.

173. It is true, that poets and orators, when they deſcribe ſublime objects, do often elevate their ſtyle with tropes and figures, and high-ſounding expreſſions. And this is ſuitable to the nature of human ſpeech. For, when we ſpeak of any thing which we conſider as great, it is natural for us, even in common diſcourſe, to raiſe our voice, and pronounce with more than uſual ſolemnity. But in the uſe of bold figures and ſonorous language great caution is requiſite. For, if they be too frequent, or ſeem to be too much ſought after, or if they be not accompanied with a correſpondent elevation of thought, they become ridiculous, and are called Bombaſt or Falſe Sublime.—Even in brutes there may be qualities which command our admiration and aſtoniſhment: whence lions, horſes, and elephants, are ſublime objects; not ſo much becauſe their bodies are large, though this may have ſome effect, as on account of their uncommon ſtrength,

ſtrength, ſagacity, or contempt of danger.

174. Though real greatneſs always raiſes admiration, littleneſs does not always excite the contrary paſſion of contempt. That which is little may be beautiful or uſeful, or ingeniouſly contrived, and ſo give pleaſure in various ways, and ſometimes raiſe admiration too;—for who does not admire the beauty of a roſe, and the wonderful inſtincts of the bee! Littleneſs is then offenſive, and is called meanneſs, when we are diſappointed by it, and meet with it in a place, where we had reaſon to expect ſomething better.—There is a meanneſs in certain words and phraſes, which for that reaſon ought to be avoided on every ſolemn occaſion, and in all elegant writing. Important ſentiments expreſſed in mean words raiſe indignation or laughter. Think what effect a ſermon would have, if it were mixed with vulgar proverbs, or broad Scotch words. Now thoſe are mean words, which are not uſed except by illiterate or by affected perſons, or on very familiar occaſions. Common pro-

verbs, cuſtomary forms of compliment, ungrammatical expreſſions, cant phraſes, and provincial barbariſms, have all more or leſs of this meanneſs; and, however they may paſs on common occaſions, or when people mean to talk ludicrouſly, will always give great offence in compoſitions that aim at ſublimity or elegance. But of this more hereafter.

175. The contemplation of the Divine Nature, and of the works of creation and providence, will no doubt conſtitute our ſupreme and final felicity. To prepare us for ſuch contemplation, and raiſe our minds above the preſent world, the Deity has been pleaſed to endow us with a capacity of receiving pleaſure, even in this life, from the view of what is good or eminently great. Our taſte for the ſublime, cheriſhed into a habit, and directed to proper objects, may therefore promote our moral improvement, by leading us to contemplate the Creator in his wonderful works; by keeping us at a diſtance from vice, which is the vileſt of all things; and by recommending virtue for its intrinſick dignity and lovelineſs.

176. Of

176. Of Beauty. This term is applied to many ſorts of agreeable things: we ſpeak of beautiful language, and of a beautiful ſong, as well as of a beautiful face. At preſent I ſpeak of viſible beauty chiefly; which may belong, firſt to *colour*, ſecondly to *figure*, thirdly to *attitude* or *geſture*, and fourthly to *motion*.—In general it may be obſerved, that the pleaſure we take in looking at what is beautiful, a roſe for example, is very different in kind from the pleaſure that attends the contemplation of a ſublime object, as a great cataract, or a huge and craggy mountain. The latter ſenſation (if it may be ſo called) ſeems to rouſe and elevate the mind, the former to compoſe it: the one is ſolemn and ſerious; the other has a mixture of gladneſs in it, which diſpoſes the face of the beholder to a ſmile. Beauty and greatneſs may be united in the ſame object, in which caſe they mutually adorn each other. The rainbow in its colours and circular form is extremely beautiful, and at the ſame time very ſublime on account of its apparent magnitude and elevation.

177. Colours are beautiful, firſt, when they convey to the mind a lively ſenſation, as white and red; ſecondly, when they cheriſh the organ of ſight, as green; thirdly, when they have that character which we term delicacy, and yield a ſenſation both lively and gentle, as pale red, and and light blue. But, fourthly, the beauty of a colour depends chiefly on the agreeableneſs of the ideas it conveys to the mind; for the ſame colour which in one thing is very beautiful may in another be very ugly. The verdure of the fields, for example, is delightful, becauſe it leads us to think of fruitfulneſs, fragrance, and many other pleaſant things; but greenneſs in the human face would be horrible, becauſe it would ſuggeſt the notion of pain, of diſeaſe, or of ſomething unnatural.

178. Colours that look as if they were ſtained or ſullied, or which are ſo indefinite that one knows not what name to give them, are not often conſidered as beautiful. But thoſe gradations of colour, which we ſee in flowers, in the plumage of ſome birds, in the rainbow, in the evening and morning

morning ſky, and in many other natural appearances, are beautiful in the higheſt degree; when the colours ſo melt away into one another, that, though we diſcern the change, we cannot mark where the one ends and the other begins. The delicacy wherewith they are blended ſo far ſurpaſſes the ordinary efforts of human ſkill, that we cannot behold it without admiration. —In general, every colour is beautiful, that brings along with it the agreeable idea of perfection, of health, of convenience, of intellectual or moral virtue, or of any other ſort of excellence. Negroes love their own colour for the ſame reaſon that we love ours; becauſe they always ſee it; becauſe all the people they love have it; and becauſe none are without it but thoſe who are thought to be ſtrangers and enemies. This at leaſt muſt be the negro's way of thinking, as long as he remains in his own country, or till he have the ſingular good fortune to find friends among white people. So much for beauty of colour.

179. Perfection and ſkill are always agreeable; and whatever ſuggeſts them to the

the mind muſt be ſo too, and, if viſible, is intitled to be called beautiful. For this reaſon it ſeems to be, that figures ſo well proportioned and ſo complete, as circles, ſquares, ellipſes, hexagons, &c. convey to us the notion of beauty. Want of proportion in figures is not agreeable, and therefore not beautiful, becauſe it makes us think of inconvenience, unſkilfulneſs, or imperfection. Figures, as they appear in furniture, in architecture, or in any other work of art, are more or leſs beautiful, according as they convey to us, more or leſs, the idea of ſkill, convenience, and uſefulneſs. In fact, the beauty of things depends very much, as Socrates rightly thought, upon their utility: for if a thing be uſeleſs, we cannot like it; if we do not like it, it will give us no pleaſure; and of all beauty it is the character, to be pleaſing. Were the horſe as ſlow as the ſnail, we ſhould be more inclined to diſlike his unwieldy ſize, than to admire his fine ſhape.

180. That form of the human body is accounted beautiful, which conveys the idea of bodily perfection. Now the human body

body is in its moſt perfect ſtate in youth; and therefore, in reſpect of *ſhape*, a youthful body is more elegant than that of an infant or old man. Another reaſon may be given for this, as follows.—In all beautiful animals, and in all the moſt beautiful parts of animals, the figure is bounded rather by curves, than by ſtraight lines; except where theſe laſt may be neceſſary, as in the legs of animals, to ſtrength and convenience. If the back and the breaſt of a fine horſe were bounded by right lines, inſtead of that flowing curve which winds ſo gracefully about them, every one muſt be ſenſible, that the beauty of the ſhape would be loſt. Now, in the outlines of the body of an infant, the curves are rather too much bent, on account of the redundancy of fleſh compared with the ſmallneſs of the ſize; in the body of an old man they are too little bent, and approach to right lines, on account of the decay of moiſture: in youth they are neither too much bent nor too little, but a middle between both; and then the *ſhape* of the body is moſt perfect.

181. In

181. In the works of nature, the greateſt uſefulneſs is often united with perfect beauty of colour and figure: and the more we ſtudy them, the more beautiful they appear; becauſe we become the more ſenſible of their utility, as well as better acquainted with their form. In them too, that which we call beauty is generally ſmooth, or ſeems to be ſo; and is rather ſmall than great, that is, rather below the uſual proportion than above it. A craggy mountain is a ſublime object, and its crags may add to its ſublimity; but a beautiful hill is, or appears to be, ſmooth. The ſtatue of Minerva may be tall, dignity being her character; but a gigantic Venus would be abſurd. So much for beauty of *ſhape* or *figure*.

182. Thoſe GESTURES are graceful, which ſhow the body to advantage; or which are aſſumed with eaſe, and may continue a conſiderable time without giving pain; or which are ſuitable to the nature of the perſon or animal, and to the paſſion or ſentiment that is ſuppoſed to be in the perſon's mind, provided that paſſion or ſentiment be

be ſuch as we approve. And no geſture is graceful, which conveys any diſagreeable idea of unwieldineſs, infirmity, conſtraint, affectation, or any evil paſſion.

183. The ſame remarks may be made on beauty of MOTION. Thoſe motions in general are graceful; which are performed with eaſe; which imply bodily perfection; and which are naturally expreſſive of agreeable paſſions or ſentiments in the mind of the perſon who moves. The motion of ſome inanimate things is very beautiful; as that of ſmoke aſcending ſlowly in the ſky, of unbroken waves in the ſea, and of flags and ſtreamers flying in the wind. The firſt pleaſes, as an emblem of tranquillity; the ſecond, on account of the ſmoothneſs, greatneſs, and uniformity; and the laſt, by the glare of colours, by the eaſy curvature, and by ſuggeſting agreeable ideas of buſy life.—The characteriſtics of beauty, according to ſome authors, are uniformity, variety, and proportion. How far each of theſe may be neceſſary to form beauty, and why each of them gives pleaſure, will perhaps appear from what has been ſaid.

184. That which in the ſmalleſt compaſs exhibits the greateſt variety of beauty, is a fine human face. The features are of *various* ſizes and forms; the correſponding ones exactly *uniform;* and each has that ſhape, ſize, poſition, and *proportion*, which is moſt *convenient.* Here too is the greateſt beauty of *colours*, which are blended, varied, and diſpoſed, with marvellous *delicacy.* But the chief beauty of the countenance ariſes from its expreſſion, of ſagacity, good nature, chearfulneſs, modeſty, and other moral and intellectual virtues. Without ſuch expreſſion, no face can be truly beautiful; and with it, none can be really ugly. Human beauty, therefore, at leaſt that of the face, is not merely a corporeal quality; but derives its origin and eſſential characters from the ſoul: and almoſt any perſon may in ſome degree acquire it, who is at pains to improve his underſtanding, to repreſs criminal thoughts, and to cheriſh good affections; as every one muſt loſe it, whatever features or complexion there may be to boaſt of, who leaves the mind uncultivated,

tivated, or a prey to evil paſſions, or a ſlave to trifling purſuits.

185. Of Imitation. Man is of all animals the moſt prone to imitation, and takes great delight in it. By imitating others, we learn to ſpeak and walk, and do many other things, long before we could either attend to rules, or underſtand them. Many of the ſports of children are imitations of the actions of men: and we find, that, in moſt nations, dramatic performances, which are alſo imitations of what happens in real life, are much attended to, and greatly eſteemed as an amuſement.

186. We receive pleaſure from ſeeing a good imitation, though the original be indifferent, or perhaps even diſagreeable. A common plant we view with indifference, and a dead man we could not ſee without pain; but a good picture of either would give pleaſure; and a picture, equally good, of a beautiful object would pleaſe ſtill more. And this pleaſure ariſes chiefly from our admiration of the ſkill diſplayed in the work: for admiration is an agreeable emotion; and it gratifies a ſound mind

to ſee any thing perfect, or advancing to perfection.

187. Poetry, Painting, and Muſic, are called *fine arts*, for a reaſon formerly given. They are alſo called *imitative arts*; becauſe in them the appearances or operations of nature are, or are ſuppoſed to be, imitated; in painting, by colour; in poetry, by language; and in muſic, by ſound. The contemplation of nature is delightful to the human ſoul; and nothing that is unnatural, or contrary to nature, can pleaſe a well-informed mind. And therefore, the fine arts, being all intended to give pleaſure, muſt exhibit either what is according to nature, or what is ſimilar to it; either what is real, or what is likely and probable.

188. That Pictures are imitations of nature, is obvious; and in them may be imitated almoſt every thing viſible, not only animals and inanimate things, but alſo the paſſions and emotions of the mind; for theſe laſt produce viſible appearances in the look and geſture, by which they are known, and which a painter may delineate. But, as no more than the events of one inſtant

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can be ſeen at one inſtant, and as the whole picture ſtrikes the eye at once, the ſubject of every painting muſt be *one* event or appearance, or muſt at leaſt be ſuch a combination of appearances, as may be ſuppoſed to be contiguous in place, and to be ſeen at one and the ſame time. The progreſs, therefore, of action, or of thought, painting cannot imitate. However, by exhibiting viſible things in thoſe attitudes, in which they are never ſeen except when they move, it may give a very lively idea of certain kinds of motion; as of rolling billows, aſcending ſmoke, trees waving in the wind, fluttering robes and ſtreamers, and animal bodies running, walking, ſwimming, or flying. Thoſe thoughts that produce no viſible change in the appearance of the body, cannot be expreſſed in a picture.

189. Language, the inſtrument of poetical imitation, is applicable to all ſubjects, and may with the greateſt accuracy imitate and deſcribe human actions, paſſions, and ſentiments, in each period of their progreſs, as well as every appearance in the animal

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or inanimate world.—It has been doubted, whether poetry be an *imitation*, or a *repreſentation*, of nature. The controverſy is of little moment, and may perhaps be thus determined. If we conſider it as an art, that exhibits, not what is real, but only what is likely or probable, we muſt call poetry imitative; becauſe there is ſomething in it which is not in nature: for it is eſſential to an *imitation* to be in ſome reſpect or other different from the original. Ideas conveyed to the fancy by good poetical deſcription would, if delineated by the painter, and made viſible by means of colour, be found to reſemble natural things; and if ſuch a picture be an imitation, the deſcription whence it is copied muſt be ſo too. *Real* things may indeed be *truly* deſcribed in poetical numbers; but this is not common; nor would this be any thing elſe than hiſtory in verſe: it being the buſineſs of the poet (as will be ſhown hereafter) to repreſent things not as they are, but rather as they might be. This reaſoning refers chiefly to narrative and deſcriptive poems. In Dramatic poetry, the imitation

tation of human action is obvious and unqueſtionable.—Whether muſic be imitative, will be ſeen by and by.—Architecture is an uſeful and noble art, but cannot be called Imitative. Only the pillars in old cathedral churches are ſaid to have been framed in imitation of rows of trees, to which indeed they bear a great ſimilitude; the people who invented this mode of building having, it ſeems, annexed ſome notion of ſanctity to that appearance; probably becauſe men had been accuſtomed, before the uſe of temples, to perform the rites of their religion under the ſhade of trees in a grove.

190. So great is the pleaſure we receive from ſeeing nature well imitated, that the repreſentation of human misfortunes upon the ſtage, or in poems, gives delight, even while it infuſes the painful paſſions of pity and ſorrow. This is owing, partly to the agitation produced in the mind of the reader or ſpectator by the circumſtances of the ſtory; partly, to the art diſplayed in the repreſentation by the player, or by the poet in the narrative; partly, to our being conſcious,

conſcious, that what we read or ſee is not real, but imaginary, diſtreſs, (for to thoſe children who miſtake it for real it is found to give pain inſtead of amuſement); and partly, and perhaps chiefly, to the nature of pity, which, though a painful paſſion, is in the exerciſe accompanied with ſeveral gratifications; ſuch as our conſciouſneſs of its being praiſeworthy in itſelf, ornamental to our nature, uſeful in ſociety, and amiable in the eyes of our brethren of mankind.

191. Of Harmony. That the ſenſe of harmony, commonly called a muſical ear, is a diſtinct faculty from the ſenſe of hearing, appears from this; that many men receive no pleaſure from muſic who hear very well, and that ſome who are dull of hearing are very fond of muſic: and other facts might be mentioned that prove the ſame thing. Obſerve, that, in the language of art, harmony and melody are diſtinguiſhed; the latter being the agreeable effect of a ſingle ſeries of muſical tones; and the former, the agreeable effect produced by two or more ſeries of muſical tones

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ſounded at the ſame time. Obſerve further, that melody gives pleaſure to all who have a muſical ear, our taſte for it being natural, though very capable of improvement; whereas harmony is little reliſhed, except by thoſe who have ſtudied it, or have been much accuſtomed to hear it. Yet harmony is in ſome degree pleaſing to moſt people; its eſſential laws being ſo well founded in nature, that no body who underſtands them queſtions their propriety.

192. Muſic conſiſts of ſound and motion. The peculiar motion of any piece of muſic is called its rhythm or number, or, in common language, its time. When a tune is accompanied with the drum, or with a dance, we hear the rhythm in the ſound of the feet, or of the drumſticks. Rhythm belongs alſo to verſe, and even to proſe: for the pauſes and the continuity of pronunciation, and the interchange of ſhort and long, or of emphatic and non-emphatic, ſyllables, may all be imitated by the drum, or by the hand ſtriking on a board. Do not confound *rhythm* with *rime*. Rhythm is a Greek word, and means what has been juſt now ſaid. Rime is a modern word,

and in Engliſh denotes the ſimilar ſounds that terminate contiguous verſes in certain ſorts of poetry.

193. By its ſounds muſic may imitate ſounds; and by its motion, motions. But irregular motions, or inharmonious ſounds, it cannot imitate; becauſe every thing in this art muſt be regular and harmonious. Its imitative powers, therefore, are very limited. And muſic may be ſtrictly imitative, and yet intolerably bad; or not at all imitative, and yet perfectly good. The imitation of nature is, therefore, not eſſential to this art, as it is to poetry and painting. Conſequently muſic pleaſes, not becauſe it imitates nature, but for ſome other reaſons which may be explained as follows.

194. Firſt: Some ſounds, eſpecially when continued, are pleaſing in themſelves, tho' they have neither meaning nor modulation: ſuch is the murmur of groves, winds, and waters. Muſical ſounds, even when heard ſeparate, are all pleaſing in themſelves, or ought to be ſo; and the more they reſemble the tones of a good human voice, the more pleaſing they are, and the more

more perfect.—Secondly: Some tones, ſounded at the ſame time, have an agreeable, and others a diſagreeable effect: the former are called Concords, the latter Diſcords. All concords are not equally agreeable, nor all diſcords equally harſh; and the art of harmony lies in blending the harſher with the ſweeter concords, or even with diſcords, in ſuch a manner as moſt effectually to pleaſe the ear. The artful management of this matter is another ſource of the pleaſure we derive from muſic.

195. Thirdly: In all regular muſic, variety and proportion are united, and have a pleaſing effect upon the mind, ſimilar to that which they have in things viſible; that is, they gently exerciſe the faculties, without bewildering or fatiguing them, and they ſuggeſt the agreeable ideas of contrivance and ſkill. But in what manner variety and proportion enter into the compoſition of muſic, can be explained to thoſe only, who know ſomething both of the practice and of the theory of the art.—One artifice however may be mentioned, which the moſt unſkilful may underſtand.

Some pieces of muſic are contrived with the expreſs purpoſe of introducing apparent confuſion; as Fugues, in which different inſtruments, or voices, take up the ſame air, but not all at the ſame time, ſo that one is, as it were, the echo of the other; and yet the general reſult is not confuſion, which one would expect, but perfect harmony: which gives an agreeable ſurpriſe, and heightens our admiration of the author's ſkill, and of the dexterity of the performers.

196. Fourthly: Muſic is agreeable, which infuſes into the mind, or prepares it for being affected with, agreeable paſſions. Now, as all the rules of the art tend to give pleaſure, all the paſſions it can raiſe muſt be of the agreeable kind. It may diſpoſe the ſoul to devotion, gladneſs, courage, compaſſion, or benevolence; but has no expreſſion for impiety, cowardice, anger, envy, or malice. The meaning, however, or expreſſion of muſic is not determinate, unleſs it be united with poetry, or language: ſo that the moſt perfect muſic is *ſong*; in which elegant words, diſtinctly

ly pronounced, give ſignificancy to melody well modulated by the voice, and enforced by ſuitable harmonies. And therefore, muſic merely inſtrumental is to a certain degree imperfect; unleſs we are led by cuſtom, or by ſome outward circumſtance, to aſſign it a definite meaning.

197. Fifthly: All muſic is agreeable, which conveys agreeable thoughts to the mind of the hearer. We have heard it formerly in an agreeable place perhaps, or performed by an agreeable perſon, or accompanied with agreeable words, or ſome other pleaſing circumſtance. Hence, when we hear it again, we hear it with pleaſure, becauſe it ſuggeſts ſome pleaſing recollection, or ſome idea at leaſt of former happineſs. From this principle, a great deal of the pleaſure may be accounted for, which we derive from muſic, eſpecially from that of our own country.

198. That the ſenſe of harmony is no unimportant part of the human conſtitution, will appear, when we conſider, that in all civiliſed, and many unpoliſhed nations, muſic has ever been accounted agreeable

able as an amuſement, and uſeful as a means of inſpiring courage, devotion, gladneſs, and other good affections. Polybius, a grave and wiſe hiſtorian, aſcribes the humanity of the antient Arcadians to their knowledge of this art, and the barbarity of their neighbours the Cynethians to their neglect of it. And as he was a native of Arcadia, we can hardly ſuppoſe that a man of his penetration could be miſtaken in a matter of this kind.

199. Of Laughter. To perceive an object, and to laugh at it, are different things: brutes perceive, but never laugh. Riſibility is one of the diſtinguiſhing characters of man. Some things excite laughter mixed with contempt or diſapprobation; as the abſurdities of a lying traveller, a boaſtful ſoldier, or a great miſer: ſuch things are properly termed *ridiculous*. Other things, which provoke laughter merely, without contempt or diſapprobation, may be called *ludicrous*. Such are the tricks of monkies and young cats: and ſuch, though in all other reſpects totally different, are thoſe examples of wit and humour, which

which we laugh at in books or perſons whom we admire and eſteem. Here we are to conſider ludicrous objects chiefly; as laughter, and not contempt, is the object of the preſent inquiry.

200. Laughter may be occaſioned by tickling, or in children by gladneſs. But I ſpeak of that laughter, which is the outward expreſſion of a certain agreeable emotion raiſed in the mind by the view, or by the conception, of ſomething which we call oddity, drollery, or by ſome ſuch name. This feeling may be in the mind, when laughter, the outward ſign, does not appear; for one may reſtrain laughter, when one is much tempted to indulge it. In like manner, tears are an outward ſign of ſorrow, but one may be very ſorrowful who does not weep. What, then, is this drollery, or oddity? What is that quality or character, which all ludicrous or laughable objects have in common?

201. Firſt: The object of ridicule in comedy is very well defined by Ariſtotle; who calls it, Some ſmall fault or turpitude, not attended with pain, and not deſtructive,

tive. For to laugh at diſtreſs, or at great faults, is at once unnatural and wicked; and therefore a writer of comedy is highly blameable, when he introduces misfortunes or crimes on the ſtage, in order to make us laugh at them. But Ariſtotle's definition does not hold true of laughter in general, or even of all innocent laughter. For men may laugh innocently at that in which they perceive no turpitude. Fine turns of wit and humour may be ludicrous, even when they ſuggeſt to the mind nothing which it is poſſible either to deſpiſe or to diſapprove.

202. Secondly: Mr Hobbes is of opinion, and he is raſhly followed by the author of the forty-ſeventh paper of *the Spectator*, that laughter is a ſudden exultation of mind, ariſing from the conception of pre-eminence in ourſelves, and of inferiority in that which we compare with ourſelves as we are at preſent. This reſolves laughter into pride. But nothing is more abſurd. Proud men are more remarkable for gravity than for laughter; and laughter is ſeldom taken for a ſign of pride.

And

And men laugh at things which they do not compare with themſelves at all; and at the wit and humour of authors, whom they believe to be their ſuperiors in every reſpect.

203. Thirdly: Hutcheſon ſays, that a mixture of dignity and meanneſs, appearing in the ſame object, or ſuggeſted to the mind by one and the ſame appearance, is the cauſe of laughter. And indeed it often is, but not always. For ſuch a mixture appears in the people, and in the houſes, of every large town; and yet a large town, or a great multitude, is rather a ſublime than a ludicrous object. And laughter may be raiſed by ſome ſorts of wit and humour, in which it is impoſſible to diſcern any mixture of dignity and meanneſs. And a mimic may make us laugh, by imitating the manner of a perſon who has no more dignity than the mimic himſelf has.—Theſe theories, therefore, are either falſe, or not ſufficiently comprehenſive.

204. If a painter, ſays Horace, were to join to the head of a man the neck of a horſe, feathers of different birds, limbs of

different animals, and the tail of a fiſh, the whole would be ludicrous. This, it ſeems, was true in Horace's time, and no doubt is ſo ſtill. It would appear then, that a ludicrous object muſt be made up of ſeveral parts; that the parts whereof it is made up muſt be in ſome degree inconſiſtent, unſuitable, or incongruous; and that they muſt be conſidered as united in one aſſemblage, or as acquiring a ſort of mutual connection from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them. And therefore it may be inferred, that laughter is occaſioned by an incongruity or unſuitableneſs of the parts that compoſe, or ſeem to compoſe, any complex object or idea. Incongruous objects may in ſeveral ways be united ſo as to make the union ludicrous.

205. Firſt: When they happen to be *placed together*. Eraſmus, in a dialogue called *Abſurda*, endeavours to provoke mirth by a conference between two perſons, who ſpeak alternately, each purſuing a ſubject of his own, without any regard to what is ſaid by the other. It looks like a dialogue between

between two deaf men: and the humour, ſuch as it is, if there be any, ariſes merely from the juxtapoſition of ſentences, which have no other relation but that of place. When Pope ſays of Prince Eugene, that "he is a great taker of ſnuff as well as of "towns," the two things ſpoken of, which are utterly incongruous, acquire an unexpected relation by being placed together, and made equally dependent on the word *taker*; which of courſe becomes a *pun*, by being uſed at one and the ſame time in two different ſenſes. And it is this mixture, of incongruity and ſeeming relation, that makes the paſſage ludicrous.

206. Secondly: When things appearing in the relation of *cauſe and effect* are very incongruous and inadequate to each other, they ſometimes provoke a ſmile; as when a man is thrown into a violent paſſion by a trifling cauſe; as if we were to ſee a perſon ſeriouſly attempt (like the child in Quarles's emblems) to blow out the ſun with a pair of bellows, or four men take hold of the four corners of a church with an intention to lift it from the ground.

207. Thirdly: The unexpected diſcovery of *reſemblance* between things ſuppoſed to be unlike, when it is clearly expreſſed in few words, conſtitutes what is commonly called *wit*; and is a very copious ſource of pleaſantry. Such, to give one inſtance, is that compariſon in Hudibras, of the dawn of the morning to a boiled lobſter; "Like a lobſter boil'd the morn From "black to red began to turn." At firſt, there ſeems to be no reſemblance at all: but, when we recollect, that the lobſter's colour is by boiling changed from dark to red, we recogniſe a likeneſs to that change of colour in the ſky which happens at day-break.

208. Fourthly: *Dignity and meanneſs* unexpectedly united, or ſuppoſed to be united, in the ſame aſſemblage, is a frequent cauſe of laughter. As when a mean ſentiment unexpectedly appears in a ſolemn diſcourſe, or a ſerious ſentiment in a trifling one:—as when the phraſeology of a ſolemn paſſage in a well-known author is, by a little change of words, made to expreſs, in the way of Parody, ſomething frivolous

frivolous or very different:—as when mean ideas and images are expreſſed in pompous language, as in the *Dunciad* and *Splendid Shilling*:—as when important ideas are debaſed by mean words or provincial barbariſms, whereof we have had ſome examples already. (See § 174.) But obſerve, that mixtures of this ſort, when they ſeem to proceed from want of taſte, or from any mental depravity, are more apt to move indignation than laughter.

209. In ludicrous writing two ſorts of ſtyle are uſed, and both imply a mixture of dignity and meanneſs; namely, the Mock-heroick and the Burleſque. The former conſiders little things as great, and deſcribes them with pomp of language and of harmony. The *Dunciad*, the *Splendid Shilling*, the *Battle of the frogs and mice* commonly though erroneouſly aſcribed to Homer, are maſterpieces in this way of writing; as are alſo the *Lutrin* of Boileau, and Pope's *Rape of the Lock*. The Burleſque author aſſumes the character of a buffoon, and conſiders great things as little, and little things as leſs than the reality; and

and affects vulgar language, and, if he write in verſe, a peculiar levity in the conſtruction of his numbers. *Hudibras*, and the *Hiſtory of John Bull*, are in the burleſque ſtyle, the one verſe the other proſe, and both excellent in their kind.

210. Some works of humour are written in a grave ſtyle, without either meanneſs or elevation of language. Many of the humorous papers in the *Tatler* and *Spectator*, and many paſſages in *Gulliver's Travels*, are of this ſort. The author takes the character of a plain man delivering a ſimple and ſerious narrative of a matter which he ſeems to think important and true; and this, if the ſubject be trifling, or the narrative palpably fabulous, has the ſame pleaſing effect, as when a perſon tells a merry ſtory with an unaffected gravity of countenance. See particularly the Journal of the Court of Honour in the *Tatler*.

211. Incongruity is not always ludicrous. It ceaſes to be ſo, when it comes to be cuſtomary and common; and therefore ludicrous incongruity muſt have in it ſomething uncommon, or at leaſt unexpected.

pected. New faſhions of dreſs often ſeem at their firſt appearance ridiculous; but, when generally adopted, are ridiculous no longer. Beſides, the inward emotion that prompts to laughter is not very powerful; many other emotions have naturally more ſtrength, and have therefore a natural right to ſuppreſs it. Conſequently, thoſe incongruous aſſociations, that give riſe to pity, diſguſt, fear, anger, hatred, or moral diſapprobation, are not laughable, becauſe they call forth paſſions of greater power, and more importance. In theſe caſes the weaker emotion gives place to the ſtronger.

212. And every one is ſenſible that it ought to be ſo. Were a man to laugh at diſtreſs, or at any thing which his conſcience tells him is criminal, he would be ſeverely cenſured; for it would be ſaid, with reſpect to the firſt, that he ought to pity, and not to laugh; and, with reſpect to the ſecond, that ſuperior conſiderations ought to have reſtrained his laughter, for that they are fools who laugh at ſin. And moſt people muſt have obſerved, that we

are not apt to laugh at that which diſguſts us, or makes us very angry, or ſeriouſly afraid. Had the writers of comedy paid a proper regard to theſe things, and never attempted to call forth either immoral or unnatural laughter, the Comic Muſe would, in reſpect both of utility and of elegance, have been more worthy of honour, than I am afraid ſhe can be ſaid to be in any nation.

213. Laughter, notwithſtanding what Lord Cheſterfield has ſaid againſt it, is perfectly conſiſtent with elegant manners; as might be proved from the practice of ſome of the moſt diſtinguiſhed characters both of theſe and of former times. Good-breeding, however, lays ſome reſtraints upon it, which may be thus explained. Good-breeding is the art, or rather the habit, of pleaſing thoſe with whom we converſe. Now we cannot pleaſe others, if we either ſhow them what is unpleaſing in ourſelves, or give them reaſon to think that we perceive unpleaſing qualities in them. All emotions, therefore, which may betray our own bad qualities, or might naturally ariſe from

from the view of bad qualities in others; and all thoſe emotions or paſſions in general, which our company may think too violent, and cannot ſympathiſe with or partake in, good-breeding requires that we ſuppreſs. Laughter that is too loud, or too frequent, is an emotion of this kind. And therefore, a well-bred man will be careful not to laugh louder or longer than others; nor to laugh at all, when he has reaſon to think, that the jeſt will not be equally reliſhed by the company.

214. This rule, a little extended, may be of great uſe, for the regulation of all thoſe emotions that diſplay themſelves in the outward behaviour. Truth we ſhould never violate, nor offer any outrage to virtue or decency. But, within the bounds of innocence, it is both our duty and our intereſt, to make ourſelves agreeable to thoſe with whom we aſſociate, eſpecially to the wiſe and good. This however we ſhall not be able to do, unleſs we take pains to regulate all our paſſions, and bring them down to that level, on which they will be agreeable to the more intelligent part of

mankind. The ſuppreſſion of evil paſſions, even for a ſhort time, weakens their force, and will at laſt, if perſiſted in, give us the victory over them. And hence, in regular ſociety, where the rules of good-breeding are obſerved, and where inordinate paſſions are not ſuffered to appear outwardly in the behaviour, we live together on a more agreeable footing, and in a way more favourable to virtuous improvement, than in any of thoſe ſtates of ſociety, in which men are at no pains to conceal or govern their paſſions. The ſavage is impetuous, and a ſlave to ſudden and violent paſſion; in the man of breeding we expect coolneſs, moderation, and ſelf-command.

215. The emotions connected with riſibility are a ſource of much amuſement to perſons of every age and condition. Wit and humour, when innocent, as they always may be and ought to be, enliven converſation, and endear human creatures to one another; and, when diſcreetly applied, may be of ſingular advantage in diſcountenancing vice and folly.

SECT.

SECT. X.

Of Sympathy.

216. THERE is in our nature a tendency to participate in the pains and pleaſures of others; ſo that their good is in ſome degree our good, and their evil our evil: the natural effect of which is, to unite men more cloſely to one another, by prompting them, even for their own ſake, to relieve diſtreſs and promote happineſs. This participation of the joys and ſorrows of others may be termed Sympathy or Fellow-feeling. Sympathy with diſtreſs is called Compaſſion or Pity. Sympathy with the happineſs of another has no particular name; but, when expreſſed in words to the happy perſon, is termed Congratulation. Every good man knows, that it is natural for him to rejoice with them who rejoice, and to weep with thoſe that weep.

217. Even for ſome inanimate things we

have a ſort of tenderneſs, which by a licentious figure of ſpeech might be called ſympathy. To loſe a ſtaff which we have long walked with, or ſee in ruins a houſe where we had long lived happily, would give a ſlight concern, though the loſs to us were a trifle, or nothing at all. We feel ſomething like pity for the dead bodies of our friends, ariſing from the conſideration of their being laid in the ſolitary grave, a prey to worms and reptiles; and yet we are ſure that from that circumſtance the dead can never ſuffer any thing. Towards the brute creation, who have feeling as well as we, though not in the ſame degree or kind, our ſympathy is more rational, and indeed ought to be ſtrong: "A righteous man regardeth the life," and is not inſenſible to the happineſs, "of his beaſt."

218. But our ſympathy operates moſt powerfully towards our fellow-men; and, other circumſtances being equal, is for the moſt part more or leſs powerful, according as they are more nearly, or more remotely, connected with us by kindred, by friendſhip, or by condition. With a friend, with

a

a relation, or with a perſon of our own condition, we are more apt to ſympathiſe, than with people of different circumſtances or connections. If we were to be tried for our life, we ſhould wiſh to have a jury of our equals. He who has had the toothach or the gout, is more inclined to pity thoſe who ſuffer from the ſame diſtempers, than that perſon is who never felt them.

219. We ſometimes ſympathiſe with another perſon in a caſe in which that perſon has little feeling of either good or evil. We bluſh at the rudeneſs of another man in company, even when he himſelf does not know that he is rude. We tremble for a maſon ſtanding on a high ſcaffold, though we have reaſon to believe he is in no danger, becauſe cuſtom has made it familiar to him. On theſe occaſions, our fellow-feeling ſeems to ariſe, not from our opinion of what the other perſon ſuffers, but from our idea of what we ourſelves ſhould ſuffer if we were in his ſituation, with the ſame habits and powers of reflection which we have at preſent.

220. Our fellow-feeling is never thoroughly

roughly rouſed, till we know ſomething of the nature and cauſe of that happineſs or miſery which is the occaſion of it: for till this be known, we cannot ſo eaſily imagine ourſelves in the condition of the happy or unhappy perſon. When we meet with one in diſtreſs, where the cauſe is not apparent, we are uneaſy indeed, but the pain is not ſo great, or at leaſt not ſo definite, as it comes to be when he has anſwered this queſtion, What is the matter with you? which is always the firſt queſtion we aſk on ſuch occaſions. And then our ſympathy is in proportion to what we think he feels, or perhaps to what we may think it reaſonable that he ſhould feel.

221. Many of our paſſions may be communicated or ſtrengthened by ſympathy. In a chearful company we become chearful, and melancholy in a ſad one. The preſence of a multitude employed in devotion tends to make us devout; the timorous have acted valiantly in the ſociety of the valiant; and the cowardice of a few has ſtruck a panic into an army. In a hiſtorical or fabulous narrative, we ſympa-

thiſe

thiſe with our favourite perſonages in thoſe emotions of gratitude, joy, indignation, or ſorrow, which we ſuppoſe would naturally ariſe in them from the circumſtances of their fortune. Paſſions, however, that are unnatural, as envy, jealouſy, avarice, malice, or unreaſonably violent, as rage and revenge, we are not apt to ſympathiſe with; we rather take part with the perſons who may ſeem to be in danger from them, becauſe we can more eaſily ſuppoſe ourſelves in their condition.

222. Nor do we readily ſympathiſe with paſſions which we diſapprove, or have not experienced. It is therefore a matter of prudence in poets, and other writers of fiction, to contrive ſuch characters and incidents, as the greater part of their readers may be ſuppoſed to ſympathiſe with, and be intereſted in. And it is their duty, to cheriſh, by means of ſympathy, in thoſe who read them, thoſe affections only which invigorate the mind, and are favourable to virtue; as patriotiſm, valour, benevolence, piety, and the conjugal, parental, and filial charities. Scenes of exquiſite diſtreſs, too long

long continued, enervate and overwhelm the ſoul: and thoſe repreſentations are ſtill more blameable, and cannot be too much blamed, which kindle licentious paſſion, or promote indolence, affectation, or ſenſuality. Of the multitudes of novels now publiſhed, it is aſtoniſhing and moſt provoking to conſider, how few are not chargeable with one or other of theſe faults, or with them all in conjunction. But immoral or extravagant novels would not be brought to market, nor of courſe written, if from the buyers of ſuch things there were not a *demand* for extravagance and immorality.

223. Let us cheriſh ſympathy. By attention and exerciſe it may be improved in every man. It prepares the mind for receiving the impreſſions of virtue; and without it there can be no true politeneſs. Nothing is more odious, than that inſenſibility, which wraps a man up in himſelf and his own concerns, and prevents his being moved with either the joys or the ſorrows of another. This inhuman temper, however common, ſeems not to be natural to the

ſoul

ſoul of man, but to derive its origin from evil habits of levity, ſelfiſhneſs, or pride; and will therefore be eaſily avoided by thoſe who cultivate the oppoſite habits of generoſity, humility, and good-nature. Of theſe amiable affections, the forms of common civility, and the language of polite converſation, are remarkably expreſſive; a proof, that good-breeding is founded in virtue and good ſenſe, and that a kind and honeſt heart is the firſt requiſite to an engaging deportment.

224. The eſſential parts of good-breeding are, to ſpeak little and modeſtly of one's ſelf, candidly of the abſent, and affectionately to thoſe who are preſent; to ſhow, by our looks and behaviour, that we reſpect our company, and that their happineſs or convenience is the chief thing we have in view; to ſympathiſe readily and tenderly in their joys and ſorrows; not to obtrude ourſelves upon the converſation, or ſeek to draw general notice; and, in all ordinary caſes, when we differ in opinion from others, to do it with that reſpect for them, and that diffidence in our-

ſelves, which become a fallible creature who wiſhes to be better informed. Such behaviour cannot be permanent or graceful, where it is hypocritical; and therefore they are greatly miſtaken, who think, with Lord Cheſterfield, that good-breeding conſiſts in diſguiſe, or that the malicious or the arrogant are at all ſuſceptible of that accompliſhment.

225. There are men, neither arrogant nor malicious, who ſometimes, without bad intention, give offence, by ſaying or doing that which, if they had entered more readily into the views and circumſtances of the company, their own good-nature would have determined them to avoid: while others apprehend ſo quickly the ſituation and ſentiments of every one preſent, that they give no offence to any, but great ſatisfaction to all. Habitual inadvertence, or perhaps a diſpoſition to be more attentive to one's ſelf than to one's company, may have produced the unpoliteneſs of the former claſs of men; which will probably be found to ariſe from one's not having been accuſtomed, in the early part of life, to the

the ſociety of well-bred people. They, on the other hand, who have been much in the world, and have found it neceſſary, from the firſt, to accommodate themſelves by obliging deportment to perſons of various characters, acquire a great facility of conceiving what modes of converſation and behaviour will be moſt agreeable to thoſe with whom they may happen to be aſſociated. And thus it appears, that the ſenſibilities, here comprehended under the general name of Sympathy, may by education and habit be greatly improved; or greatly weakened, if not deſtroyed, by inattention and want of practice.

226. There is a third claſs of men that one has ſometimes the misfortune to meet with, who affect what they call a bluntneſs of manners, and value themſelves on ſpeaking their mind on all occaſions whether people take it well or ill. Now it is right that people ſhould ſpeak their minds; but the mind that is fit *to be ſpoken* (if I may expreſs myſelf ſo ſtrangely) ought to be free from pride, oſtentation, and ill-nature; for from theſe hateful paſſions the

bluntneſs here alluded to may generally be derived. Such people may have a ſort of negative honeſty; but of delicacy they are deſtitute. In their company one ſweats with the apprehenſion of their committing ſome groſs indecorum; for no body knows what limits an indelicate mind may chooſe to preſcribe to itſelf. From injury puniſhable by law they may abſtain, but they often give ſuch offence as amounts not to injury only, but to cruelty. The thief that picks our pocket does not ſo much harm in ſociety, nor occaſion ſo much pain, as they may be charged with who ſhock the ear of piety with profaneneſs, or tear open the wounds of the bleeding heart by forcing upon it ſome painful recollection.

227. Sympathy with diſtreſs is thought ſo eſſential to human nature, that the want of it has been called *inhumanity*. Want of ſympathy with another's happineſs is not ſtigmatiſed by ſo hard a name; but it is impoſſible to eſteem the man who takes no delight in the good of a fellow-creature; we call him hard-hearted, ſelfiſh, unnatural; epithets expreſſive of high diſapprobation.

tion. Habits of reflection, with ſome experience of misfortune, do greatly promote the amiable ſenſibility of which we now ſpeak. *Non ignara mali miſeris ſuccurrere diſco*, ſays Dido in Virgil. Inconſiderate men are ſeldom tender-hearted, and mere want of reflection leads children into acts of cruelty.

SECT. XI.

Of Taſte.

228. THAT faculty, or thoſe faculties, which fit us for receiving pleaſure from what is beautiful, elegant, or excellent, in the works of nature and art, has in modern times been called *Taſte*. He who derives no pleaſure from ſuch elegance, excellence, or beauty, is ſaid to be a man of *no taſte*: he who is gratified with that which is faulty in works of art, is a man of *bad taſte*: and he who is pleaſed, or diſpleaſed, according to the degree

gree of excellence or faultineſs, is a man of *good taſte*. This way of expreſſing critical ſagacity by an alluſion to the ſenſations received by the tongue and palate, though it be now found in moſt of the languages of Europe, is of no great antiquity. Petronius indeed uſes *Sapor* in this ſenſe: from which, as well as from many other circumſtances, I ſuſpect, that the trifling book which bears that name is partly modern.

229. Good taſte implies ſeveral talents or faculties. The firſt is *a lively imagination*. This qualifies a man for readily apprehending the meaning of an author or artiſt, tracing out the connection of his thoughts, and forming the ſame views of things which he had formed. Without this talent, it is impoſſible to form a right judgement of an author's work. Delicacy of connection, and ſuch contrivances in a fable or ſtory as tend to produce ſurpriſe, are among the chief beauties of poetry; but theſe a man of dull imagination is apt to overlook, or not to underſtand.—This livelineſs of fancy muſt be corrected and regulated by the knowledge

knowledge of nature both external and internal, that is, both of the viſible univerſe, and of the human mind. For he who is unacquainted with nature can never be a man of taſte; becauſe he cannot know whether the productions of art reſemble nature or not: and, if he know not this, he cannot receive from the imitative arts any real ſatisfaction.

230. The ſecond thing neceſſary to good taſte is, *a clear and diſtinct apprehenſion of things.* Some men think accurately on all ſubjects: the thoughts of other men are almoſt always indefinite and obſcure. The former eaſily make you comprehend their meaning: the latter can never ſpeak intelligibly except upon familiar topics. He who is maſter of his ſubject, ſays Horace, will not be at a loſs either for expreſſion or for method: whence we may learn, that accurate knowledge is the beſt, and indeed the only ſolid, foundation of true eloquence. Lord Cheſterfield ſeems to think otherwiſe; but the eloquence he recommends is, like his favourite ſyſtem of manners, not ſolid, but ſhowy and ſuperficial.—It is plain, that

that they who are accuſtomed to think with preciſion muſt be the only competent judges of what they ſtudy, becauſe they alone can thoroughly underſtand it. Habits of accuracy and method will gradually improve the mind in this reſpect: and indeed ſtudy is good for little when it is not methodical and accurate.

231. The third thing neceſſary to good taſte, is a quick perception of, or a capacity of being eaſily and pleaſurably affected with, thoſe objects that gratify the ſecondary ſenſes, particularly ſublimity, beauty, harmony, and imitation. In this reſpect different minds are differently conſtituted. Many have little or no taſte for harmony either in language or in muſical ſound. Some have great talents in wit and humour, with hardly any reliſh for the ſublime and beautiful: Swift is an inſtance. Others, like Milton, have an exquiſite invention in regard to ſublimity and beauty of deſcription, and harmony of language, without any talents for wit or delicate humour. And ſome have excelled both in ſublimity and in wit; as Shakeſpeare did in a high degree,

degree, and Pope in a very conſiderable degree. Homer, too, is ſaid by Ariſtotle to have excelled in ludicrous as well as ſublime compoſition, and to have written a comic poem, called *Margites*, which is loſt. —The only way of improving the Secondary ſenſes, is by ſtudying nature and the beſt performances in art; by cultivating habits of virtue; and by keeping at a diſtance from every thing groſs and indelicate, in books and converſation, in manners and in language.

232. The fourth thing neceſſary to good taſte, is that *Sympathy* or Senſibility above deſcribed; by which, ſuppoſing ourſelves in the condition of other men, we readily adopt their ſentiments and feelings, and make them as it were our own; and ſo receive from them ſome degree of that pain or pleaſure which they would bring along with them if they were really our own. Without this moral ſenſibility, our minds would not be open to receive thoſe emotions of pity, joy, admiration, ſorrow, and imaginary terror, which the beſt performances in the fine arts, particularly in

poetry, are intended to raiſe within us; nor, by conſequence, could we form a right eſtimate of the abilities of the author, or of the tendency and importance of his work.

233. The laſt thing requiſite to form good taſte is *Judgement*, or *Good Senſe*; which is indeed the principal thing, and may without much impropriety be ſaid to comprehend all the reſt. Without this, we could not compare the imitations of nature with nature itſelf, ſo as to perceive how far they agree or differ; nor could we judge of the probability of events in a fable, or of the truth of ſentiments; nor whether the plan of a work be according to rule, or otherwiſe. For in every art certain rules are eſtabliſhed; ſome reſulting from the very nature of the thing, and the end propoſed by the artiſt, and theſe are eſſential and indiſpenſable rules; and others that may be called mechanical or ornamental, which depend rather upon cuſtom, than upon nature, and claim no higher origin, than the practice of ſome great performer, whom

whom it has become the faſhion to imitate.

234. The violation of an eſſential rule diſcovers want of ſenſe in an author, and conſequently want of taſte; for where good ſenſe is not, taſte cannot be. To depart from a mechanical rule, may be conſiſtent with the ſoundeſt judgement, and is ſometimes a proof both of good taſte, and of great genius.—Take an example or two:—To divide a tragedy or comedy into five acts; and rigidly to obſerve, in dramatic fable, the unities (as they are called) of time and place, are rules, which, though many poets have obſerved, and many critics enjoined them, are not eſſential. But, to make poetical perſons ſpeak and act ſuitably to their characters; to adhere, in hiſtory and philoſophy, to truth, and in poetry to probability; and to give to every work, whether proſe or verſe, a moral tendency, with ſimplicity of contrivance and of ſtyle, and unity of deſign,—are eſſential rules, which no writer is at liberty to violate.

235. All men, and even children, have

ſomething of taſte, as appears from the pleaſure they take in ſongs, tales, wit and humour, pictures, and other imitations. But education and ſtudy are neceſſary to the improvement of taſte; and it may be improved by various methods, ſome of which have been mentioned already. Whatever tends to enlarge, correct, or methodiſe, our knowledge, either of men or of things, is to be conſidered as a means of improving judgement, and conſequently taſte. Hiſtory and geometry, and thoſe parts of philoſophy which convey clear ideas, and are attended with ſatisfactory evidence, are peculiarly uſeful in this reſpect; to which muſt be added ſuch an acquaintance with life and manners, as fits a man for buſineſs and converſation.

236. Taſte is further improved, as already hinted, by ſtudying nature, and the beſt performances in art. Among theſe are to be reckoned the Greek and Latin claſſics; the moſt valuable of which are Homer, Xenophon, Demoſthenes, Thucydides, Sophocles, Plutarch's Lives; Terence, Ceſar, Cicero, Salluſt, Virgil, Horace,

race, and Livy. He who has read theſe few authors with due attention, may be truly ſaid to be a man of learning, and can hardly fail to be a man of taſte. I need not add, that bad books, and bad company, not only deprave the taſte, but alſo pervert the underſtanding, and poiſon the heart; and that the practice of reading even good books ſuperficially, breeds a habit of inattention alike unfriendly to intellectual and to moral improvement.—It was formerly ſaid, that we ſhould read none but approved authors, and never leave a good one till we underſtand every point of his doctrine and every word of his language. To prepare us for ſtudy ſo rigidly accurate, an exact, and even a minute, knowledge of grammar is neceſſary: indeed it is not eaſy to ſay, to what degree, and in how many different ways, both memory and judgement may be improved by an intimate acquaintance with grammar; which is therefore, with good reaſon, made the firſt and fundamental part of literary education. The greateſt orators, the moſt elegant ſcholars, and the moſt accomplished

pliſhed men of buſineſs, that have appeared in the world, of whom I need only mention Ceſar and Cicero, were not only ſtudious of grammar, but moſt learned grammarians; and Horace and Virgil, and moſt of the great authors above mentioned, appear, from the wonderful correctneſs of their ſtyle, to have been the ſame.

237. Taſte is alſo improved by reading the beſt books of criticiſm; particularly, the critical works of Horace, Quintilian, Longinus, Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, and the Poetics and Rhetoric of Ariſtotle. In Pope's notes on his Tranſlation of Homer; in Dryden's Prefaces; in Addiſon's papers on Paradiſe Loſt in the fourth and fifth volumes of the Spectator; in Hurd's commentary on Horace's Art of Poetry and Epiſtle to Auguſtus; in Pope's and Johnſon's Prefaces to Shakeſpear, and in Mrs Montagu's Eſſay on his writings and genius; in Rollin's method of ſtudying and teaching the Belles Lettres, and in the Abbe Du' Bos's Reflections on Poetry and Painting; you will find a great deal of good criticiſm perſpicuouſly and elegantly expreſſed.

expreſſed.—My laſt remark on this ſubject is, that taſte is greatly improved by cultivating all the generous, benevolent, and pious affections, and repreſſing pride, malice, envy, and every other ſelfiſh and wicked paſſion. Virtue is the perfection of beauty; and the love of virtue might have been, and perhaps ought to have been, mentioned as eſſential to true taſte.

238. It cannot be denied, that ſome unſkilful writers have obtained conſiderable reputation, and that inelegant modes of writing have frequently been faſhionable. There have been men, who could prefer Pliny to Cicero, Lucan to Virgil, Waller to Spenſer, and Cowley and Blackmore to Milton. But from this we muſt not infer, as ſome have done, that Taſte is a variable thing. Its principles are real and permanent, though men may occaſionally be ignorant of them. Very different ſyſtems of philoſophy have appeared; yet nature and truth are always the ſame. Faſhions in dreſs and furniture are perpetually changing; and yet, in both, that is often allowed to be elegant which is not faſhionable:

able: which could not be, if there were not, in both, certain principles of elegance, which derive their charm, neither from caprice, nor from cuſtom, but from the very nature of the thing.

239. In the fine arts, the ſtandard of excellence may be preſumed to be ſtill more permanent. There are now extant, ſtatues, carvings, and remains of antient buildings, which were the admiration of antiquity, and are as much admired now as ever. And there are authors, Homer and Virgil for example, whom, for theſe two thouſand years, all who underſtood them have conſidered as the greateſt of poets. When an author, or when a work of art, has been long in poſſeſſion of the public eſteem, and has been admired by the moſt candid and enlightened minds, it muſt be taken as a proof of extraordinary merit; and the diſſatisfaction of a few cavillers may not unreaſonably be imputed to ignorance or affectation.

240. To be pleaſed with novelty and imitation, to prefer good pictures to bad, harmony to harſhneſs, and regular ſhape

to

to diſtortion; to be gratified with accurate repreſentations of human manners; to be intereſted in a detail of human adventures, and more or leſs according to the degree of probability: to look with delight on the ſun, moon, and ſtars; the expanſe of heaven; grand and regular buildings; human features expreſſive of health, ſagacity, chearfulneſs, and good nature; colours, and ſhapes, and ſizes, of plants and animals, that betoken perfection and uſefulneſs; the ſcenery of groves and rivers, of mountains and the ocean; the verdure of ſpring, the flowers of ſummer, and even the pure ſplendor of winter ſnow;—is ſurely natural to every rational being, who has leiſure to attend to ſuch things, and is in any degree enlightened by contemplation.

241. If this be denied, I would aſk, whence it comes, that the poetry of all nations, which was certainly intended to give pleaſure to thoſe for whom it was made, ſhould abound in deſcriptions of theſe and the like objects; and why the fine arts ſhould have been a matter of general attention in all civiliſed countries. And if

this is not denied, a ſtandard of taſte is acknowledged; and it muſt be admitted further, that, whatever temporary infatuations may take place in the world of letters, ſimplicity and nature ſooner or later gain the aſcendant, and prove their rectitude by their permanency. *Opinionum commenta delet dies; naturæ judicia confirmat.*

CHAP. II.

Of Man's Active Powers.

SECT. I.

Of Free Agency.

242. ACTION implies motion; but there may be motion, as in a clock, where, *properly* ſpeaking, there is no agent. Many motions neceſſary to life are continually

nually going on in the human body; as thoſe of the heart, lungs, and arteries: but theſe are not human actions, becauſe man is not the cauſe of them. For the ſame reaſon, breathing, and the motion of the eye-lids, are not actions; becauſe, tho' we *may act* for a little time in ſuſpending them, for the purpoſe of ſeeing or hearing more accurately, they commonly go on without any care of ours; and, while they do ſo, we are, in regard to them, not active, but paſſive.

243. In like manner, the caſual train of thought, which paſſes through the mind in a reverie (ſee § 140.) is not action; but when we interrupt it, in order to fix our view upon a particular object, that interruption, and the attention conſequent upon it, are mental actions. Recollection is another, and inveſtigation a third; but a remembrance occurring to us, without any exertion on our part, is not action, and our minds in receiving it, or becoming conſcious of it, are as really paſſive, as the eye is in receiving the images of thoſe viſible things that paſs before it when it is

open. Nor is the mere perception of truth or falſehood a mental action, any more than the mere perception of hardneſs: the ſtone, which we feel, we muſt feel while it preſſes upon us; and the propoſition, which our judgement declares to be true, we muſt, while we attend to it and its evidence, perceive to be true. But to exert our reaſon in endeavouring to find out the truth, or to be wilfully inattentive to evidence, are actions of the mind; the one laudable, and becoming our rational nature, the other unmanly and immoral.

244. All action is the work of an agent, that is, of a being who acts; and every being who acts is the beginner of that motion which conſtitutes the action. The bullet that kills a man, the exploſion that makes it fly, the ſparkles from the flint which produce the exploſion, and the colliſion of the flint and ſteel whereby the ſparkles are ſtruck out, are none of them agents, all being paſſive and equally ſo; nor is it the finger operating upon the trigger that begins the motion, for that is in like manner a paſſive inſtrument: it is the mind,

mind, giving to the finger direction and energy, which is the firſt mover in this buſineſs, and therefore is, properly ſpeaking, the agent. And if we were to be ſupernaturally informed, that the mind thus exerted was made to do ſo by the ſecret but irreſiſtible impulſe of a ſuperior being, we ſhould inſtantly declare that being the agent, and the mind as really a paſſive inſtrument, as the finger or the gunpowder.

245. To aſk therefore, and the queſtion is almoſt as old as philoſophy itſelf, whether man in any of his actions be a free agent, ſeems to be the ſame thing as to aſk, whether or not man be capable of action. To every *action*, uſing the word in its *proper* ſenſe, it is eſſential *to be free: neceſſary agency* (unleſs we take the word in a figurative ſenſe, as when we ſay, the *agency* of the pendulum regulates the clock) is as real a contradiction in terms as *free ſlave*. If every motion in our mind and body is neceſſary, then we never move ourſelves; and thoſe motions, which are commonly called human actions, are not the actions of men, but of ſomething elſe, which,

which, according to the language of this theory, we muſt term *neceſſity*. To be an active being, is to have a power of beginning motion; to act, or to be an agent, is to exert that power. Brutes have a power of beginning motion; which, being in them not accompanied with any ſenſe of right and wrong, has been called *Spontaneity*; to diſtinguiſh it from that power which rational beings poſſeſs of beginning motion, and which, being accompanied with a conſciouſneſs of moral good and evil, is denominated *Liberty*.

246. Mental actions were mentioned; and them the mind performs without any dependance, that we can explain, on any bodily part. Bodily exertions do alſo take their riſe in the mind, which has the power of beginning motion in the body, as well as in itſelf. But the human body, like every other piece of matter, poſſeſſes not in itſelf the power of beginning motion; and therefore bodily motions proceeding from the mind are not properly *actions* of the body; becauſe, in regard to them, the body is only the paſſive inſtrument of the

ſoul.

ſoul.—The power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called *Volition* or *Will*. It is in man the immediate cauſe of action. We *will* to exert ourſelves in recollection or attention; and at the ſame inſtant the act of recollecting or attending is begun: we *will* to move our arm, or leg, or any particular finger, and inſtantly it is moved; and we feel, that this energy of mind, which we call *will*, is the cauſe of the motion. But in what way, or by what means, the mind operates upon itſelf ſo as to produce attention or recollection, or upon the muſcles that move the ſeveral parts of our body ſo as to give motion to thoſe muſcles, we can neither explain nor conceive.

247. Some things we can, and others we cannot do: we can walk, but we cannot fly. Thoſe things it is in our power to do, which depend upon our will; and from them proceeds whatever may be called moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, praiſeworthy or blameable, in our conduct. For no man is ſeriouſly blamed or praiſed for that in the performance of which he is not

not conſidered as a free agent; that is, as one who had it in his power either to do or not to do. This, according to the ſenſe of the words *agent* and *action*, as already explained, is ſaying nothing more, than that no man is ſeriouſly blamed or praiſed, except for actions done by himſelf, and not by another.

248. Our mind and body are put in motion by the will; and philoſophers have ſaid, that the will is determined by motives, purpoſes, intentions, or reaſons. Granting this to be true, I cannot admit, that by ſuch motives or purpoſes the will is *neceſſarily* determined. It is the will itſelf, or the ſelf-determining power of the mind, that gives a motive that weight and influence whereby the will is determined: in other words, it depends on ourſelves, whether we are to act from one motive or from another. A man, for example, is tempted to ſteal. His motive to commit the crime is the love of money; his motive to abſtain is a regard to duty. If he ſuffer himſelf to be determined by the former motive, he is a thief, and deſerves puniſhment; if he

comply

comply with the latter, he has done well. Now all the world knows and believes, and the laws of every country ſuppoſe, that he had it in his power to act according to the impulſe of either the one motive or the other; that is, that he had it in his power to give to either of them that influence which would determine his conduct.

249. To ſet this matter in another light. Action implies motion; and where there is not a power to begin motion, there cannot be action, there muſt always be reſt. Now, though motion, when begun, may be communicated from one body to another, nothing, ſo far as we know, can begin motion, but mind. If therefore motives or purpoſes have in themſelves a power to determine neceſſarily the mind to act, they muſt alſo in themſelves poſſeſs the power of beginning or communicating motion; that is, they muſt be either minds or bodies. But a motive, ſuch as the love of money, or a ſenſe of duty, is neither a mind, nor a body, and therefore cannot begin motion, nor conſequently be of it-

ſelf the immediate and neceſſary cauſe of action.

250. A motive may indeed raiſe within us a certain deſire or averſion, or may itſelf be that deſire or averſion when raiſed: but deſire and averſion are ſo far from being underſtood to be actions, that in all the languages we know they are called by a name correſponding to the Engliſh word *paſſions*, and ſignifying, not acting, but ſuffering, or being acted upon. We may indeed act according to the impulſe of averſion or deſire; but ſtill it is *we* that act; and it depends upon our will, upon our power of ſelf-determination, whether we are to act according to that impulſe, or not. A hungry man has a great deſire to eat; but within his reach there may be victuals, which, though he knows to be good, he may refrain from eating; though at the ſame time he is conſcious it is in his power to eat, notwithſtanding any motive, a regard to health for example, that may urge him to abſtain. Every man has an averſion to pain and death; but whether a ſoldier ſhall flee from both, or bravely in his

his country's cauſe ſet both at defiance, depends entirely upon himſelf;—as long at leaſt as he retains the uſe of reaſon, and the power of managing his limbs; that is, as long as he is an accountable being.

251. There are writers, who maintain, that the human frame is wholly corporeal, and that there is no good reaſon for diſtinguiſhing between the ſoul and the body of man. This doctrine has been called Materialiſm. If I could acquieſce in it, I ſhould perhaps grant, that all human actions are neceſſary; becauſe, being produced by one bodily part operating upon another, they muſt as really be the effects of mechaniſm, as the motions of a clock. But if this be true; and if motives, that is, thoughts and abſtract ideas, have the power of producing human action; thoſe motives or ideas muſt have the power of putting that great machine, the human body, or part of it at leaſt, in motion, and muſt therefore themſelves be either bodies, which is inconceivable and impoſſible, or ſpirit, which the materialiſt denies to be in human nature. Here is a difficulty, which

it ſeems impoſſible to get over, without renouncing both materialiſm and neceſſity; that is, without admitting, that there is in man ſomething which is not matter, and which has the power of beginning motion both in itſelf, and in the human body.

252. I do not here mean to enter minutely into the queſtion concerning liberty and neceſſity: firſt, becauſe I have explained myſelf at ſome length on that ſubject in another place; ſecondly, becauſe to give even a ſummary of all that has been written about it would take up too much time; and thirdly, becauſe in theſe moral inquiries I think it my duty to avoid controverſy and unprofitable ſpeculation, and confine myſelf to plain, practical, and uſeful truth. I therefore only add a few miſcellaneous remarks. The firſt is, that the freedom of the human will is a matter of fact and experience, whereof the human mind is conſcious, and which the language and behaviour of mankind in all ages prove that they did, and do, and muſt acknowledge. In all caſes of conduct, in which I conſider myſelf as an accountable being, I

feel

feel that I have it in my power to do or not to do, to ſpeak or be ſilent, to ſpeak truth or falſehood, to do my duty or neglect it. And were I to ſpeak and act as if ſuch things did not ſeem to me to be in my power, the world would charge me with affectation or inſanity.

253. Even thoſe few ſpeculative men, and they are but few, who in words deny the freedom of the will, do yet in the ordinary affairs of life ſpeak and act like other people; making promiſes, giving advice, laying down rules and precepts, blaming certain actions as what ought not to have been done, and praiſing others as right and what ought to be done: the propriety of which conduct it is not eaſy to reconcile, in a ſatisfactory manner, to the tenets of thoſe who teach, as the advocates for neceſſity do, that no paſt action of our lives could have been different from what it is, and that no future action can be contingent, or ſuch as it is in our power to do or not to do. The condition of theſe theoriſts is ſimilar to that of thoſe who argue againſt the exiſtence of matter. Both affirm

firm what contradicts the opinion and experience, not of the vulgar only, but of the moſt acute philoſophers, and of mankind in general: both ſay, they believe that, which is inconſiſtent with what common ſenſe taught them to believe, and with what they would ſtill have believed, if they had *kept to their natural ſenſe of things*, and not perplexed themſelves with metaphyſical arguments: and both aſſert to be true what they cannot reduce to practice, and what is not warranted by Chriſtianity, or by the morality and politics of any enlightened nation.

254. With reſpect to the Chriſtian religion, as concerned in this matter;—it may be obſerved, that one ſtrenuous fataliſt urges the doctrine of neceſſity, as an argument, either in favour of atheiſm, or againſt the turpitude of vice; and that another zealous neceſſarian, who avows his belief both in God and in Chriſt, ſeems to admit, that the teſtimony of the ſacred writers is rather againſt neceſſity than for it. Judging, then, either from the affirmation of the one, or from the conceſſion of the other, we muſt infer, that the Chriſtian religion and

and the doctrine of neceſſity are not friendly to each other; which is indeed what the aſſerters of liberty have generally maintained. If neceſſity lead to atheiſm, or if it confound the diſtinctions of vice and virtue, (and I not only agree with Mr Hume, that it does either the one or the other, but am ſatisfied that it does both), it is ſurely ſubverſive of all religion. And if the ſacred writers ſeem to declare in favour of liberty, (which I agree with Dr Prieſtley that they do); and if it is from them, and from them only, that I learn what Chriſtianity is; I muſt either queſtion their infallibility as teachers, or I muſt with them declare in favour of liberty. But, though the belief of neceſſity would, if I were capable of it, be fatal to *my* religious and moral principles, I am far from thinking, that it muſt have the ſame effect on every other perſon: different minds may no doubt conceive of it differently. Yet it is remarkable, that ſome of its moſt diſtinguiſhed advocates, of whom I ſhall only mention Spinoſa, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, and Voltaire, were enemies to our faith;

faith; whereas of the modern defenders of liberty I do not recollect one who was not a Chriſtian. The opinion of neceſſity, ſays Biſhop Butler, ſeems to be the very baſis upon which infidelity grounds itſelf.

255. We are permitted, and commanded to pray: we conſider it as a high privilege, and moſt reaſonable ſervice: we feel that it produces good effects on the mind; and our religion promiſes particular bleſſings to thoſe who piouſly perform it. But if every change in our minds to the better or to the worſe, if all the bleſſings we can receive, and if our praying, or not praying, are all things neceſſary, and the unalterable reſult of a long ſeries of cauſes, that began to operate before we were born, and ſtill continue to operate independently on us, why is prayer, or indeed any thing elſe, enjoined as a duty? and how are we to blame for neglecting, or how can we be rewarded for doing, that which it is not poſſible for *us* either to do or to neglect? In like manner, if no paſt action of our lives could have been different from what it is, why do we blame ourſelves for any

action

action of our paſt life? we may as reaſonably blame ourſelves for not having learned to fly, or for not coming into the world before the preſent century. And yet, if we do not blame any part of our paſt conduct, we cannot repent of it; and if we do not repent, we cannot be ſaved. Here ſeems to be another ſtrange and ſtriking oppoſition between the doctrine of the New Teſtament, and that of the fataliſt. In ſhort, all the precepts of morality and religion, all purpoſes of reformation, and all thoſe ſentiments of regret, ſelf-condemnation, and ſorrow, which accompany repentance, proceed on a ſuppoſition, that certain actions are ſo far in our power, that we may either do them or not do them. And moſt of the words we make uſe of in ſpeaking of the morality of actions are, on the principles of thoſe who deny free agency, unintelligible. Such are the words, *ought*, *ought not*, *moral*, *immoral*, *merit*, *demerit*, *reward*, *puniſhment*, and many others.

256. By a very zealous aſſerter of neceſſity ſome conceſſions have lately been made, which ſeem to convey notions of this doc-

trine, that are not much in its favour. He ſays, that nothing can be plainer than the doctrine of neceſſity, that it is as certain as that two and two are four: and yet he admits, that nine tenths of the generality of mankind will always diſbelieve it. What can this mean but that nine tenths of mankind are irrational; or that neceſſity is an incredible thing, notwithſtanding its being as certain as that two and two are four; or that the teachers of this doctrine are unable to explain it? Were it ſelf-evident, I ſhould grant, that argument could not make it plainer. But that cannot be ſelf-evident, which nine tenths of mankind deny, and which many of the acuteſt philoſophers that ever lived have to the ſatisfaction of thouſands proved to be abſurd.

257. He admits, that, according to his doctrine of neceſſity, the Deity is the cauſe of all the evil, as well as of all the good, actions of his creatures. What can this mean, but either that there is no difference between moral good and moral evil, between harm and injury, between crimes and calamities; or that the Divine charac-

ter

ter is as far from being in a moral view perfect, as that of any of his creatures? The ſame writer affirms, that the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity is a modern diſcovery, not older than Hobbes, or, perhaps he might mean, than Spinoſa. Strange, that a thing, in which all mankind are ſo much intereſted; and of which every man, who thinks, is a competent judge, and has occaſion to think and ſpeak, every day of his life; ſhould not have been found out till about two hundred years ago, and ſhould ſtill, in ſpite of all that can be ſaid for it, although as certain as that two and two are four, be diſbelieved by all mankind, a few individuals excepted.—I ſhall only add, that, if the Deity be, as this author affirms, the cauſe of all the evil, as well as of all the good, actions of his creatures, reſentment and gratitude towards our fellow men are as unreaſonable as towards the knife that wounds, or the ſalve that heals us; and that to repent of the evil I am conſcious of having committed would be not only abſurd but impious, becauſe it would imply a diſſatisfaction with the will

of Him, who was the almighty cauſe of that evil, and was pleaſed to make me his inſtrument in doing it.

258. I deny not, that the oppoſite doctrine of liberty may be thought to involve in it ſome difficulties which our limited underſtanding cannot diſentangle, particularly with reſpect to the Divine Preſcience and Decrees. But in moſt things we find difficulties which we cannot ſolve; nor can any man, without extreme preſumption, affirm, that he diſtinctly knows, in what manner the Divine Preſcience exerts itſelf, or how the freedom of man's will may be affected by the decrees of God. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us: but of our own free agency we are competent judges, becauſe it is a matter of fact and experience; and becauſe all our moral and religious notions, that is, all our moſt important knowledge, may be ſaid to be either founded on it, or intimately connected with it.

259. As Omnipotence can do whatever is poſſible, ſo Omniſcience muſt know whatever can be known. Every thing, which God

God has determined to bring *certainly* to paſs, he muſt foreſee *as certain*: and can it be thought impoſſible, that he ſhould foreſee, not as *certain* but as *contingent*, that which he has determined to be *contingent* and *not certain*? Or will it be ſaid, that it is not poſſible for the Almighty to decree contingencies, as well as certainties; to leave it in my power in certain caſes to act according to the free determination of my own mind? Our bodily ſtrength, and our freedom of choice in regard to good and evil, are matters of great moment to us; but the latter can no more interfere with the purpoſes of divine providence, than the former can retard or accelerate the motion of the earth. It would not be very difficult for a prudent man, who ſhould have the entire command of a few children, to make them in certain caſes promote his views, without laying any reſtraint on their will. Infinitely more eaſy muſt it be, for the almighty and omniſcient Governor of the univerſe, ſo to over-rule all the actions of his moral creatures, as to make them promote,

promote, even while they are acting freely, his own wiſe and good purpoſes.

SECT. II.

Further Remarks on the Will *.

260. IT was ſaid, that the power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called Volition or Will. The word *will* has other ſignifications, but I wiſh at preſent to uſe it in this ſenſe. I call it a power of beginning motion; meaning by the term *motion* every change in the human mind or body which is uſually denominated action.—When we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power; and when we *will* we always will ſomething, (and this ſomething may be termed the object of volition); even as when we remember we always remember ſomething, which may be called the object of remembrance.

* See Dr Reid's Eſſays on the active powers of man.

brance. Things therefore done voluntarily are to be diſtinguiſhed from things done, like a new-born infant's ſucking, by inſtinct, as well as from things done by habit, like the conſtant motion of the eyelids.

261. *Will* and *Deſire* are not the ſame. What we *will* is an action, and our own action: but we may *deſire* what is not action, as that our friends may be happy, or what is no action of ours, as that our friends may behave well. Nay we may *deſire* what we do not *will*, as when we are thirſty and abſtain from drink on account of health; and we may *will* what we *have an averſion to*, as when, on the ſame account, we force ourſelves to ſwallow a nauſeous medicine. Let us alſo diſtinguiſh between *will* and *command*; although, in common language, what a man commands is often called his will. We *will* to do ſome action of our own; we *command* an action to be done by another. Deſires and Commands are alſo, in popular language, confounded: but here too we muſt diſtinguiſh. "O if ſuch a thing were given

"me"

"me," is not the ſame with "Give me "ſuch a thing:" and if a tyrant, to get a pretence for puniſhing, were to command what he knew could not be done, it might be a command without deſire.

262. I ſaid, that when we *will* to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power, or to depend upon our will. In exerting myſelf to raiſe a weight from the ground, I believe, either that I can raiſe it, or that it is in my power to try whether I can raiſe it or not. A very great weight, which I know to be far above my ſtrength, I never attempt to raiſe. I never exert myſelf for the purpoſe of flying; I never *will* to ſpeak a language I have not learned; becauſe I know it to be out of my power. Our will may however be exerted in attempting to do what we know to be at the firſt trial impracticable; as when one begins to learn to perform on a muſical inſtrument: but in this caſe we believe, that frequent attempts properly directed will make the thing poſſible, and at laſt eaſy. And we know, that the firſt principles of muſical performance, as well

as

as of other arts, are adapted to the ability of a beginner, and conſequently in his power.

263. Some acts of the will are tranſient, others more laſting. When I *will* to ſtretch out my hand and ſnuff the candle, the energy of the will is at an end as ſoon as the action is over. When I *will* to read a book, or write a letter, from beginning to end, without ſtopping, the will is exerted till the reading or the writing be finiſhed. We may *will* to perſiſt for a courſe of years in a certain conduct; to read, for example, ſo much Greek every day, till we learn to read it with eaſe: this ſort of will is commonly called a reſolution. We may will or reſolve to do our duty on all occaſions as long as we live; and he who ſo reſolves, and perſeveres in the reſolution, is a good man. A ſingle act of virtue is a good thing, but does not make a man of virtue: he only is ſo, who reſolves to be virtuous, and adheres to his purpoſe. Ariſtotle rightly thought, that virtue conſiſts not in tranſient acts, but in a ſettled habit or diſpoſition; agreeable to which is the old defini-

tion of juſtice, *Conſtans et perpetua voluntas* ſuum cuique tribuendi. So of the other virtues. He is not a temperate or valiant man, who is ſo now and then only, or merely by chance; but he who is intentionally and habitually temperate or valiant. Him, in like manner, we judge to be a vicious character, not who through the weakneſs of human nature has fallen into tranſgreſſion, but who perſiſts in tranſgreſſion, or intends to tranſgreſs, or is indifferent whether he tranſgreſs or not, or reſolves that he will not take the trouble to guard againſt it.

264. For actions wherein the will has no concern, a man, as obſerved already, is not accounted either virtuous or vicious, and can deſerve neither reward nor puniſhment, neither praiſe nor blame. This is the univerſal belief of rational nature, and on this the laws of all enlightened nations are founded. It is true, that laws have entailed inconvenience upon the guiltleſs offſpring of the guilty. But ſuch laws either were unjuſt; or were made with a political view, to reſtrain fathers the more effectual-

ly from certain great crimes, high treaſon for example: in which laſt caſe they may, as many human laws are, be good upon the whole, becauſe profitable to the community, though a grievous hardſhip to individuals. Inequalities of this kind are unavoidable. At my return from a long voyage my health may require the refreſhments of the land; and yet, if there be a ſuſpicion of plague in the ſhip, I may, without having any reaſon to charge the government with cruelty, be forced to remain on board many days, even though my death ſhould be the conſequence. With his parents a man is indeed ſo cloſely connected, that, even where the law does not interpoſe at all, he may, and often muſt, derive good from their virtue, or evil from their miſconduct; competence, for example, from their induſtry, or poverty from their ſloth; a ſound conſtitution from their temperance, or hereditary diſeaſe from their ſenſuality; honour from their merit, or diſhonour from their infamy. This may ſuggeſt an obvious and important leſſon both to parents and to children.

SECT. III.

Principles of Action.

265. IN ſtrict propriety of ſpeech, and in all rational inquiry concerning the imputableneſs of actions, every thing that is called *human action* is ſuppoſed to depend on the human will. But, in common language, the word *action* is uſed with more latitude, and animals are often ſaid to *act*, or do, what they do not will, and even what they do not think of. An infant is ſaid to act, while it ſucks; a bee, while it gathers honey; and a man while he takes ſnuff without knowing that he takes it, as I have been told that ſnuff-takers often do. In ſpeaking of the *principles of action*, I muſt now uſe the word in this inaccurate and popular ſenſe. A *principle of human action* is, that which incites a man to act *. Our principles of action are many and various; I will not undertake to give a complete enumeration: it may be ſufficient to

* See Dr Reid on the active powers of man.

ſpecify

ſpecify a few of the moſt remarkable; which I arrange under the following heads. 1. INSTINCT. 2. HABIT. 3. APPETITE. 4. PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS. 5. MORAL PRINCIPLES; deferring theſe laſt at preſent, as they will find a place hereafter in Moral Philoſophy.

OF INSTINCT.

266. INSTINCT is a natural impulſe to certain actions which the animal performs without deliberation, without having any end in view, and frequently without knowing what it does. It is thus the new-born infant ſucks, and ſwallows, and breathes; operations, which in their mechaniſm are very complex, though attended with no labour or thought to the infant: thus, when hungry, it has recourſe to the mother's milk, before it knows that milk will relieve it: thus it cries while in pain or in fear; and thus it is ſoothed by the ſimple ſong and ſoft accents of the nurſe. Similar inſtincts are found in the young of other animals:

animals: and, as they advance in life, the ſame unerring principle, derived not from experience, or art, or habit, but from the all-wiſe author and preſerver of their being, makes them provide for themſelves and their young, and utter thoſe voices, betake themſelves to that courſe of life, and uſe thoſe means of ſelf-defence, which are ſuitable to their circumſtances and nature.

267. The arts of man are all of human invention, and advance to perfection gradually; and long practice is neceſſary to make us perform in them with eaſe. But the arts of inferior animals, and their *manufactures*, (if we may uſe ſo ſtrong a catachreſis); the neſt of the bird, for example, the honey and honeycomb of the bee, the web of the ſpider, the threads of the ſilkworm, the holes or houſes of the beaver, &c. are not invented or taught, are uniform in all the individuals of a ſpecies, are not more exquiſite now than they were four thouſand years ago, and, except where outward circumſtances are unfavourable, are all perfect in their kind. Thoſe things, however,

however, which the more ſagacious animals may *be taught* to do, are more or leſs perfectly done, according to their degree of ſagacity, and the ſkill and pains employed in their education.

268. Inſtinct, being partly intended to make up for the weakneſs or the want of underſtanding in animals, is more or leſs neceſſary to their preſervation and comfort, according as the underſtanding is more or leſs defective. In the beginning of life we do much by inſtinct, and little by underſtanding: when we have got the uſe of reaſon, the caſe is in ſome meaſure reverſed. Yet, even when arrived at maturity, there are occaſions innumerable on which, becauſe reaſon cannot guide us, we muſt be guided by inſtinct. Reaſon informs us, that we muſt do a certain action, ſwallow our food, for example, ſtretch out our arm, move our limbs, &c.: but *how* the action is done we know not; we only know that it follows or accompanies an energy of our will. We will to ſwallow, to walk, &c. and the very complex machinery of nerves and muſcles neceſſary

to

to thoſe actions is ſet agoing by inſtinct, and inſtantly produces them. There are actions too, as the motion of our eye-lids, which muſt be done ſo frequently, that, if we were obliged to intend and will them every time they are done, we could do nothing elſe: theſe therefore are generally inſtinctive. And ſometimes, for our preſervation, we muſt act ſo ſuddenly that there is no time for determination and willing; as when we pull away our hand from any thing that burns it, ſhut our eyes againſt a ſtroke that ſeems to be aimed at them, or throw out our arm to recover the balance of our body when in danger of falling. Such motions may alſo be aſcribed to inſtinct; as well as thoſe efforts which animals, in immediate danger of death by drowning, ſtrangling, &c. make to preſerve themſelves.

269. Our proneneſs to imitation is alſo in ſome degree inſtinctive. In the arts indeed, as painting and poetry, imitation is the effect of will and deſign. But a child who lives in ſociety learns of himſelf to ſpeak, though no particular pains be taken

to

to teach him; and acquires at the ſame time the accent, and frequently the ſound of voice, of thoſe with whom he lives, as well as their modes of thinking and acting. What a happineſs, then, is it for a young perſon to be brought up in the company of the wiſe and the good? Wild men, who in their younger years lived ſavage, ſolitary, and dumb, and were afterwards brought into civiliſed ſociety, (a few inſtances there have been of ſuch), were found incapable of acquiring either ſpeech or a right uſe of reaſon, though pains were taken to teach them both.—In many caſes children, and in ſome caſes grown men, may be ſaid to *believe* by inſtinct. Thus an infant believes what a man ſeriouſly tells him is true; and that what has once or twice happened in certain circumſtances will in the ſame circumſtances happen again, as in the caſe of his finger having been burned by the candle. And thus we all believe, that things *are* as they appear to our *ſenſes*, and that things *were* what we *remember* them to have been.

Of Habit.

270. The word Habit is uſed in two different ſignifications, which frequently are, and may without inconvenience be, confounded in common language. It denotes a facility of doing a thing acquired by having frequently done it; in this ſenſe of the word, *habit* can hardly be called a *principle of action*. See § 265. Habit is a principle of action, when, in conſequence of having frequently done a thing, we acquire an inclination to do it. A man, who is accuſtomed to walk every day at a certain hour, is uneaſy if he be kept from walking: and they who read much are never happy at a diſtance from books. Chooſe the beſt courſe of life, ſaid an antient moraliſt, and cuſtom will make it the moſt pleaſant. If frequency of performance did not produce facility, art would be impoſſible; but why the one ſhould produce the other we cannot explain; we can only ſay that ſuch is the law of our nature. And if doing a thing frequently did

not

not breed an inclination to do it, the improvement of our nature would be impoſſible, and we could hardly be ſaid to be moral beings. Without inſtinct an infant could not live to be a man, and without habit a man would always continue as helpleſs as an infant.

271. Habit, in both ſenſes of the word, is obſervable in the more ſagacious brutes, and in none more than in dogs trained to hunting, and horſes inured to the diſcipline of war. The war-horſe not only learns to obey command, but is impetuous to obey it; and the beagle ſeems to take as much delight as his maſter in the ſports of the field. The power of habit in forming rational beings to vice or virtue, to elegant or ruſtic manners, to attention or inattention, to induſtry or idleneſs, to temperance or ſenſuality, to paſſionateneſs or forbearance, to manual dexterity or the want of it, is univerſally acknowledged: ſomething, no doubt, depends on the peculiar conſtitution of different minds; and ſomething too perhaps on the ſtructure and temperament of different bodies: but in

faſhioning the character, and in giving impulſe and direction to genius, the influence of habit is certainly very great.

272. As in early life our powers of imitation are ſtrongeſt, our minds moſt docile, and our bodily organs moſt flexible, ſo good or bad habits, both mental and corporeal, are then moſt eaſily acquired. Hence the neceſſity of early diſcipline, the unſpeakable advantages of a good education, and the innumerable evils conſequent upon a bad one. It amazes one to conſider, what progreſs, in the moſt difficult arts, may be made, when our faculties of mind and body are properly directed in the beginning of life; and how eaſy an action, which at firſt ſeemed impracticable, comes to be when it has grown habitual. Performances in muſic and painting, and many other ſorts of manual dexterity, might be mentioned as examples: to ſay nothing of thoſe barbarous arts of balancing, tumbling, and legerdemain, which in all ages have been deemed ſo wonderful, that the clown is inclined to impute them to magic, and even the more conſiderate

ſpectator,

ſpectator, when he firſt ſees them, can hardly believe his own eyes.

273. But nothing in a more aſtoniſhing manner diſplays the power of habit, or rather of habit and genius united, in facilitating the performance of the moſt complex and moſt difficult exertions of the human mind, than the eloquent and unſtudied harangue of a graceful ſpeaker, in a great political aſſembly. It is long before we learn to articulate words; long before we can deliver them with exact propriety; and longer ſtill before we can recollect a ſufficient variety of them, and, out of many that may occur at once, ſelect inſtantly the moſt proper. Then, the rules of grammar, of logic, of rhetoric, and of good-breeding, which can on no account be diſpenſed with, are ſo numerous, that volumes might be filled with them, and years employed in acquiring the ready uſe of them. Yet to the accompliſhed orator all this is ſo familiar, in conſequence of being habitual, that, without thinking of his rules, or violating any one of them, he applies them all; and has, at the ſame time, preſent to his

his mind whatever he may have heard of importance in the courſe of the debate, and whatever in the laws or cuſtoms of his country may relate to the buſineſs in hand: which, as a very acute and ingenious author obſerves, "if it were not more "common, would appear more wonder-"ful, than that a man ſhould dance blind-"fold, without being burned, amidſt a "thouſand red-hot plowſhares *."

Of Appetite.

274. The word Appetite in common language often means hunger, and ſometimes, figuratively, any ſtrong deſire. It is here uſed to ſignify a particular ſort of uneaſy feeling in animals, returning at certain intervals, and demanding ſuch gratification as is neceſſary to ſupport the life of the individual, or to continue the ſpecies. The gratification being obtained, the appetite ceaſes for a while, and is afterwards

* See Reid on the active powers of man. Eſſay III.

renewed.

renewed. Hunger and thirſt are two of our natural appetites; their importance to our preſervation is obvious; brutes have them as well as we; and the ſame remarks that are here made on the one may with a little variation be made on the other. Hunger is a complex ſenſation, and implies two things quite different from each other, an uneaſy feeling, and a deſire of food. In very young infants it is at firſt only an uneaſy feeling; which, however, prompts the little animal inſtinctively to ſuck and ſwallow ſuch nouriſhment as comes in his way, and without which he muſt inevitably periſh. Afterwards, when experience has taught him, that the uneaſy feeling is to be removed by food, the one ſuggeſts the other to his mind, and hunger becomes in him the ſame complex feeling as in us. In the choice of food, the ſeveral ſpecies of irrational animals are guided, by inſtinct chiefly, to that which is moſt ſuitable to their nature: and in this reſpect their inſtinct is ſometimes leſs fallible than human reaſon. The mariner in a deſert iſland is ſhy of eating thoſe unknown fruits, however

ever delectable to ſight and ſmell, which are not marked with the pecking of birds.

275. Before we ceaſe to be infants, our reaſon informs us that food is indiſpenſable; but through the whole of life appetite continues to be neceſſary, to remind us of our natural wants, and the proper time of ſupplying them: for as nouriſhment becomes more needful, appetite grows more clamorous; till at laſt it calls off our attention from every thing elſe, whether buſineſs or amuſement; and, if the gratification be ſtill with-held, terminates in delirium and death. Hunger and thirſt are the ſtrongeſt of all our appetites, being the moſt eſſential to our preſervation: it is generally owing to criminal indulgence, when any other appetite acquires unreaſonable ſtrength.—In obeying the natural call of appetite, in eating when hungry or drinking when thirſty, there is neither virtue nor vice; unleſs by ſo doing we intentionally promote ſome good purpoſe, or violate ſome duty. But rightly to manage our appetites, ſo as to keep them in due ſubordination to reaſon, is a chief part of virtue;

virtue; as the unlimited or licentious indulgence of them degrades our nature, and perverts all our rational faculties.

276. Reſt after motion is eſſential to life, as well as food after faſting; and, when reſt becomes neceſſary, nature raiſes the ſenſation of *wearineſs*; which, like hunger and thirſt, comes at laſt to be irreſiſtible, is made up of an uneaſy feeling and a deſire of a certain object, goes off on being gratified, and after a certain interval returns. But we muſt not call wearineſs an appetite, nor is it commonly called ſo. Appetite prompts to action, wearineſs to reſt; appetite riſes though no action have preceded, wearineſs follows action as the effect follows the cauſe. We have a ſort of appetite for action in general: it may be called *activity*; and, when exceſſive or troubleſome to others, is termed reſtleſſneſs. For, as action is neceſſary to our welfare both in mind and body, our conſtitution would be defective, if we had not ſomething to ſtimulate to action, independently on the dictates of reaſon. This activity is very conſpicuous in children; who, as ſoon as

they have got the faculty and habit of moving their limbs, and long before they can be ſaid to have the uſe of reaſon, are, when in health and awake, almoſt continually in motion. It is, however, through the whole of life, ſo neceſſary, that without it there can be no happineſs. To a perſon of a ſound conſtitution idleneſs is miſery: if long continued, it impairs, and at laſt deſtroys, the vigour of both the ſoul and the body.

277. It were well for man, if he had no appetites but thoſe that nature gave him; for they are but few; and they are all beneficial, not only by miniſtering to his preſervation and comfort, but alſo by rouſing him to induſtry and other laudable exertions. But of *unnatural* or artificial appetites, if they may be called *appetites*, which man creates for himſelf, there is no end; and the more he acquires of theſe; the more he is dependent, and the more liable to want and wretchedneſs. It behoves us therefore, as we value our own peace, and the dignity of our nature, to guard againſt them. Some of the propenſities

ſities now alluded to may no doubt have been occaſioned in part by diſeaſe of body, or diſtreſs of mind; but they are in general owing to idleneſs and affectation, or to a fooliſh deſire of imitating faſhionable abſurdity. They are not all criminal, but they all have a tendency to debaſe us; and by ſome of them men have made themſelves diſagreeable, uſeleſs, contemptible, and even a nuiſance in ſociety. When I mention tobacco, ſtrong liquors, opiates, gluttony, and gaming, it will be known what I mean by unnatural appetite, and acknowledged that I have not characteriſed it too ſeverely.

SECT. IV.

The Subject continued.

Paſſions and Affections.

278. THE word *Paſſion* properly means Suffering; but is ſeldom uſed in that ſenſe, except when we ſpeak of *our*

Saviour's paſſion, as in the beginning of *Acts of the Apoſtles*. By Paſſion the common people mean little more than Anger; and anger is a paſſion, but it is only one of many. Some philoſophers have uſed the word to ſignify whatever moves us to action; but this uſe of it is too extenſive. The ſenſe in which I here underſtand it will appear by and by.—When we act voluntarily, it is in order to obtain what is, or appears to be, good, or to avoid what is, or appears to be, evil. Good real or apparent excites deſire; evil real or apparent excites averſion: but in this acceptation, the words *deſire* and *averſion* are uſed with great latitude. Deſires and Averſions are two copious claſſes of paſſions; and aſſume different forms, and are called by different names, according to the nature of the good or evil that draws them forth, and its ſituation with reſpect to us. For example; preſent good gives riſe to *joy*, probable good to *hope*, preſent evil to *ſorrow*, probable evil to *fear*; good qualities in another perſon raiſe our *love*, or *liking*, evil qualities in another our *diſlike*, &c.

279. Each

279. Each variety of desire and aversion, as well as every other passion, is agreeable in the feeling, or is disagreeable; and, if in any degree violent, is attended with some commotion in the body as well as in the mind. For, by varying the human countenance and attitude, painters may express almost every passion; which could not be, if the passions did not make perceptible changes in the outward appearance of the body. A passion therefore may be said to be "A commotion of the soul, attended with pleasure or pain, affecting both the mind and the body, and arising from the view of something which is, or appears to be, good or evil." If we rank *admiration* among the passions, which I think is commonly done, we must vary the last clause thus:—"and arising from the view of something which is, or appears to be, good, or evil, or uncommon." In treating of the Passions, I shall, first, make some general remarks upon them; secondly, I shall endeavour to arrange them in classes, and describe the more remarkable ones; and I shall conclude

clude with ſome rules for the right management of this part of our moral nature. I do not promiſe, I will not even attempt, a complete enumeration. Some paſſions may probably occur to me, which yet I ſhall forbear to mention, becauſe I would not put my hearers in mind of them.

280. Theſe emotions have got the name of Paſſions, probably becauſe in receiving the firſt impreſſions of them our mind is paſſive, being acted upon, or influenced, by the body, by external things, or by the imagination.—We may diſtinguiſh between the *cauſe* of a paſſion and its *object*. The *cauſe* is that which raiſes it; the *object* is that towards which it prompts us to act, or on which it inclines us to fix our attention. The cauſe and the object of a paſſion are often, but not always, one and the ſame thing. Thus preſent good is both the cauſe and the object of *joy*; we rejoice *in* it, and we rejoice *on account* of it. But of *love* or *eſteem* the cauſe is ſome agreeable quality, and the object is ſome perſon ſuppoſed to poſſeſs that agreeable quality: of *reſentment*, in like manner, injury is the cauſe,

cauſe, and the injurious perſon the object.

281. That may be well enough underſtood which it is not eaſy to deſcribe philoſophically. This part of human nature is in general ſo well underſtood, that moſt people know what will draw forth the paſſions of men, and in what manner thoſe paſſions operate; yet a complete analyſis of them is ſtill, if I miſtake not, a *deſideratum* in moral ſcience. The following ſketch (for the *outline* of which I am indebted to Dr Watts) may have its uſe, but is very ſuſceptible of improvement. The difficulties attending this ſubject ariſe from ſeveral cauſes: from the inſufficiency of human language, which does not ſupply a name for each form and variety of human affection, and of courſe makes it neceſſary to expreſs different affections by the ſame name; from the complex nature of the paſſions themſelves, as they vary their appearance in men of different characters, and in the ſame man at different times and in different circumſtances; and perhaps too from that partiality, which inclines us to think

think and ſpeak too favourably of thoſe paſſions that moſt eaſily beſet ourſelves, and with too little favour of ſuch as may ſeem to predominate in other men.

282. The Paſſions have been variouſly arranged according to the various views which have been taken of them. They may be divided into Pleaſant and Painful. Criminal paſſions bring pain, virtuous affections pleaſure. And therefore to cheriſh good affections makes a man happy, and to indulge evil paſſions makes him wretched: happineſs being rather a habit of the mind, than a thing that depends on outward circumſtances. For, amidſt the greateſt worldly proſperity, the ſtate of a man's mind, who is haunted with the horrors of a guilty conſcience, or with envy, jealouſy, malice, and other evil paſſions, may make him completely miſerable; and diſeaſe and poverty united will not make that perſon unhappy, who has a good conſcience, and is piouſly reſigned to the Divine will.—It may be objected, that ſome evil paſſions, as revenge, give pleaſure; and that ſome good ones, pity for example, are painful.

But

But the anſwer is eaſy. Of pity, as both a painful and a pleaſurable emotion, I have ſpoken already (§ 191.): and, with reſpect to revenge, I ſhall only obſerve at preſent, that though it may to an indelicate and inconſiderate mind give a momentary gratification, even as gluttony and exceſſive drinking may to a depraved appetite, it can never bring happineſs along with it;—becauſe it is accompanied with many tormenting thoughts; becauſe the promiſcuous perpetration of it would unhinge ſociety, and in time exterminate the human race; and becauſe the oppoſite virtue of forgiveneſs is one of the moſt amiable and moſt delightful (I had almoſt ſaid, moſt godlike) affections whereof rational nature is capable.

283. Though the paſſions are juſtly reckoned principles of action, (indeed if we had no paſſions we ſhould never act voluntarily, at leaſt we ſhould never act with alacrity or vigour), they may however be divided into ſuch as *do not* prompt to action, and ſuch as *do*. Of the former claſs, which incline rather to reſt, by fixing the

attention upon their cauſes or objects, are *admiration*, *joy*, and *ſorrow*. Of the latter, which are properly active principles, are *hope*, *fear*, *deſire*, *averſion*, *benevolence*, *gratitude*, *anger*, &c. If *joy* in the poſſeſſion of good be blended with the *fear* of loſing it, this will produce an active propenſity, diſpoſing us to exert ourſelves in the preſervation of it. In like manner, if *ſorrow* be mixed with *hope*, as in the caſe of one whoſe friend is dangerouſly ill; or with *fear*, or with *curioſity*, as in the caſe of one who hears he has loſt a friend, but is not informed of the perſon; — in theſe caſes, *ſorrow* will become active, and make a man exert himſelf in procuring relief for his friend in the one caſe, and in obtaining full information in the other. In all our active paſſions there is a certain degree of anxiety, reſtleſſneſs, or deſire; which however is not always painful. *Benevolence* is anxious to promote another's good, and *gratitude*, to make acknowledgements and requite the favour; but theſe are delightful emotions notwithſtanding.

284. The paſſions may be divided into

ſelfiſh

ſelfiſh and *benevolent*: the former aim at our own good, the latter at the good of others. A rational deſire of our own happineſs, which may be called *ſelf-love*, is a powerful and uſeful propenſity, and when rightly managed tends to happineſs univerſal. In this reſpect, "true ſelf-love and ſocial "are the ſame." For that muſt be beneficial to the ſpecies, which, without injury to any, promotes the good of the individual; even as that which removes diſeaſe from one of the limbs contributes to the health of the whole body. Self-love, when exceſſive, or when injurious to others, may be called *ſelfiſhneſs*, and is a hateful diſpoſition.

285. With rational ſelf-love we muſt not confound thoſe deſires which men take to particular worldly things, as power, pleaſure, and riches. For ſo far are theſe from making a man happy, that they often make him miſerable. And it is not ſo much with a view to happineſs, that ambitious, covetous, and ſenſual men purſue their favourite ſchemes, as in order to obtain power, wealth, and pleaſure; to the poſſeſſion of which they muſt know, if they

know any thing, that happineſs is not annexed. But without power, pleaſure, wealth, ſay they, we cannot be happy, and therefore we purſue them. Sots in like manner ſay they cannot be happy without the means of intoxication. But ſurely no man in his ſenſes can believe that ſelf-love is gratified by exceſſive drinking; or that brandy and tobacco * have any thing to do with rational felicity, except perhaps by their tendency to deſtroy it. There have been drunkards, who could perſevere in their vile habits, even while they knew that ruin and death would be the conſequence. Such men being really their own enemies, it would be a ſtrange abuſe of words to ſay that they were actuated by ſelf-love: and the ſame thing may be affirmed of all who are enſlaved to ambition, covetouſneſs, or ſenſuality.

286. It has been queſtioned, whether there be in man any principle of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's ſelf. By doing good to others we

* I ſpeak of them not as medicines but as luxuries.

do

do indeed moſt effectually gratify ourſelves; for what can give a man more pleaſure, than to reflect that he has been inſtrumental in promoting a fellow-creature's happineſs! Yet every good man may be ſenſible, that he often does good, and wiſhes well, to others, without any immediate view to his own gratification, nay without thinking of himſelf at all. In fact, if we had not principles purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourſelves by doing others good. Children have been known to ſacrifice their inclinations to the happineſs of thoſe they loved, when they themſelves believed that their own intereſt would in every reſpect ſuffer by doing ſo. It is not my meaning, that all children, or all men, are ſo diſintereſted; I only ſay, that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature: a doctrine, which, though to many it may appear ſelf-evident, has been much controverted; and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themſelves, will never heartily acquieſce in.

287. It has alſo been made a queſtion, whether

whether there be in man a principle of univerſal benevolence. But does not every good man wiſh well to all mankind? and is not this univerſal benevolence? He who wiſhes harm to thoſe who never offended him, or who cares not whether a fellow-creature be happy or unhappy, is a monſter, and deſerves not the name of a man. It is true, that every man, even in civiliſed ſociety, is not capable of forming extenſive views of things, or of conſidering the whole human race, or the whole ſyſtem of percipient beings, as the objects of his benevolence. But in every good man there is a benevolent principle, which makes him wiſh well, and do good, to every one to whom he has it in his power to be ſerviceable; and this ſort of benevolence will do as much real good in the world, as benevolence univerſal. Accordingly our religion, which is ſuited to our general nature, and enjoins nothing as incumbent on all men, but what every man, of extenſive or narrow views, of more or leſs knowledge, may perform;—our religion, I ſay, inſtead of recommending univerſal benevolence in the

the abſtract, requires, that we do good to all men, *as we have opportunity*; and commands us to love our neighbour as ourſelves; declaring every man to be our neighbour, who needs our aid, and to whom we have the means of giving it.

288. Concerning univerſal benevolence ſome have argued in this manner. "Benevolence ariſes from love; and love "from the view of agreeable qualities in "another. Now the good qualities of o-"thers can be known to us in two ways "only; from perſonal acquaintance, or "from information. Of one whom we "never ſaw or heard of, we cannot know "either the good qualities, or the bad: "him therefore we cannot love; but be-"nevolence is founded in love: therefore "towards ſuch a perſon we cannot be be-"nevolent. It follows, that there can be "no ſuch affection as univerſal benevo-"lence in human nature." This reaſoning is good for nothing. Whether the principle in queſtion be a part of our frame, is a query that relates to a matter of fact, and is therefore to be determined, not by argument,

argument, but by obſervation and experience. He who is conſcious, that he wiſhes well to all his fellow-creatures, is a man of univerſal benevolence; and I have no ſcruple to affirm, that every good man does ſo, and that to do ſo is in the power of every man.

289. Though one were to grant the premiſes of the foregoing argument, the concluſion would not follow. For, though we are not perſonally acquainted with every man upon earth, we know that all men poſſeſs certain agreeable qualities, for which we may and ought to love them. We know, that all men are percipient beings, are endowed with reaſon and ſpeech, are animated with ſouls intelligent and immortal, are deſcended from our firſt parents, and are dependent on the ſame Great Being on whom we depend. On theſe accounts, a good man loves all mankind; and may therefore, if benevolence ariſe from love, be benevolent towards all mankind. The very circumſtance of our all inhabiting the ſame planet, and of being all liable to the ſame wants and infirmities, will naturally

ſerve

ſerve as a bond of endearment; for ſimilarity of fortune never fails to attach men to one another.

290. Some paſſions are called unnatural, as *envy*, *malevolence*, and *pride*. The reaſon is, becauſe they are deſtructive of good affections that are natural. We naturally love excellence wherever we ſee it; but the envious man hates it, and wiſhes to be ſuperior to others, not by raiſing himſelf by honeſt means, but by injuriouſly pulling them down. It is natural to rejoice in the good of others; but the malevolent heart triumphs in their miſery. It is natural for us to regard mankind as our companions and brethren; but the proud man regards himſelf only, deſpiſing others as if they were beneath him. Theſe unnatural paſſions are always evil; they make a man odious to his fellow-creatures, and unhappy in himſelf; and they tend to the utter depravation of the human ſoul. Anger and reſentment may lead to miſchief; but, if kept within the due bounds, are uſeful for ſelf-defence, and therefore not to be altogether ſuppreſſed. We *may* be angry

without ſin; and not to reſent injury is the ſame thing as not to perceive it, which would be inſenſibility. Nay on ſome occaſions reſentment and anger are further uſeful, by cheriſhing in us an abhorrence of injuſtice, and fortifying our minds againſt it. But pride, malevolence, and envy, can never be uſeful or innocent; to indulge them even for a moment is criminal.

291. The paſſions have long ago been divided into *calm* and *violent*. Of the former ſort, commonly termed *Affections*, are Benevolence, Pity, Gratitude, and in general all virtuous and innocent emotions. Of the latter, are Anger, Hatred, Avarice, Ambition, Revenge, exceſſive Joy or Sorrow, and in general all criminal and all immoderate emotions; which, in imitation of the Greeks, we may call *Paſſions*, uſing the word in a ſtrict ſenſe. The former are ſalutary to the ſoul, the latter dangerous. Thoſe reſemble ſerene weather, accompanied with ſuch gales, and refreſhing ſhowers, as prevent ſtagnation, and chear by their variety; theſe may be likened to ſtorms

and

and other elemental commotions that terrify and deſtroy. Violent paſſions, very properly expreſſed by the Latin word *perturbationes*, always diſcompoſe the mind and impair reaſon to a certain degree; and have been known to riſe even to phrenſy, and hurry men on to perpetrations, that have ſhortened their days, and made life miſerable, and death infamous. Many of them are attended with feveriſh ſymptoms; ſome give an unaccountable addition of bodily ſtrength, which however ſoon ends in languor; and ſome have brought on fainting, apoplexy, and inſtant death. Nothing more needs be ſaid to ſhow the dreadful effects of violent paſſion, the indiſpenſable duty of guarding againſt it, and the inexcuſable temerity of ſpeaking and acting under its influence.

292. The Peripatetics, or followers of Ariſtotle, rightly thought, that the Paſſions, dangerous as they are, ought not to be extinguiſhed, even though that were poſſible; for that, being natural, they muſt be uſeful; but that they are to be regulated by reaſon, and kept within the bounds of moderation.

deration. All thoſe violent emotions, that urge us on to pleaſure or to the avoidance of pain by a blind impulſe, were by the ſchoolmen, who profeſſed to derive their tenets from the ſame ſource, referred to what they called the Senſitive Appetite, becauſe they ſeemed to partake more of the ſenſes than of reaſon: and thoſe calmer affections, that prompt us to purſue good rationally and with tranquillity, they referred to the Rational Appetite, becauſe more nearly allied to reaſon than to the ſenſes.

293. Pythagoras and Plato aſcribe to the ſoul two natures, or, to give it in the words of Cicero, *animum in duas partes dividunt*, divide the ſoul into two parts, the one rational, the other irrational. In the rational nature they placed what they called Tranquillity, that is, as Cicero explains the word, *placida et quieta conſtantia*, an eaſy and quiet conſiſtency or uniformity. To the irrational part they referred what the Greeks called πάθη or paſſions, and the Latins, more properly, *perturbationes* or diſcompoſures, thoſe turbulent emotions both of

of anger and of desire, which are contrary and unfriendly to reason. There is, in Cicero's fourth book of Tusculan Inquiries, a particular enumeration of the several sorts of *Perturbationes* and *Constantiæ*, according to the Stoical system. The passage deserves attention; not so much for the philosophy contained in it, as because it ascertains the signification of some Latin words, which are not for the most part exactly understood.

294. Indeed it is not very easy to comprehend what the Stoics say on this subject. Sometimes they would seem to require the extinction of all our passions, of all at least that are influenced by external things; for they hold, that nothing external is either good or evil, virtue being, according to them, not only the greatest but the only good. At other times they are not so unfavourable to the passions; but grant indulgence to those that interrupt not that calm constancy, and steady uniformity, which they supposed to constitute the glory of the human character. Thus they allow, that *gaudium*, or rational and tranquil

tranquil joy, may be permitted to have a place in the human breaſt; but they proſcribe *lætitia*, which it ſeems is a more tumultuous ſort of gladneſs, as unworthy of a wiſe man. They are indeed licentious, and frequently whimſical, in their uſe of words; ſo that it is difficult to underſtand them in their own tongues, the Greek and Latin, and ſtill more ſo to tranſlate their doctrines into any modern language. Mrs Carter has however been ſingularly ſucceſsful in her verſion of the diſcourſes of Epictetus; to which ſhe has prefixed an elegant introduction, of more value than all the reſt of the book. To that introduction I would refer thoſe who wiſh to form a juſt idea of the ſpirit and genius of the Stoical philoſophy.

295. It cannot be doubted, that pure and created ſpirits may be ſuſceptible of emotions ſomewhat ſimilar to human paſſions, as Joy, Gratitude, Admiration, Eſteem, Love, and the like. Hence ſome authors, in treating of the paſſions, have divided them into Spiritual and Human. The former we are ſuppoſed to be capable

of

of in common with angels and other created ſpirits; the latter are peculiar to our preſent conſtitution as compoſed of ſoul and body. I need not take further notice of this diviſion. Through the whole of the enſuing arrangement I muſt be underſtood to ſpeak of the paſſions, as they affect human creatures in the preſent ſtate. Of the emotions of pure ſpirits we may form *conjectures*; but we can ſpeak with certainty, and ſcientifically, of thoſe only which are known to us by experience.

SECT. V.

The Subject continued.

Paſſions and Affections.

296. THE firſt claſs of Paſſions that I ſhall take notice of comprehends *Admiration*, and ſome other emotions allied to it. What is either *uncommon* in itſelf, or endowed with uncommon qualities, raiſes admiration or wonder. The ſun is ſeen every

every day, and therefore is in one reſpect not uncommon; yet who does not *admire* his extraordinary magnitude and ſplendour, and beneficial influences! When, as in this example, the object we contemplate is tranſcendently excellent or great, admiration becomes *aſtoniſhment*; and an uncommon or unexpected object appearing on a ſudden raiſes within us an emotion called *ſurpriſe*. The paſſions of this claſs, when under no reſtraint, naturally expreſs themſelves by opening the mouth and eyes, raiſing the eyebrows, lifting up the hands and ſpreading the fingers: ſurpriſe, when violent, occaſions ſtarting and other nervous ſymptoms. Theſe are all kindred emotions, and yet they are not the ſame.

297. *Admiration* and *wonder* may be diſtinguiſhed. The former is generally a pleaſurable paſſion, its object being for the moſt part good, or great, or both; the latter may be agreeable, or otherwiſe, according to circumſtances. We wonder at the folly and wickedneſs of ſome people, but can hardly be ſaid to admire it. We wonder at the ingenuity diſplayed in harneſſ-

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ing a flea to a microſcopic chariot; but the genius of the artiſt we do not admire, becauſe it exerts itſelf in nothing that can be called either great or good; and becauſe, though at firſt view it may yield a ſlight gratification, one is rather vexed than pleaſed to think that ſo much ſkill and time ſhould be thrown away upon ſuch a trifle. We may alſo diſtinguiſh between admiration and ſurpriſe. The ſudden appearance of a perſon in a place where we did not expect him may ſurpriſe us without being matter of admiration. And admiration, as already obſerved, is generally, if not always, pleaſing; but it is not ſo with ſurpriſe.

298. We ſpeak of diſagreeable as well as agreeable ſurpriſes, and of aſtoniſhment that confounds, as well as of aſtoniſhment that delights; but of diſagreeable or painful admiration I think we ſeldom or never ſpeak. It would be an agreeable ſurpriſe, if, on going to viſit a friend whom we believed to be dangerouſly ill, we ſhould find him in perfect health; and in contrary circumſtances our ſurpriſe would be

painful in the extreme. Delightful aſtoniſhment we receive from the contemplation of pure ſublimity (ſee § 168.); but the aſtoniſhment that ſeizes the young warrior, when the thunder of the battle begins, confounds at firſt and ſtupifies, tho' valour and a ſenſe of duty ſoon get the better of it. This extreme and painful aſtoniſhment is ſometimes, both in Engliſh and Latin, called *conſternation*, as if it had a tendency to throw a man down.—It is to be obſerved here, and while we treat of the paſſions it muſt not be forgotten, that as two or more paſſions really different may in ſome reſpects be ſimilar, it is not ſtrange, that the name of one ſhould often be put figuratively for another. Inſtances might be given of the words *admiration*, *ſurpriſe*, *aſtoniſhment*, and *wonder*, uſed indiſcriminately; but the philoſopher muſt endeavour to diſtinguiſh as well as he can. From this licentious or indefinite uſe of language, diſputes frequently ariſe where there is no real difference of opinion.

299. Admiration, ſays Plato, is the mother of wiſdom, but, when exceſſive or miſplaced,

miſplaced, becomes folly. The young and inexperienced are moſt liable to it, and to them it is, unleſs directed to mean or improper objects, peculiarly beneficial: for curioſity prompts them to ſearch for what is new, and admiration fixes their view upon it till it be imprinted on the memory. Our admiration of things great or good heightens the pleaſure we take in them; and the aſtoniſhment, that ariſes when any thing uncommonly evil attracts our notice, ſerves to quicken diſguſt and preſerve us from contagion. Horace conſiders what the Greeks called ἀθαυμασια, *nil admirari*, an exemption from admiration, as a ſecurity againſt thoſe turbulent emotions that interrupt the happineſs of life: but he is there ſpeaking of that admiration which is beſtowed upon unworthy objects. And in this view his doctrine is right. For whatever raiſes this paſſion is apt to kindle others of equal or ſuperior violence, as love, hatred, or deſire; and where theſe are improperly directed, the mind muſt be ſubject to perturbations incompatible with virtue, and conſequently with happineſs.

—So much for the firſt order of paſſions, whereof the object is in general *uncommonneſs*. See § 279.

300. A much more copious claſs are thoſe of the ſecond order; which take their riſe from the view of what is, or appears to be, *good* or *evil*. That which is, or appears to be *good*, or *agreeable*, raiſes ſome modification of *Love*: that which is, or appears to be, *evil*, or *diſagreeable*, excites one form or other of *Hatred*. Now a thing may ſeem to be good, either *in itſelf* ſimply, or both *in itſelf* and alſo *with a reference* to us: and that which, with reſpect to us as well as in itſelf, appears to be good, may ſeem fit, or in a condition, either to *do us good*, or to *receive good from us*. In like manner, a thing may ſeem to be evil, *in itſelf* ſimply, or both *in itſelf* and alſo *with a reference to us*: and that which, with reſpect to us as well as in itſelf, appears to be evil, may ſeem fit, either to *do us evil*, or to *receive evil from us*. From good and evil things thus arranged, riſe three forms of *love* and of its oppoſite *hatred*: I ſhall call them, *Eſteem* and *Contempt*;

tempt; *Benevolence* and *Malevolence*; *Complacency* and *Diſlike*. Eſteem, benevolence, and complacency, may be ſo blended as that one and the ſame being ſhall be the object of all the three; and this happens when that being appears good in itſelf, fit to do us good, and fit to receive good from us. In like manner, contempt, malevolence, and diſlike, may unite ſo as to form one complex paſſion; as when one and the ſame object appears at once evil in itſelf, fit to do us evil, and fit to receive evil from us. Thus the paſſions in queſtion may coaleſce; but it is proper to analyſe, and conſider them ſeparately.

301. That love, which we bear to a perſon whom we conſider as a good character merely, without taking into the account his fitneſs either to do us good or to receive good from us, may be called *Eſteem*. We eſteem ſtrangers the moment we form a favourable opinion of their merit; and thoſe good men, whom we never ſaw or can ſee, and of whom we know nothing but by report: and this emotion (for *paſſion* it can hardly be called) inclines us to ſpeak of

of them with affection and praiſe, and endeavour to make others think of them as we do. If there be any thing great, or *uncommonly* good in ſuch perſons, *admiration* will heighten our eſteem into *reſpect* and *reverence*. Things, as well as perſons, are ſometimes ſaid to be the objects of eſteem; we ſay, of a good book or a good picture, that it is *well eſteemed*: but this uſe of the word is figurative. To eſteem, and to value, are different things. However much we may value a good horſe, a convenient houſe, or a fine garden, we can hardly be ſaid to eſteem them.

302. *Mind*, therefore, and *rationality* ſeem neceſſary to draw forth the affection we ſpeak of. Nor are theſe alone ſufficient. An acute underſtanding employed in ſophiſtry, a great genius exerting itſelf in purſuits either criminal or trifling, may raiſe our *wonder*, perhaps our *aſtoniſhment*, but has no more claim to our eſteem, than the juggler, rope-dancer, or dextrous player at cards. In ſhort, *eſteem* implies moral approbation; and probity, induſtry, and other moral virtues, are the objects of it.

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This being the caſe, it follows, that we ourſelves, as moral beings, may either riſe or ſink in our own eſteem. *Self-eſteem*, kept within due bounds, and warranted by the approbation of conſcience, would be a rational as well as delightful emotion. But to keep it within due bounds is difficult and rare; for where is the man, who has a juſt ſenſe, neither too high nor too low, of his own merit!

303. When we think too highly of ourſelves, which we are very apt to do, ſelf-eſteem degenerates into the evil paſſions of *vanity*, *pride*, *arrogance*, and *inſolence*. Theſe, though nearly allied, are not the ſame. Pride and vanity may be diſtinguiſhed. The proud man is ſufficiently happy in the conſciouſneſs of his own ſuppoſed dignity; the vain man is not happy unleſs he believe that others admire him. Hence the former is reſerved and ſullen, the latter oſtentatious and affable. Pride implies ſomething, and generally not a little, of ill-nature; vanity is often officiouſly obliging. The vain man laughs, and is himſelf a ludicrous animal; the proud man is

a hateful being, and unwilling even to ſmile; "Or if he ſmile, it is in ſuch a ſort, "As if he ſcorn'd to ſmile at any thing." It is generally true, that, in proportion as a man behaves proudly towards thoſe whom he thinks beneath him, he is fawning and ſervile with reſpect to thoſe whoſe ſuperiority he feels himſelf conſtrained to acknowledge: Swift obſerves, that the poſture of climbing is pretty much the ſame with that of crawling. Pride and vanity, though in ſome things inconſiſtent, have been known to meet in the ſame character; but he may be vain who is not proud; and ſome men are too proud to be vain. The language of the former would be, Admire me, and I will love you dearly; that of the latter, We value not your good opinion, and will give ourſelves no trouble to obtain it.

304. Pride, arrogance, and inſolence, may perhaps be thus diſtinguiſhed. *Pride*, though no degree of it is excuſable, may be ſo reſtrained by good-breeding, as not to do injury, or give great offence to others: *Arrogance* is always offenſive, becauſe

cauſe in demanding more than its due (for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word) it manifeſts a petulant and injurious diſpoſition, that diſdains to be controuled by good-breeding or any other reſtraint. *Inſolence* is pride co-operating with arrogance and ill-nature in gratifying itſelf by inſulting others: a temper utterly deteſtable, and ſuch as no elevation of rank, of wealth, or of genius, can render pardonable in any perſon: nay, let a man's ſuperiority be what you pleaſe, this alone is ſufficient to cancel all his merit. And true it is, that they who are really diſtinguiſhed by rank or by genius are not apt to be either inſolent or arrogant; and, if not wholly exempt from pride, will however be careful to conceal it; which it is very much their intereſt to do. Of all writers the petty verbal critic is, I think, the moſt addicted to theſe enormities: Newton's meekneſs and modeſty were as exemplary, as his genius was tranſcendent.

305. Pride is an artificial paſſion: in early life, unleſs enjoined by precept, or recommended by example, it ſeldom ap-

pears. The Pſalmiſt, ſpeaking of his exemption from haughtineſs, compares himſelf to a young child; and the humble docility of little children is, in the New Teſtament, repreſented as a neceſſary preparative to the reception of Chriſtian faith. But there is a ſort of pride, from which a weak and inexperienced mind may be in danger, which refuſes advice and inſtruction from an opinion that they are unneceſſary: it is ſometimes called *Self-conceit*. This mental diſeaſe, at firſt infuſed by the fondneſs and flattery of parents perhaps, or of inferiors, gives riſe to innumerable diſappointments and ridiculous undertakings; and, if years and experience do not ſpeedily remove it, hardens into incurable folly.

306. *Contempt* ſeems to ſtand in oppoſition to Eſteem, and ariſes from our conſidering an object as inſignificant or deſtitute of merit. But it is not every ſort of inſignificance that draws forth contempt: things of no value we are apt to overlook, or attend to with indifference; and indifference and neglect are no paſſions. When

a thing is of ſuch a nature as gives us reaſon to expect to find good in it, we deſpiſe it if we find none. An inſignificant man, for example, is always the object of contempt, unleſs he be known to labour under ſome infirmity which prevents his exerting himſelf to any good purpoſe. In thoſe who pretend to knowledge, or have had the means of acquiring it, ignorance is contemptible; but ignorance in a child, in a ſavage, or in any perſon who neither pretends to knowledge, nor has ever had the means of it in his power, is not contemptible at all, but pitiable.

307. In like manner, a child's firſt attempts in drawing or writing, however rude, are not to be contemned: but were a fond father to diſplay ſuch things as wonderfully ingenious, we ſhould deſpiſe both the work and him who praiſes it: yet the child who made it we ſhould not deſpiſe, unleſs he partook of his father's vanity; becauſe from a child nothing better is to be expected. In ſhort, what we deſpiſe we always in ſome degree diſapprove; and the object of diſapprobation, as of eſteem, (ſee

§ 302.) is a rational being. For I think we cannot be properly ſaid to *diſapprove* of an inconvenient houſe, or untractable horſe, nor conſequently to *deſpiſe* either, even as we cannot be ſaid to *eſteem* their oppoſites; but the conceited architect who built the one, and the knaviſh jockey who would cheat us in the other, we may have good reaſon both to diſapprove and to deſpiſe.

308. A man habitually contemptuous is an unamiable character, becauſe he is generally both malevolent and proud: but it does not follow, that contempt is an evil or uſeleſs paſſion, or a blemiſh in the human conſtitution. For the fear of incurring it (and who would not be afraid of being deſpiſed!) proves a good preſervative from pride, vanity, raſhneſs, and other follies, as well as a powerful incentive to the acquiſition of thoſe talents and virtues which the world has reaſon to expect from us, and for which, if we acquire them, it will eſteem us. It is ſcarce neceſſary to add, that eſteem and contempt are more or leſs to be regarded, according to the wiſdom and goodneſs of him who eſteems

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and contemns. To have the eſteem of fools, can gratify none but fools; to be deſpiſed by ſuch, can never diſhearten a man of ſpirit. To be praiſed for good qualities which we are conſcious that we do not poſſeſs, is, to a generous mind, not pleaſing but mortifying; to be deſpiſed or blamed by an incompetent or uncandid judge, may give a momentary pain, but ought not to make us unhappy. The lady who paints her face to make us *admire her complexion* *, and the fop who tells lies to raiſe our opinion of his wit or valour, are among the moſt deſpicable characters in human ſhape.—*Diſdain* and *ſcorn* are terms denoting different forms or degrees of contempt. To diſtinguiſh them with preciſion, and unexceptionably, would perhaps be difficult, and is not neceſſary; thoſe words being in general well enough underſtood.

309. The oppoſite of Pride is *Humility*; which conſiſts in a juſt ſenſe of our own imperfections, inclining us to bear with and pity thoſe of others: a moſt amiable diſpoſition in the ſight of both God and

* Face-painting, where it is faſhionable and avowed, deceives nobody.

man;

man; but which, as it ſettles and ſoothes the mind, and occaſions little or no commotion in the bodily frame, is to be called, not a paſſion, but a virtue. And a virtue it is of the moſt eſſential importance to happineſs; indeed, without it, there can be no *virtue*, in the Chriſtian ſenſe of the word. Proud men are continually beſet with affronts real or imaginary, and haraſſed with anger, indignation, revenge, and other pernicious and painful emotions, from which the humble are entirely free. The lowly mind is conſiderate and recollected, benevolent and pious, at peace with itſelf and with all the world; and is generally accompanied with a ſimplicity of manners, a ſerenity of countenance, a gentleneſs of ſpeech, and a ſweetneſs of voice, which recommend one to the love of good men, and to reſpect even from the thoughtleſs. Good-breeding, which all men who underſtand their own intereſt are ambitious to acquire, always aſſumes the look and the language of humility: a proof, that it is univerſally pleaſing; as oſtentation and pride are to the ſame extent and in the ſame degree offenſive.

310. There

310. There is in ſome minds a timorous diffidence which, making them judge too harſhly or too meanly of themſelves, depreſſes them with melancholy thoughts that diſqualify them equally for happineſs and for the buſineſs of life. This cannot be called a fault, but it is a dangerous infirmity; and for the moſt part owing to diſorder of body as well as diſcompoſure of mind. Of our virtue, as it muſt appear to a being of infinite perfection, we cannot think too meanly; and of our abilities, as compared with thoſe of other men, we ſhould always ſpeak and think modeſtly. But we ſhall do well to guard againſt unreaſonable dejection. And this in all ordinary caſes we may do, by entertaining right notions of the Divine goodneſs and mercy; judging with candour of ourſelves as well as of others; cultivating habits of activity, chearfulneſs, and ſocial intercourſe; improving our talents and faculties to the utmoſt of our power; and never engaging in enterpriſes above our ſtrength, or in ſchemes that ſeem likely to expoſe us to the tyranny of unruly paſſion.

311. So

311. So much for Eſteem and Contempt, and the paſſions allied to them. They are all different modifications of Love and Hatred; and all or moſt of them ſeem to ariſe from our conſidering things or perſons as ſimply, and in themſelves, good or evil. The next claſs of paſſions are thoſe which ariſe in us when we conſider objects as good or evil not only in themſelves, but alſo with a peculiar reference to us. If a thing, or rather a perſon, ſeem fit *to receive good from us*, we regard it with that ſort of love which is termed *Benevolence*; if fit to *receive evil from us*, our hatred to it we may call, till we get a more proper name, *Malevolence*: if a thing or a perſon give us pleaſure, or ſeem fit *to do us good*, we regard it with *Complacency* or *Delight*; if fit *to do us evil*, or deprive us of pleaſure, with *Diſplacency*, or, to uſe a more common word, with *Diſlike*.

312. Benevolence and eſteem, though often united, are not the ſame. A man is benevolent to his new-born infant, whom he cannot be ſaid to eſteem; and to a poor profligate, whom it may be impoſſible for him

him not to deſpiſe. Nor are malevolence and contempt the ſame, though they alſo go often together: our hatred of a powerful adverſary, though blended with malevolence, may be without the leaſt mixture of contempt; nay, if he have great abilities, may be conſiſtent with admiration. Eſteem and complacency muſt, in like manner, be diſtinguiſhed; though frequently, as when we converſe with a friend, they have one and the ſame perſon for their object: for we have complacency in, that is we receive pleaſure from, things inanimate, as a houſe, a garden, a book, a picture, none of which is, properly ſpeaking, the object of our eſteem. Contempt and diſlike muſt alſo be diſtinguiſhed; for that which we do not deſpiſe may be fit to do us evil, as a highwayman, a ſerpent, a ſtorm, &c.

313. As benevolence prompts us to promote, or at leaſt to wiſh, the happineſs of others, its object muſt be, not only a percipient being, but a being who is capable of deriving happineſs or comfort from us: complacency, as already obſerved, may

have for its object, not only percipient, but even inanimate beings. Theſe two paſſions muſt therefore be yet further diſtinguiſhed. Good men delight, or have complacency, nay may be ſaid even to rejoice, in God: indeed the contemplation of his adorable nature yields the higheſt and moſt laſting felicity whereof rational minds are capable. But we cannot be ſaid to be benevolent towards God; becauſe our goodneſs extends not to him, he being, in and of himſelf, eternally and infinitely happy. Further ſtill: the object of our complacency muſt always be, or ſeem to be, agreeable; but the object of our benevolence may be neither agreeable nor good; it is enough if it have a capacity of being made ſo. A good man takes no delight in the wicked; but he wiſhes them well, and endeavours, if he can, to reform them.

314. The paſſion that riſes within us towards thoſe percipient beings who ſeem fit to receive evil from us, I called *Malevolence*, as being, according to etymology at leaſt, the oppoſite of Benevolence. But the term is not proper. An undutiful child may

may to the moſt affectionate parent ſeem a very proper object of correction; but it would be an abuſe of words to ſay, that ſuch a parent is malevolent towards his child. To a good magiſtrate malefactors may ſeem fit to receive, from the laws of their country, as adminiſtered by him, even capital puniſhment; but there is no malevolence in a good magiſtrate, nor is the law capable of it: and ſanguinary laws are enacted from a principle, not of ill-will to individuals, but of love to the community. To be *indifferent* to the welfare of thoſe who are fit to receive good from us, would manifeſt a ſavage diſpoſition which might be conſidered as the oppoſite of benevolence; but *indifference* is not a paſſion. The *paſſions* that counteract this amiable affection, by diſpoſing men to do no good, but poſitive evil to others, will be hereafter taken notice of, under the names of Reſentment, Anger, Revenge, &c.

315. Dr Watts ſeems to think, that benevolence to our equals may be called *Friendſhip*, and to our inferiors *Mercy*. And it is true, that we are always the

friends of thoſe towards whom we are benevolent; and that in popular language a good man may be ſaid to be *merciful* to his beaſt. But, in order to conſtitute what is commonly called Friendſhip, acquaintance, eſteem, and complacency are neceſſary, as well as benevolence; whereas we may, and indeed ought to exerciſe benevolence towards ſtrangers, criminals, and even enemies; that is, towards thoſe in whom we take no delight and repoſe no truſt, and with whom we have but a ſlight acquaintance, or none at all. And the object of, what is properly called Mercy, is a perſon liable to puniſhment: mercy is what we all pray for from God; and it is mercy which a condemned malefactor implores from his ſovereign. It may be added, with reſpect to friendſhip, that, though the proverb ſays it either finds men equal or makes them ſo, equality of condition, or of talents, is by no means eſſential to it. For a maſter and his ſervant, a peer and a commoner, a ſovereign and his ſubject, an unlettered man and a philoſopher, may be affectionate and faithful friends to each

each other: and if a man were to forſake his friends on being promoted to a rank above them, the world would cenſure his conduct as equally ungenerous and unnatural.

316. Benevolence towards the brute creation has, I think, no other name than *Humanity* or *Tenderheartedneſs*, nor needs any other; for he, who is cruel to his beaſt, would be ſo to his ſervant or neighbour, if he durſt. Uſeful and inoffenſive animals have a claim to our tenderneſs, and it is honourable to our nature to befriend them; by expoſing them to no unneceſſary hardſhip, making their lives as comfortable as we can, and, if we muſt deſtroy them, putting an end to their pain in an inſtant. But more of this hereafter.—Some people contract a *fondneſs* for certain animals, as horſes and dogs, which are indeed furniſhed by nature with the means of recommending themſelves to us in various ways; ſome, leſs excuſably, for cats, parrots, monkeys, &c. When this ſort of fondneſs becomes immoderate, it is ſomething worſe than folly, and ſeldom fails

fails to withdraw our affections from our brethren of mankind, as well as to reconcile us to habits of idleneſs and naſtineſs. Low company, of whatever kind, debaſes our nature in proportion as we become attached to it.

317. Fondneſs is founded in complacency. It partakes alſo of benevolence, but often counteracts it: as when it impriſons for life that playful, beautiful, and harmleſs creature, a ſinging bird; mangles the ears of a dog, or the tail of a horſe; pampers a lapdog, ſo as to make him more helpleſs and uſeleſs than nature made him; and, which is infinitely more cruel, corrupts a child by indulgence and flattery. Theſe are melancholy proofs of the weakneſs of human reaſon. But there is, in ſome of our beſt affections, a tenderneſs of love, which has alſo obtained the name of fondneſs, and which, ſo far from being an infirmity, may be juſtly accounted a virtue, being highly natural, amiable, and beneficial. Such is that fondneſs, which unites itſelf with the ſeveral forms of natural affection, whereby parents

rents and children, brothers and ſiſters, and other near relations, are mutually attached to, and delighted with, one another. Theſe parental, conjugal, filial, and fraternal charities not only humanize the heart of man, and give a peculiar and exquiſite reliſh to all the comforts of domeſtic life, but alſo cheriſh that elevating principle, a ſenſe of honour, which heightens the gracefulneſs, and adds to the ſtability, even of virtue itſelf.

318. The paſſion oppoſite to complacency is *Diſplacency* or *Diſlike*. It has for its object that which ſeems fit to do evil, or take away good; that, in a word, which is diſagreeable; and, according to the degree of violence wherewith it operates, aſſumes different names, as *Diſguſt*, *Loathing*, *Abhorrence*, *Abomination*, *Deteſtation*. We *diſlike* an ill-natured countenance; we are *diſguſted* with the converſation of a vain-glorious fool; we *loathe* or *nauſeate* food when we are ſick; we *abhor* an unjuſt or ungenerous action; we *abominate* the impious rites of Pagan ſuperſtition; we *deteſt* ſuch characters as Tiberius, Herod, Caligula,

gula, Nero. By theſe examples I do not mean to aſcertain the exact ſignification of the words; which perhaps could not be eaſily done; as people in the choice of ſuch words may be determined by their preſent feelings, or merely by the habit of uſing one word more than another: but I give theſe examples, to ſhow that the words above mentioned mean, not different paſſions, but rather different degrees of the ſame paſſion. Words expreſſive of very keen diſlike ought not to be employed on ordinary occaſions. In general, the frequent uſe of hyperbolical expreſſions, though ſome people affect them, is a ſign of levity or intemperance of mind.

319. We are ſometimes conſcious of ſtrong diſlike which we can hardly account for, and which to others, and to ourſelves too perhaps, may appear capricious or even ridiculous. This has been called *antipathy*. Moſt people feel it on ſeeing a crawling toad or ſerpent; and ſuch antipathy is uſeful and therefore reaſonable, becauſe it contributes to our ſafety: but whether it be owing to conſtitution

tion or to acquired habit, I cannot ſay; as I know not whether a child, previouſly to advice or example, would be conſcious of it. To certain kinds of food, as pork and cheeſe, ſome people have an antipathy; which may be the effect of unpleaſing aſſociations; or perhaps it may be conſtitutional; for I have heard of thoſe who would grow ſick if cheeſe were in the room, though they did not ſee it. I know men both healthy and ſtrong, who are uneaſy when they touch velvet, or ſee another handling a piece of cork. And I remember that, in my younger years, if my hands happened to be cold, I could not, without uneaſineſs, handle paper, or hear it ruſtle, or even hear its name mentioned. What could give riſe to this, I know not; but I am ſure there was no affectation in the caſe.

320. Of this *papyrophobia* I need not inform the reader that I was cured long ago. And I doubt not, that ſuch unaccountable infirmities might be in many, perhaps in moſt, caſes got the better of: which, when it can be done, ought not

to be neglected; as every thing is a ſource of inconvenience, which gives one the appearance of ſingularity, or makes one unneceſſarily dependent on outward circumſtances. Perſons, however, there are, who from an affectation of extreme delicacy are at pains to multiply their antipathies and other ſingularities; to the no ſmall moleſtation of themſelves as well as others. Such people will ſcream at the ſight of a ſpider, a caterpillar, a mouſe, or even a frog: and if, at table, you be conveying ſalt to your plate with a careleſs or trembling hand, will ſweat with apprehenſion leſt you let it fall, and ſo bring miſchief, as they are willing to believe, upon one or other of the company. But this laſt example ſavours more of ſuperſtition than of falſe delicacy. All ſuch fooleries are quite inconſiſtent with that manly ſimplicity of manners, which is ſo honourable to the rational character.

321. From the different forms of Love and Hatred, Complacency and Diſlike, which I have been endeavouring to analyſe, a third claſs of paſſions derive their origin,

origin, which vary in their feelings and names, according as their objects vary with reſpect to us. If that which ſeems fit to do us good be ſo far in our power that we may conſider it as attainable, it excites *Deſire*; if probably attainable, *Hope*; if actually obtained, *Joy*; and the perſon who helps us to obtain it is the object of our *Gratitude*. If that which ſeems fit to do us harm may poſſibly come upon us, it excites what may be called *Averſion*; if it may probably come upon us, *Fear*; if it be actually come upon us, *Sorrow* or *Grief*: and if any of our fellow-men has been inſtrumental in bringing it upon us, that perſon is the object of our *Anger*. On theſe pairs of oppoſite paſſions, Deſire and Averſion, Hope and Fear, Joy and Sorrow, Gratitude and Anger, I ſhall make a few remarks, and ſo conclude this part of the ſubject.

322. *Deſire* and *Averſion*. Things may ſeem *deſirable*, in the popular ſenſe of that epithet, which are not attainable: ſuch is an affluent fortune, to thoſe who are ſure they can never have it; and ſuch is health,

to him who knows that he is dying of a conſumption. But in general, it is true of thoſe things which draw forth the active paſſion of Deſire, that they ſeem to be within the reach of the perſon who wiſhes to have them. Few people can be ſaid to deſire to fly, or to deſire to be the governors of kingdoms; and to thoſe who have aſpired to crowns and ſceptres the attainment of ſuch things muſt have appeared at leaſt poſſible. Deſire is a reſtleſs paſſion; and if every ſort of excellence, whether attainable or unattainable, were to raiſe it, there would be no end of diſappointments, and human life would be completely wretched. This paſſion, as it ariſes from the view of ſomething agreeable, is partly a pleaſurable feeling; and it is alſo painful, and ſometimes intenſely ſo, becauſe it implies a conſciouſneſs of our wanting ſomething, without which we think we are not ſo happy as we ſhould be if we had it.

323. Nothing more diſcompoſes the mind than inordinate deſire, or more effectually diſqualifies it for prudent exertion,

tion. It is a torment in itſelf, and it expoſes to diſappointment; and the anguiſh of diſappointment is in proportion to the violence of deſire. And therefore it is of the utmoſt importance to our virtue and happineſs, and indeed to our reputation as men of prudence, that we inure ourſelves to habits of moderation in all our deſires, in all thoſe at leaſt that are liable to become extravagant, that is, in all that regard this world. To effect this, we ſhall do well to meditate frequently on the ſhortneſs of life, the uncertainty of preſent things, and their inſufficiency to yield thoſe gratifications which are expected from them. If we are anxious to be wealthy, eminent, or great, let us attend to the fates and fortunes of thoſe who have acquired renown, riches, or power, and conſider how much happier they were than other men, what proportion of their happineſs aroſe from ſuch things, and whether a reaſonable ſhare of felicity might not be attained without them: continually bearing in mind, that, though happineſs is not always in our power, contentment

tentment is; and that contentment is enough.

324. A ſlight degree of deſire has been called *Propenſity* or *Inclination*; when it becomes very importunate, it is termed *Longing*; and Longing may grow ſtronger and ſtronger, till it overwhelm the mind and deſtroy the body. This may happen, not only in regard to food and drink and other things neceſſary, but alſo when the object of deſire may ſeem to many to be eſſential neither to life nor to happineſs. Men have lived long and comfortably at a great diſtance from the place of their birth, the neighbourhood of which is ſurely no neceſſary of life: yet there have been men who ſickened and died of an exceſſive longing to reviſit their native land. To this malady the Swiſs were formerly ſo ſubject, that they gave it a name ſignifying the diſeaſe of the country: the Scots too have ſuffered from it; and Homer makes Minerva ſay, of the wandering Ulyſſes, that, to enjoy the happineſs of again ſeeing the ſmoke aſcend from his native Ithaca, he would willingly die.

325.

325. Some of our deſires take different names according as their objects differ. To deſire the good that others poſſeſs may be termed *Covetouſneſs*; as in the tenth law of the Decalogue, where it is very emphatically prohibited: as in the New Teſtament it is not only prohibited, but branded with the name of Idolatry, and declared to be a ſin that excludes from heaven. Deſire of riches has alſo been called Covetouſneſs. But this deſire, if moderate, and if it purſue its object without injury to any perſon, cannot be called criminal; nay, if it engage in the purſuit in order to obtain the means of doing good, it is very commendable, and gives riſe to induſtry, temperance, and other virtues equally beneficial to individuals and to ſociety. Deſire of the pleaſures of ſenſe is termed *Senſuality*; eſpecially when it becomes habitual, and excludes or weakens the more generous principles of action: and then it is a diſeaſe of the moſt debaſing nature, and reduces man to the condition of a beaſt. Temperance, a hardy way of life, and a ſuperiority to the faſci-

nations

nations of luxury, are by all moraliſts recommended, as friendly to our moral improvement, and highly honourable to man as a rational being.

326. The deſire of honour and power has obtained the name of *Ambition*. It is very apt, as Cicero obſerves, to ſpring up in noble minds; and it may, if properly regulated, produce good; but when in any degree immoderate (as it ſeldom fails to be when it has been in any great degree ſucceſsful) it is almoſt impoſſible to reſtrain it within the proper limits. Dreadful are the miſeries which unbridled ambition has introduced into the world; as may be ſeen in the hiſtories of all nations: hiſtory indeed contains little more than the acts of ambitious men and their conſequences; and the very word *ambition* conveys to us ſome idea of evil. And yet the love of power, or a deſire of ſuperiority, is natural to man, and ſo far from being in itſelf cenſurable, that a total want of it is blamed or pitied as meanſpiritedneſs. The only principles that can controul ambition, ſo as to render it at once innocent

innocent and beneficial, are benevolence and the love of juſtice; principles ſo nearly allied, that the one cannot exiſt without the other. Cicero has ſome good remarks on this ſubject in the eighth chapter of his firſt book *De Officiis*.

327. To deſire money for its own ſake, and in order to hoard it up, is *Avarice*; an unnatural paſſion, that diſgraces and entirely debaſes the ſoul, from which it ſeldom fails to eradicate every generous principle and kind affection. It impairs the underſtanding alſo, and contracts the genius. To this vile paſſion Horace ſcruples not to aſcribe the inferiority of the Roman literature to the Greek; and Longinus imputes the decay of eloquence in his time to the ſame cauſe. Againſt avarice the ridicule of the Comic muſe has been pointed, and the ſcourge of ſatire brandiſhed, in every age; and by no writer more ſucceſsfully than by Horace. Indeed we ſhould be tempted to think, that he recurs rather too frequently to this topic, if we did not recollect, that, in the decline of the republic, the Romans, and ſome of

the moſt ſplendid characters among them too, were beyond meaſure addicted to the hoarding up of money.

328. Many vices bring their puniſhment along with them, and none more conſpicuouſly than avarice. The more it is indulged, and the more it has been ſucceſsful, the more miſerable it makes the poor wretch that is enſlaved to it; to whom, in our language, with an alluſion no doubt to this circumſtance, the appellation of *miſer* has long been appropriated. Even when miſers, at the cloſe of life, have applied their accumulations to a charitable purpoſe, the erection of hoſpitals for example, they have not been able to reſcue their memory from contempt and deteſtation. For the world knows well, that there is no liberality in giving away what one can no longer keep; no virtue in rearing monuments to one's own vanity; and neither good nature nor common honeſty in robbing ſociety of the benefits that ariſe from commercial intercourſe and a free circulation of wealth, or in adopting a plan of life which one cannot

cannot perſiſt in without hardening one's heart againſt the deſerving and the poor.

329. The deſire of having that which others alſo deſire gives riſe to *Rivalſhip*; and a deſire to be equal or ſuperior to others is *Emulation*. Between rival candidates for the ſame object there ought to be no enmity; and between thoſe who are ambitious to equal or excel one another there ought to be no envy. Enmity and envy, in caſes of this nature, are marks of a little mind. And nothing gives a more favourable opinion of a man's candour and temper, than to live on good terms with thoſe whom he conſiders as his antagoniſts in the career of honour, or in the purſuit of that, which, if he obtain, his rivals muſt loſe. We are to conſider thoſe as our enemies (ſays Tully, adopting a ſentiment of Plato) who carry arms againſt us, not thoſe who aſpire to the ſame poſts of honour which we wiſh to gain: imitating the moderation of Africanus and Metellus, between whom there was rivalſhip, but no bitterneſs.

330. Emulation, when without any mix-

ture of malice or envy, is a noble principle of action, and a powerful incitement to the acquiſition of excellence. Prudent parents and teachers are at pains to cheriſh it in young perſons, and find that, when properly directed, it has better effects than the fear of puniſhment or the hope of reward. There are writers, who, viewing human nature in an unfavourable light, have thought fit to affirm, that emulation cannot be without envy, and that therefore it is dangerous to encourage it in ſchools or families. But this is a miſtake. Theſe two paſſions differ as widely as candour differs from cunning, or a reaſonable regard to ourſelves from ill-will to our neighbour. Emulation wiſhes to raiſe itſelf without pulling others down, that is, without doing or wiſhing them any injury; and no principle of action is in itſelf more commendable, or more uſeful to others as an example to rouſe them to honeſt induſtry: there is great generoſity in ſuch emulation; and the man who exerts himſelf in it is making continual advances in virtue, becauſe he is every moment acquiring

more

more and more the command of his own ſpirit.

331. *Envy* is the reverſe of all this. The envious man wiſhes to be ſuperior, not by raiſing himſelf, but, as already obſerved, by pulling others down; and their proſperity, nay even their genius and their virtue, are to him matter not of joy, but of anguiſh: which is part of the character we aſcribe to the devil. The envious man ſets an example of ſelfiſhneſs, rancour, pride, and almoſt every other perverſity incident to a deſpicable mind. Envy is a proof, not only of malignity, but of incapacity alſo. Hence it is, that no man is willing to acknowledge himſelf liable to this deteſtable paſſion; for that would be to provoke and acquieſce in his own diſgrace. One exception to this remark I have indeed met with, and one only. I formerly knew a perſon, who would own that he was envious, and that it tormented him to hear even his beſt friends praiſed, or to ſee them treated with any uncommon degree of complaiſance. But this was not the only fooliſh ſingularity which that perſon

ſon affected in order to make himſelf remarkable.

332. The exertions of generous emulation are highly delightful; for they rouſe the ſoul, they amuſe it, and they improve it. But Horace well obſerves, that the moſt cruel tyrants have never deviſed a torment greater than envy. Surely, it muſt be of infinite importance that we guard againſt a paſſion ſo productive of folly, wickedneſs, and miſery. And caution is the more neceſſary here, becauſe emulation, though, as we have ſeen, entirely different from envy, is very apt, through the weakneſs of our nature, to degenerate into it. Let then the man, who thinks he is actuated by generous emulation only, and wiſhes to know whether there be any thing of envy in the caſe, examine his own heart, and aſk himſelf, whether his friends, on becoming, though in an honourable way, his competitors, have leſs of his affection than they had before; whether he be gratified with hearing them depreciated; whether he would wiſh their merit leſs, that he might the more eaſily equal or excel them; and

and whether he would have a more ſincere regard for them, if the world were to acknowledge him their ſuperior. If his heart anſwer all or any of theſe queſtions in the affirmative, it is time to look out for a cure; for the ſymptoms of that vile diſtemper, envy, are but too apparent.

333. If that which ſeems fit to do us evil may poſſibly come upon us, it raiſes what may be called *Averſion*; a term which, in its etymology, implies *turning away from*: Diſlike is a word of ſimilar import, though perhaps not ſo emphatical. On Diſlike, as oppoſed to Complacency, I made a remark or two already, and have little more to ſay about it. Averſion, or active diſlike, exerts itſelf with more or leſs energy, according to the magnitude of the evil, or rather according as we ſeem to be more or leſs in danger from it. We diſlike, nay we may deteſt, the character of a perſon who died two thouſand years ago, Nero for example; but, becauſe we have no reaſon to apprehend evil from it, I know not whether it would be ſtrictly proper to ſay, that we have an averſion to Nero's character. Yet,

if

if I were deſired to write the hiſtory of Nero, I might ſay with propriety that I have an averſion to the ſubject: for, tho' Nero himſelf can do me no harm, it might ſeriouſly hurt me to employ much time in thinking of matters ſo diſagreeable. *Averſion*, in ſhort, ſeems to point at ſome evil which may come upon us; even as its oppoſite, *Deſire*, has for its object a good that is not altogether beyond our reach.

334. *Hope* and *Fear*. Theſe two paſſions are more reſtleſs and active than the preceding pair; as they view good and evil in a nearer ſituation. If the abſent good is not only poſſible to be attained, but alſo probably attainable, it quickens deſire into Hope: if the abſent evil not only may come upon us, but probably will, it changes ſimple averſion into Fear. In this country, whatever averſion we may have to a plague of locuſts, we can hardly be ſaid to *fear* it, becauſe, if we may judge of the future by the paſt, there is no probability of our being expoſed to ſuch a viſitation: and, in like manner, we cannot *hope* that our fields will yield a hundred times the grain

grain we ſow in them; becauſe, though ſuch a thing may be poſſible elſewhere, we have no reaſon to think it ever happened here or will happen. The purchaſer of a lottery-ticket wiſhes no doubt to gain the firſt prize; but he is a fool if he *hope* for it, the probabilities againſt him being ſo very great.

335. Things in our power cannot properly be called the objects of Hope and Fear. For if the good which we deſire be within our reach, we poſſeſs ourſelves of it, and ſo hope is extinguiſhed; and of the evils, from which we have it in our power at any time to eſcape, it is our own fault if we be afraid. Yet in the poſſeſſion of good there may be, and generally is, the fear of loſing it, and the hope of preſerving it; and, while we ſuffer evil, we may hope its removal, and fear its continuance. In fact, in every circumſtance of life, Hope and Fear may be ſaid to be preſent with us, as long at leaſt as we are intelligent and active beings: for theſe paſſions are the great ſprings to action, and without them the mind would be in a ſtate

of *torpor* hardly conſiſtent with rationality. Even in the hour of death, man's hopes and fears do not forſake him; the approbation of his own mind cheriſhes the moſt tranſporting hope of Divine favour; as an evil conſcience would awaken fear ſo intenſely tormenting that nothing ſhort of hell could exceed it. Theſe paſſions are in other reſpects beneficial. In proſperity we ought to fear, leſt we ſhould become high-minded; and in adverſity hope is a good defence againſt trouble. Hope in adverſity is favourable to happineſs: fear in proſperity is friendly to virtue.

336. Hope with little or no fear has been called *Confidence*, or Security: a temper of mind, which it is unſafe to indulge, as it embitters diſappointment, to which, in a world ſo changeable as this, we are always more or leſs liable. Sometimes, however, in caſes of great difficulty and danger, this paſſion has animated men to extraordinary efforts, and proved ſucceſsful where timidity, or even prudent circumſpection, would have had nothing to expect but diſaſter. But theſe are caſes which

in common life rarely occur. Even in war this ſort of enthuſiaſm is at beſt but a deſperate expedient: it may have gained victories, but it has alſo been productive of defeat. How much more reſpectable was Fabius Maximus in that caution which broke the power of Hannibal, than Pompey in that oſtentatious confidence which preceded and partly occaſioned his ignominious overthrow at Pharſalia!

337. Fear without any mixture of hope is *Deſpair*; a paſſion, which it is miſery to feel, and impiety to entertain. Deſpair implies inattention to the viciſſitude of human affairs, which often, and ſometimes rapidly, make a tranſition from adverſe to proſperous; and which, at any rate, are of ſo mixed a nature, that in the deepeſt gloom they are ſeldom without rays of comfort, and in the greateſt brightneſs not entirely free from clouds of apprehenſion. It implies further, an audacious and moſt unwarrantable diſtruſt of both the wiſdom and the goodneſs of God; who never chaſtiſes but in order to reform, and who, if it is not our own fault, will undoubtedly

make preſent evil terminate in future good. A meek and humble ſpirit is not in danger from this hideous paſſion. Deſpair ariſes from pride and hardneſs of heart, is generally preceded by long perſeverance in evil habits, and frequently ends in phrenſy and ſelf-deſtruction.

338. How much then is it our intereſt, as well as duty, to cultivate benevolence and piety, humility and chearfulneſs, temperance and patience! Theſe are the ſunſhine of the mind; and as effectually exclude the demons of deſpair, as the radiance of the morning drives the birds of night to their abodes of darkneſs. Little hope, with a great mixture of fear, is termed *Deſpondence*; which, as it enervates the ſoul, ought to be avoided; and may be, if we are moderate in our expectations and deſires; not haſty to engage in what is likely to be very intereſting; and always prepared to ſubmit, without a murmur, to the will of Providence. Let hope be encouraged, but not to exceſs. When rational and moderate, it is an excellent auxiliary in ſurmounting the difficulties of life;

when

when in any degree extravagant, it leads to folly and misery.

339. Fear should not rise higher than to make us attentive and cautious: when it gains an ascendency in the mind, it becomes an insupportable tyranny, and renders life a burden. The object of fear is evil; and to be exempt from fear, or at least not enslaved to it, gives dignity to our nature, and invigorates all our faculties. Yet there are evils which we ought to fear. Those that arise from ourselves, or which it is in our power to prevent, it would be madness to despise, and audacity not to guard against. External evils, which we cannot prevent, or could not avoid without a breach of duty, it is manly and honourable to bear with fortitude. Insensibility to danger is not fortitude, no more than the incapacity of feeling pain can be called patience; and to expose ourselves unnecessarily to evil, is worse than folly, and very blameable presumption: it is commonly called fool-hardiness, that is, such a degree of hardiness or boldness as none but fools are capable of.

340. Courage

340. Courage and Fortitude, though confounded in common language, are however diſtinguiſhable. Courage may be a virtue or a vice, according to circumſtances, fortitude is always a virtue: we ſpeak of deſperate courage, but not of deſperate fortitude. A contempt or neglect of danger without regard to conſequences may be called courage; and this ſome brutes have as well as we: in them it is the effect of natural inſtinct chiefly; in man it depends partly on habit, partly on ſtrength of nerves, and partly on want of conſideration. But fortitude is the virtue of a rational and conſiderate mind; it is indeed a virtue rather than a paſſion: and it is founded in a ſenſe of honour and a regard to duty. There may be courage in fighting a duel, though that folly is more frequently the effect of cowardice; there may be courage in an act of piracy or robbery: but there can be no fortitude in perpetrating a crime. Fortitude implies a love of equity and of public good: for, as Plato and Cicero obſerve, courage exerted for a ſelfiſh purpoſe, or without

without a regard to juſtice, ought to be called audacity rather than fortitude.

341. This virtue takes different names, according as it acts in oppoſition to different ſorts of evil: but ſome of thoſe names are applied with conſiderable latitude. With reſpect to danger in general, Fortitude may be termed *Intrepidity*; with reſpect to the dangers of war, *Valour*; with reſpect to pain of body or diſtreſs of mind, *Patience*; with reſpect to labour, *Activity*; with reſpect to injury, *Forbearance*; with reſpect to our condition in general, *Magnanimity*. Fear in war, or fear that hinders a man from doing what he ought to do, is *Cowardice*; ſudden fear without cauſe is *Panic*; habitual fear is *Puſillanimity*; fear of the labour that one ought to undergo is *Lazineſs*. Fear with ſurpriſe is *Terror*; and violent fear with extreme deteſtation is *Horror*. Thoſe unaccountable fears too are called *Horrors*, which ſometimes ariſe in the imagination in ſleep, or in certain diſeaſes, and produce trembling, ſweating, ſhivering, and other nervous ſymptoms.

342. For-

342. Fortitude is very becoming in both ſexes; but courage is not ſo ſuitable to the female character: for in women, on ordinary occaſions of danger, a certain degree of timidity is not unſeemly, becauſe it betokens gentleneſs of diſpoſition. Yet from thoſe of very high rank, from a queen or an empreſs, courage in emergencies of great public danger would be expected, and the want of it blamed: we ſhould overlook the ſex, and conſider the duties of the ſtation. In general however, maſculine boldneſs in a woman is diſagreeable; the term *virago* conveys an offenſive idea. The female warriors of antiquity, whether real or fabulous, Camilla, Thaleſtris, and the whole community of Amazons, were unamiable perſonages. But female courage exerted in defence of a child, a huſband, or a near relation, would be true fortitude, and deſerve the higheſt encomiums.

343. The motives to fortitude are many and powerful. This virtue tends greatly to the happineſs of the individual, by giving compoſure and preſence of mind, and

and keeping the other paſſions in due ſubordination. To public good it is eſſential; for, without it, the independence and liberty of nations would be impoſſible. It gives to a character that elevation, which poets, orators, and hiſtorians have in all ages vied with one another to celebrate. Nothing ſo effectually inſpires it as rational piety: the fear of God is the beſt ſecurity againſt every other fear. A true eſtimate of human life; its ſhortneſs and uncertainty; the numberleſs evils and temptations to which by a long continuance in this world we muſt unavoidably be expoſed; ought by no means to diſcourage, or to throw any gloom on our future proſpects; but ſhould teach us, that many things are more formidable than death; and that nothing is loſt, but much gained, when, by the appointment of Providence, a well-ſpent life is brought to a concluſion.

344. Let it be conſidered, too, that puſillanimity and fearfulneſs can never avail us any thing. On the contrary, they debaſe our nature, poiſon all our comforts,

and make us deſpicable in the eyes of others; they darken our reaſon, diſconcert our ſchemes, enfeeble our efforts, extinguiſh our hopes, and add tenfold poignancy to all the evils of life. In battle, the brave ſoldier is in leſs danger than the coward; in leſs danger even of death and wounds, becauſe better prepared to defend himſelf; in far leſs danger of infelicity; and has before him the animating hope of victory and honour. So in life: the man of true fortitude is in leſs danger of diſappointment than others are, becauſe his underſtanding is clear, and his mind diſencumbered; he is prepared to meet calamity without the fear of ſinking under it; and he has before him the near proſpect of another life, in which they who piouſly bear the evils of this will obtain a glorious reward.

345. When our minds are greatly moved with the apprehenſion of approaching, but not certain, evil, the emotion is called *Anxiety* or *Solicitude*, and generally gives more pain than the evil itſelf would give, if preſent and real. It is therefore very imprudent

imprudent to give way to this paſſion, which will certainly do us harm, and probably can do us no good. Our Saviour himſelf prohibits it. "Take no thought "for to-morrow," that is (according to the ſenſe in which the tranſlators of the Bible and other writers of their time often uſed the word *thought*) be not anxious or very ſolicitous about to-morrow: "ſuffi-"cient to the day is the evil thereof." There is great benignity in this as in all the other precepts of our Divine Lawgiver. Do not afflict yourſelves with evil which is only imaginary, and perhaps may never be realized: it is enough that you have evils to bear when they are actually come upon you. Exceſſive anxiety long indulged becomes a diſeaſe worſe than death. To guard againſt it, we have nothing to do but to obey this ſhort command: Truſt in God, and hope the beſt.

346. *Suſpicion* is a painful paſſion, nearly allied both to fear and to anxiety, yet different from both. We may fear, and may be anxious, without being ſuſpicious

of any body; becauſe the evil we apprehend may be ſuch as our fellow-creatures can neither prevent nor bring upon us. Such is the anxiety and the fear occaſioned by the illneſs of a friend. But if we think the phyſician from intereſted motives unwilling to cure the diſorder, ſuſpicion ariſes in us with reſpect to him. This paſſion, therefore, ſeems to have for its object ſome perſon who we think is likely to prevent our attaining or poſſeſſing good, or to bring upon us ſome dreaded evil. Suſpicion, like fear, may have its uſe on many occaſions, when it ſerves merely to put us on our guard; but to be habitually inclined to it makes a man malevolent, timorous, and odious. How different is Chriſtian charity, which "is not eaſily provoked, and "thinketh no evil!"

347. The word *Jealous* is ſometimes uſed in a good ſenſe; as when we ſay of a man, that he is jealous of his honour; which means that he is ſolicitouſly cautious againſt diſhonour. "I am jealous "over you with a godly jealouſly," ſays

St

St Paul to the Corinthians; that is, I am very vigilant to ſecure your ſpiritual welfare. In this acceptation, *jealous* is of ſimilar import with *zealous*. *Jealouſy*, taking the word in another ſenſe, is the ſame nearly with *Suſpicion*; but is ſomewhat more limited in its uſe. The ſuſpicion which one man may entertain of another's honeſty or credit can hardly be called jealouſy; this term being more commonly uſed to denote ſuſpicion in love: as when a huſband ſuſpects his wife's fidelity, or a wife her huſband's. This is a tormenting and furious paſſion, and has driven even generous minds into deeds of the moſt fatal extravagance. Often has it formed the ſubject of tragedy; but no other poet deſcribes it ſo forcibly as Shakeſpeare in his Othello.

348. *Joy* and *Sorrow*. I mentioned theſe as a third pair of oppoſite paſſions derived from Love and Hatred. When the good we deſired is actually obtained, our fear and hope, with reſpect to it, ceaſe, and *joy* takes poſſeſſion of the heart: when that evil which was the object of our averſion

verſion is really come upon us, the hopes and fears, to which it formerly gave riſe, diſappear, or are ſwallowed up, in *Sorrow*. But if there be danger of our loſing the good we poſſeſs, or if there be a chance of our eſcape from the preſent evil, hope and fear will continue to unite themſelves with joy in the one caſe, and with ſorrow in the other. And, as all worldly enjoyment is uncertain, and unexpected deliverances from evil ſometimes happen, a conſiderate mind, even when joy is predominant, will not be wholly exempt from fear; and in the deepeſt affliction a pious mind will not be without hope of deliverance, or at leaſt of conſolation. Joy and Sorrow belong properly to the mind, Pleaſure and Pain to the body. There may be bodily pain without ſorrow, as when a valiant ſoldier is wounded in gaining a victory for his country: there may be bodily pleaſure where there is no joy, as in the caſe of a thirſty man drinking while he is in great anguiſh of mind: and every one knows, that there may be

ſorrow

ſorrow without pain of body, and joy without any poſitive bodily pleaſure.

349. Moderate joy, in Latin *Gaudium*, we may term *gladneſs*: the Stoics allowed it, as already obſerved, to be not unworthy of a wiſe man, although in general they affected to be very unfriendly to the paſſions. Great joy, in Latin *Lætitia*, the ſame philoſophers condemned. Exultation, or extravagant joy, is no doubt unſeemly, at leaſt on ordinary occaſions; for it betrays ſuch levity and want of conſideration as, though excuſable in a child, we ſhould not eaſily pardon in a man, eſpecially in one who has any dignity of character to ſupport. The appearance of exceſſive joy in a king or commander, on occaſion of a victory, would be unbecoming, and ſeem to foretel an equal degree of unmanly dejection in the event of a defeat.

350. I cannot however go ſo far as the Stoics did in blaming every ſort of violent *diſcompoſure*, whether expreſſive of happineſs or of affliction; for I think, that the ſtrongeſt emotions are neither ungrace-

ungraceful, nor likely to give offence, when they diſcover an exquiſite degree of moral ſenſibility. A child after long abſence ſpringing to the embrace of a parent; a wife meeting her huſband alive and well whom the moment before ſhe believed to have periſhed by ſhipwreck; the man, who had been lame from his birth, entering the temple, on being miraculouſly cured by Peter, "walking and *leaping*, and "praiſing God;"—theſe, with a thouſand other inſtances of agreeable ſurpriſe that might eaſily be imagined, would give delight to the beholder, however extravagantly the paſſion might expreſs itſelf. And in ſurpriſes of an oppoſite nature, and equally violent, the moſt immoderate ſorrow would hardly be cenſurable.

351. Different degrees of joy are ſignified by the words *Gladneſs*, *Mirth*, *Exultation*, *Rapture*, *Ecſtaſy*; and different degrees of ſorrow by *Grief*, *Trouble*, *Anguiſh*, *Miſery*. Mirth is accompanied with laughter, and exultation (as the name literally imports) with leaping and dancing. The joy that one feels on having overcome oppoſition

poſition has been called *Triumph*; but this word is frequently ſo uſed as to convey an idea of inſult, which is quite unworthy of a generous mind. "Triumph not "over thine enemy," ſays an old adage, "victory is ſufficient." Nothing does leſs honour to the national character of the Roman people, than their triumphs. There might be policy in them; but policy that ſhocks humanity is not good. Rejoicing for victory may be allowed, and is natural, and indeed, by its influence in diffuſing public ſpirit, beneficial. But to expoſe to public view noble and royal priſoners in chains, in order to ſhow our power over them, is almoſt as barbarous, as to laugh at a fallen enemy writhing in the agonies of death.

352. Savages are addicted to this ſort of cruelty; and the Romans cannot be ſaid to have emerged from the ſavage ſtate, when this barbarous exhibition was firſt introduced among them by Romulus. Its continuance after they became civilized we may partly impute to faſhion; which frequently betrays poor mortals into ſtrange

inconſiſtencies of conduct and ſentiment. In their better days the Romans were neither ill-natured nor ungenerous: yet, if we knew no more of their ſtory than what relates to their triumphs and gladiators, we muſt have thought them brutal and bloody barbarians.

353. When gladneſs, or moderate joy, ſettles into a habit, or continues for a conſiderable time, it is called *Chearfulneſs*: and habitual ſorrow is termed *Dejection*, *Heavineſs*, *Melancholy*. Chearfulneſs is far preferable to mirth: the former is a habit, the latter a temporary act. Mirth is not always friendly to virtue, and, when too frequently indulged, betrays an intemperate mind not a little tinctured with folly: chearfulneſs is a great ſupport as well as ornament to every virtue, and is conſiſtent with dignity, and even with ſanctity, of character. Our mirth is liable to be ſucceeded by dejection: our chearfulneſs diſpels melancholy both from ourſelves and from others. A merry companion is often teizing, and ſometimes intolerable: a chearful friend is always welcome, and one

one of the greateſt comforts of life. Mirth, ſays Addiſon, is like a flaſh of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment: chearfulneſs keeps up a kind of ſunſhine in the ſoul, and fills it with a ſteady and perpetual ſerenity. A chearful man is maſter of himſelf, and enjoys a ſound judgement and untroubled imagination: mirth to a conſiderate mind ſoon becomes oppreſſive, and for a time diſcompoſes all its faculties.

354. There are perſons who, from bodily infirmity or a deficiency of animal ſpirits, cannot for any length of time be chearful; but if their mind be ſuited to their condition, and their deſires proportioned to what they poſſeſs, they have *contentment*; and that, when founded in a firm perſuaſion of the goodneſs and wiſdom of Providence, creates a heaven upon earth. I know not whether contentment and chearfulneſs ought not to be called virtues rather than paſſions, as they are not, when moderate, as the former always is, accompanied with bodily commotion. Yet in the countenance they diſplay themſelves

ſelves very ſignificantly: and he muſt be a ſuperficial obſerver indeed, who cannot diſtinguiſh gay from gloomy features, and the placid ſmile of contentment from the ſurly look of diſſatisfaction. They who wiſh to be contented and chearful muſt cultivate habits of benevolence, humility, and rational piety. Pride, malice, and ſuperſtition disfigure the face with frowns, and haraſs the ſoul with endleſs vexation.

355. When we rejoice on account of the joy of others, or grieve becauſe they are in trouble, it may be called *Sympathetic Joy* or *Sorrow*. The remarks formerly made on it need not be repeated. Joy, when ſoftened by tender paſſions, as conjugal love, natural affection, gratitude, and the like, does ſometimes expreſs itſelf by two ſymptoms, which one would think inconſiſtent, a ſmiling countenance and eyes full of tears. Homer aſcribes them to Andromache on a particular occaſion, δακρυοεν γελασασα, when her huſband Hector, going out to battle, puts his child in her arms, after having held him in his own, and ſolemnly invoked the bleſſing of heaven upon

on him. A face with this expreſſion is one of the moſt intereſting objects in nature. Painters have endeavoured to do juſtice to Homer's idea: indeed there cannot be a finer ſubject for painting. Many other emotions allied to joy are apt to expreſs themſelves in the ſame way; eſpecially in thoſe who have weak nerves or very delicate minds. There are perſons, who cannot without tears read ſublime verſes, or hear or ſpeak of any extraordinary inſtance of generoſity. The ſenſations that accompany ſuch weeping are, if I may ſo ſpeak, painful from exceſs of pleaſure.

356. The ſatisfaction one feels in the approbation of one's own conſcience may be called *Moral joy*; and is of all human feelings the moſt delightful and permanent. An approving conſcience is a counterbalance to all the evils of life, and ſupplies even in the hour of death the ſweeteſt conſolation. Without it there can be no happineſs, and with it there can be no miſery. As, on the other hand, *Moral Sorrow*, in all its forms of Remorſe, Regret, and Self-condemnation, unleſs alleviated by thoſe hopes

hopes of pardon which the truly penitent are permitted and encouraged to entertain, is alone ſufficient, even in the greateſt worldly proſperity, to make life a burden. "The ſpirit of a man will ſuſtain his in-"firmity," that is, may ſupport the natural evils that fleſh is heir to; "but a "wounded ſpirit who can bear!" A condemning conſcience has often driven men to diſtraction; and ſometimes made them confeſs crimes, which it was in their power to conceal, and which they knew would, when confeſſed, bring upon them capital puniſhment.

357. *Shame* is a paſſion which always accompanies moral ſorrow. Some perſons are indeed incapable of ſhame; but thoſe, it is to be hoped, are few: for to ſay of a man, that he is impudent, or has loſt the ſenſe of ſhame, is a moſt ſevere cenſure, and ſeems to imply, that he has no conſcience, no fear of God, and no regard to man. The word *ſhame* has ſeveral ſignifications, and is applied to ſeveral paſſions, ſimilar perhaps in their nature, but not the ſame. Conſciouſneſs of reputation loſt, or

in

in danger of being loſt, cauſes one ſort of ſhame, which is alſo called *Confuſion of face*, and diſcovers itſelf by bluſhing, downcaſt eyes, and abject behaviour. We feel in ſome degree the ſame paſſion, when any thing diſhonourable is unjuſtly charged upon us: only in this caſe our knowledge of our own innocence ſupports the mind, and yields great conſolation; and the ſhame that may then remain proceeds from our apprehenſion that others, whoſe opinion we revere, may think hardly of us, from not having the means of being better informed.

358. Upon the baſe mention of any thing indecent, though not imputed to any body, a perſon of delicacy is conſcious of a paſſion or feeling, which has alſo been called ſhame, and diſcovers itſelf by the ſame ſymptom of bluſhing. This, as a ſign of an uncorrupted mind, is a very amiable affection, and particularly becoming in young people; as the rudeneſs or impudence of thoſe who give occaſion to it is deteſtable. Profane talkers, lewd jeſters, and they who by ſpeech or writing

preſent

preſent to the ear or to the eye of modeſty any of the indecencies I allude to, are peſts of ſociety. Againſt the thief and the highwayman, we may, with the aſſiſtance of law, guard ſo as to be in no great danger from them; but a ſhameleſs profligate, by ſcrawling his execrable traſh on the walls or windows of an inn, may to the young and harmleſs do laſting miſchief, which it is impoſſible to puniſh, and which therefore the law cannot prevent. In this reſpect there is not, I have been told, any other country ſo infamous as our own. It is ſome comfort however to reflect that none but the vileſt of the people are capable of this enormity. Thoſe ſpecimens of it that I have had the misfortune to ſee, appear, from the ſpelling and other circumſtances, to have been the work of wretches who were equally deſtitute of ſenſe, delicacy, and literature.

359. There is another ſort of ſhame, commonly called *Baſhfulneſs*, which often gives great pain to the young and unexperienced, when they appear before ſtrangers, or in the preſence of their ſuperiors, or

or have occaſion to ſpeak or act in public. When this *evil ſhame* (as the French call it) is exceſſive, ſo as to make people act abſurdly, or diſqualify them for doing their duty, it is very inconvenient as well as awkward, and pains ſhould be taken to get the better of it; not all at once, however, nor in haſte; for thus they might be driven into the oppoſite and much worſe extreme of Impudence; but by little and little. Young perſons of great ſenſibility are apt to be too much diſcouraged in the conſciouſneſs of this infirmity: but they have no occaſion to be ſo. For, if they are attentive and reſpectful to their company, baſhfulneſs will not injure them in the opinion of the diſcerning; it will rather raiſe prepoſſeſſions in their favour.

360. Even when the ſeaſon of youth is paſt, a ſlight degree of baſhfulneſs is not at all ungraceful on particular occaſions, eſpecially in thoſe public ſpeakers who wiſh to gain upon their audience by the gentle arts of perſuaſion; becauſe it betokens humility and reſpect. Homer, who diſcriminates human characters with the greateſt

accuracy, tells us, that this was one of the peculiarities that diſtinguiſhed Ulyſſes as an orator; and the poet adds, that his eloquence was irreſiſtible. Ovid attended to this circumſtance; as appears from his account of the conteſt between Ajax and Ulyſſes for the arms of Achilles. Ajax, who by the by loſt his cauſe, begins with exclamation and bluſtering, ſuitable to his character; but nothing can be more modeſt or delicate than the attitude and exordium of Ulyſſes *. I mention this, becauſe, in the hope that ſome of thoſe who hear me may in time become public ſpeakers, I would caution them againſt that air of confidence and ſelf-ſufficiency, which I have ſeen ſome preachers aſſume, and which is very offenſive to a hearer of diſcernment and delicacy. I may add that, as humility is one of the diſtinguiſhing virtues of a Chriſtian, a gentle, unaſſuming, and modeſt deportment, eſpecially in public, is indiſpenſable in a clergyman. Among ſenators in debate a more vehement

* See Ovid. Metam. xiii. 124.

animation

animation takes place, and may ſometimes be proper; yet the modeſt ſpeaker never fails to intereſt the audience in his favour.

361. *Anger* and *Gratitude.* Theſe are the laſt pair of oppoſite paſſions which I mentioned as derived from Hatred and Love. The perſon, who is inſtrumental in bringing evil upon us or otherwiſe offending us, raiſes our *Anger*; which, Locke ſays, implies a preſent purpoſe of revenge, as well as a ſenſe of injury. Revenge and anger do indeed too often go together; but ſurely there may be anger, as in an affectionate parent towards his child, without any purpoſe of revenge. The chaſtiſement that may follow ſuch anger is not vindictive; it aims at nothing but the good of the child; and to the good parent, whom duty compels to adminiſter ſo harſh a remedy, it gives pain inſtead of pleaſure. —The perſon who is inſtrumental in doing us good, is the object of our *Gratitude*; which is a very pleaſing emotion: as anger is ſo much the reverſe, that we often call it *Diſpleaſure.* Some people are ſo prone to anger, that one would almoſt think they

delighted in it. But if this is really the caſe, there muſt be ſomething unnatural in the diſpoſition of their minds.

362. Every thing that hurts us is not the object of anger. We are not angry at the ſtone which, falling by accident from the top of a houſe, gives us a wound: but if we believed that a man occaſioned its fall, we ſhould be angry, either at his malice if he did it on purpoſe, or at his negligence if he took no pains to prevent it. A ſudden fit of inſtinctive anger may indeed break out againſt an inanimate thing; as when we ſay bitter words to the bench that bruiſes our ſhin in the dark: but ſuch anger is not rational; we immediately become aſhamed of it; and were it to continue, it would make us ridiculous. An irrational animal, a horſe that kicks, or a dog that without provocation bites us, may raiſe our anger, becauſe we have ſome notion, though perhaps not well founded, that he might and ought to have let us alone; and the puniſhment we apply in ſuch caſes is neither blamed nor ridiculed; becauſe the provocation was great;

and

and becauſe our blows may be effectual, by frightening the animal, in preventing ſuch evil for the future.

363. Anger is generally made up of diſlike and ſome degree of ill-will; but of ſuch ill-will as does not always imply malevolence. Parents, as already obſerved, may be angry with thoſe children whom they fondly love; and that anger is not only conſiſtent with benevolence, but is even a proof of it. For if a parent were not angry when his child is guilty of tranſgreſſion, we ſhould ſay that he does not love his child ſo much as he ought to do. In like manner, we may be angry with a friend or neighbour; that is, we may be offended at ſome injury he has done us, and wiſh ſomething to happen to make him ſenſible of his fault, and prevent his doing the like for the future: and all the while we may be, and indeed ought to be, far from wiſhing him any real or laſting evil, but, on the contrary, ready to forgive him, deſirous of reconciliation, and inclined to do him a favour when it is in our power.

364. Anger

364. Anger is called by Horace a ſhort madneſs. When in any degree violent, it is truly ſo; for it deprives a man for a time of the uſe of his reaſon, occaſions abſurd and immoral conduct, and if long continued may terminate in real phrenzy. Anger that is both laſting and violent is termed *Rancour* or *Malignity*, a paſſion which makes a man miſerable and deteſtable. When anger is apt to riſe on every trifling occaſion, it is called *Peeviſhneſs*; and renders one a torment to one's ſelf, and a plague to others. Anger that breaks forth with violence, but is ſoon over, is termed *Paſſionateneſs*; which, though not inconſiſtent either with good nature or with generoſity, ought to be reſtrained, becauſe it is extremely inconvenient to friends and dependents, and may hurry a man on to the perpetration of crimes. Anger that is cool, ſilent, and vindictive, is a much worſe paſſion: it is indeed ſo bad, that nothing good is to be expected from him who is capable of it.

365. Anger was implanted in our conſtitution for many valuable purpoſes, particularly

ticularly for ſelf-defence. Had we nothing iraſcible in us, there would be no end of injuries and indignities; but our knowledge of the nature and effects of anger makes us unwilling to provoke it: and thus men ſtand in awe of one another, which greatly contributes to the peace of ſociety. If an injury be accompanied with circumſtances of peculiar baſeneſs or meanneſs, our anger is termed *Indignation*. When anger exceeds the bounds of ſelf-defence, and contrives to bring real harm upon others, without any view to their good or to that of the community, it becomes *Revenge*, or *Vengeance*; which, if generally practiſed, would introduce endleſs confuſion.

366. For we are apt to think the injury we have juſt now received greater than it really is; and therefore, if we were to retaliate immediately by word or deed, we ſhould hardly fail to go beyond the due bounds, and ſo become injurious in our turn; which would call for new revenge from the oppoſite party; and that, being no doubt equally outrageous, would provoke

provoke to further vengeance, ſo that the evil would be incurable. Accordingly, revenge is forbidden by the laws both of God and of man. Savages, who enjoy not the protection of law, are their own avengers: whence they become addicted to this dreadful paſſion; and their vengeance is always exceſſive. One is not a competent judge in one's own cauſe. And therefore, in regular ſociety, perſons of impartiality and conſiderable learning are appointed judges, to puniſh according to the exact amount of the tranſgreſſion, and give the injured party reaſonable redreſs and no more.

367. When civilized nations go to war, or individuals go to law with one another, the principle of their conduct ought to be, not revenge, but a regard to public good; which, in order to diſcourage injury and defend our violated or endangered rights, compels us to have recourſe to violent meaſures, that are juſtifiable only from the neceſſity of the caſe. To go to law to plague a neighbour, or in order to obtain reparation for a petty treſpaſs that does neither

neither us nor the public any material injury, has in it more of malice than of love to juſtice. In war, to kill unneceſſarily, or with a view to gratify private malevolence, is nothing leſs than murder; and is indeed diſcountenanced by the opinions and practice of all enlightened nations. While the enemy attacks or reſiſts, it is lawful becauſe neceſſary, to repel force by force: when he ſubmits, he is intitled to mercy, and even to the generoſity of the conqueror. "Cowards are cruel, but the "brave Love mercy, and delight to ſave."

368. There are many occaſions, on which anger is not to be blamed; there are many, on which it is praiſeworthy. The Scripture intimates, that we may be angry without ſin: nay, our Saviour himſelf once looked round with anger on the Jews, "being grieved for the hardneſs of "their hearts." Ariſtotle has very perſpicuouſly, though with great brevity, marked the boundaries within which this paſſion may innocently operate, and ſo as to deſerve praiſe, inſtead of blame. ὁ μὲν μὴ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτι, καὶ

ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινέται *. He who is angry, only on ſuch occaſions as he ought, and with ſuch perſons as he ought, and in ſuch manner, and at ſuch time, and for ſuch length of time, as he ought, is actuated by a laudable anger. I ſhall make a few remarks on the ſeveral parts of this aphoriſm.

369. Firſt, Anger is laudable, when the *occaſion* is ſuch as renders it in ſome degree our duty: and that happens, when not to be angry would diſcover on our part a want of moral ſenſibility, or might prove an encouragement to wickedneſs in others. Parents overlooking a child's tranſgreſſion, or being equally indulgent to him when he is, and when he is not, in a fault, would ſhow a very blameable indifference: they could hardly take a more effectual way to corrupt his mind. A woman liſtening, without extreme indignation, to a licentious propoſal from a man, would undoubtedly give him reaſon to think that ſhe did not diſapprove of it.

* Ethic. ad Nic. iv. 5.

To

To ſpeak without emotion of any ſhocking inſtance of cruelty, ingratitude, injuſtice, blaſphemy, or any other impiety, would make us ſuſpect the ſpeaker, not only of inſenſibility, but of a total want of principle. In caſes of this nature, anger under certain limitations is a virtue, and the want of it a vice.

370. With reſpect to indignities offered to ourſelves, though we ought always to exerciſe forbearance, and be ready to forgive;—yet if, on receiving a very groſs and public inſult, we were to ſhow no reſentment, the world would blame our meanneſs of ſpirit, and think us not very fit to be entruſted with the important concerns of another, when we ſhowed ſo little attention to our own. Peculiar circumſtances, however, and the dignity of certain characters, might make great alteration in a matter of this kind. When, at the trial of Charles I. one of the byſtanders ſpat in the king's face, and he, without ſpeaking or even looking at the traitor, calmly wiped his cheek with a handkerchief, he manifeſted a greatneſs of

ſoul that had in it ſomething more than heroic, and almoſt more than human. But what words can expreſs our deteſtation of the ruffian who could perpetrate ſuch a deed!

371. Anger is laudable, ſecondly, when a man is angry with *ſuch perſons* as he ought. The perſons with whom we may reaſonably be angry have been, moſt of them, ſpecified already. Thoſe towards whom we ought to exerciſe particular lenity and forbearance, are, firſt, Our benefactors and friends, who may happen, in an unguarded moment, through the weakneſs of human nature, to give us offence. Secondly, Men eminently good, or whom we know to be good. Great reverence is due to good men; and if we only hint to them, in the gentleſt terms, that they have without deſign done us injury, it will wound them as deeply as they ought to be wounded; they will readily make acknowledgements; and further reproach from us would be cruel. Thirdly, They who are liable to be too much diſheartened by our anger, as dependents,

pendents, affectionate children, perſons in adverſity, or of delicate health and ſpirits, or weak in underſtanding, are all intitled to peculiar tenderneſs; being all objects of pity, and not likely to offend, except through inadvertence. And fourthly, Thoſe whom our anger would probably irritate, or to whom it could not do any good, we ought to bear with, or let alone, for our own ſakes, as well as for theirs *.

372. I need not add, that to be angry with our Creator is of all paſſions the moſt ſhocking, unnatural, and inexcuſable; inſomuch that you may perhaps think the human heart, bad as it is, incapable of ſuch impiety. But are not they guilty of it, who repine at Providence, either for bringing on them adverſity which they may fancy they do not deſerve, or for making their neighbour proſperous beyond what they may think him intitled to? All ſuch murmurings, envyings, and diſcontents, however common, and however diſguiſed, are ſo many inſtances of

* See Archbiſhop Secker's Sermons, vol. 5.

anger,

anger, if not of hatred, towards both God and man. This ought to be ſeriouſly conſidered. Contentment with our lot, joy in our neighbour's proſperity, and reſignation to the Divine Will, diffuſe ineffable tranquillity over the ſoul, prevent the intruſion of anger and every other painful paſſion, keep us at peace with all the world, and make us rejoice in God and in all his diſpenſations.

373. Thirdly, Anger is laudable, when the *manner* of it is conſiſtent with propriety and duty. It appears from what has been ſaid, that our anger may be in too ſlight a degree; as when it ſets before others an example of blameable indifference, or tends to repreſs, and conſequently to weaken, our moral ſenſibility. But exceſs of anger is the more common and more dangerous extreme. And it is hardly poſſible, and perhaps would not be expedient, to fix the boundary to which anger, conſiſtently with innocence, may go. If this were aſcertained, and people taught that they might ſafely proceed ſo far, they would think they might proceed a little

and

and a little further, till at laſt they might loſe all remembrance of the boundary. For he who ventures to the utmoſt verge of innocence ſeldom fails to go beyond it: there is criminal preſumption in venturing ſo far. Two rules, however, may be given on this head: the firſt, that our anger ſhould never make us loſe the government of ourſelves; the ſecond, that it ſhould never do injury to others.

374. Anger, thus moderated, will not produce in us any commotion ſo violent as to hurt our health, or our character as men of prudence; nor will it break out in boiſterous or inſulting language, far leſs in that impious and barbarous practice of curſing and ſwearing. To whatever degree we may be irritated, we ſhall do well neither to ſpeak nor to act, while our agitation is ſuch as to prevent calm reflection. It is ſaid of Socrates, that, when greatly provoked, he became inſtantly ſilent; and I ſuppoſe he never had occaſion to repent of his ſilence. And I have heard it recommended as a good rule, that, before a man give way to his paſſion, he

ſhould

ſhould take time to do ſomething elſe that is not connected with it, and if poſſible retire for a moment, if it were only to recollect ſome paſſage of a favourite author, or even to repeat the letters of the alphabet. A little delay may do good, and forbearance and mildneſs can never do harm.

375. Fourthly, Anger is laudable, when it is *well-timed*. Now it is not well-timed, when it interferes with the performance of any important duty: to pray, or go to church, in anger, would be very indecent. Nor is anger well-timed, when we have not had the means of knowing, whether any real offence has been given, or what is the true amount of the offence: miſtakes of this nature are not uncommon; men are often offended without cauſe, and generally more than they ought to be. Anger is alſo unſeaſonable, when it is likely to give pain or ſhow diſreſpect to our company; or when it is directed againſt a man whoſe preſent temper of mind makes him, from an exceſs of levity, or from any other intemperance, deaf to reaſon, or in a condition of being eaſily exaſperated,

perated. Such infirmities we all have; and, as we all wiſh allowances to be made for them in ourſelves, we all ought to make the like allowances in favour of others.

376. Fifthly, Anger is not blamed when it *continues no longer* than is reaſonable. Laſting reſentment is inexcuſable, whatever the provocation may have been. It ſours the temper, and ſo makes a man unfit for ſociety, and unhappy in himſelf; it excludes from his mind benevolent and pious thoughts; it cheriſhes pride, envy, contempt, and other violent and gloomy perturbations. "Let not the ſun go down "on your wrath," is an excellent rule: but, for the moſt part, anger is cenſurable if it laſt an hour, or even a much ſhorter ſpace. The moment the offender owns his fault, or ſeems deſirous of reconciliation, our anger ought to be loſt in forgiveneſs. Though he ſhould not own his fault, nor give reaſon to believe that there is any change in his mind for the better, we ſhall do well to check our anger; or, if it be prudent to keep up an appearance

of it, to take care that it be an appearance only: for, becauſe he is injurious, it does not follow that we ought to make ourſelves unhappy; which we ſhall certainly do, if we ſuffer this tormenting paſſion to take and to keep poſſeſſion of us.

377. Let thoſe who are prone to anger abſtain at leaſt from every outward expreſſion of it, from reproachful words and vindictive deeds, and conceal it carefully within their own breaſt. In this way they may in time get the command of it; for moſt paſſions thus reſtrained become weaker. Let them reſolve that they will abſtain from anger for a day, for two days, for a week, for a month; and, if they adhere to the reſolution, they will ſoon congratulate themſelves on the happy conſequences. Let them, as much as poſſible, keep aloof from vexatious buſineſs, and from quarrelſome and litigious men; and avoid not only thoſe altercations which may lead to anger, but diſputes in general, and all that ſort of reading which is termed controverſial. Let them never for a moment imagine, as paſſionate men are

apt

apt to do, that their anger is incurable. They can manage it ſometimes for the ſake of intereſt: let them learn to manage it for God's ſake, and for the ſake of their fellow-creatures and themſelves.

378. *Gratitude* was mentioned as the paſſion that ſeems to ſtand in oppoſition to Anger. We naturally love a man, becauſe he is of the ſame condition with ourſelves; we have good-will towards him, becauſe he ſtands in need of our aid, and may be profited by it; we love him yet more, if we know him to be of a mild diſpoſition, and more ſtill when he proves himſelf a friend to mankind by acts of beneficence: but if we ourſelves are the objects of that beneficence, our good-will towards him, and our delight in him, ought to be very ſtrong. When we thus contemplate our benefactor, not only with ſentiments of complacency and benevolence, but alſo with a diſpoſition to requite his favours, this mixture of pleaſurable emotions is termed Gratitude. The reverſe is *ingratitude*; which, if it cannot be called a paſſion, becauſe it occaſions little com-

motion in the corporeal part of our nature, is however a vice of ſuch enormity, that the moſt profligate man would be aſhamed to acknowledge himſelf guilty of it.

379. *Si ingratum dixeris, omnia dixeris*, ſays the Latin maxim: if you call a man ungrateful, you have called him every thing that is baſe; you need ſay nothing more. The ungrateful man is an enemy to the human race; for his conduct tends to diſcourage beneficence: and he is unfit for ſociety and unworthy of it, becauſe his indifference or hatred towards his benefactor proves him to be hard-hearted and unjuſt. There are two forms of this vile diſpoſition; one, when a man neglects to requite a favour when the requital is in his power; the other, when he returns evil for good. The laſt is no doubt the worſt; but both are ſo bad that they are called by the ſame name; it being difficult to find in language an epithet of more reproachful import than *ungrateful*. Gratitude is a gentle affection, and makes no great commotion in the animal economy; yet

yet is an active principle, and often diſplays itſelf viſibly in the countenance by raiſing the complexion, brightening the eyes, and ſometimes filling them with tears. An eye that weeps with gratitude has a particular ſplendor and earneſtneſs in the expreſſion.

380. Gratitude towards things irrational, or even inanimate, (if the term *gratitude* may be uſed in ſuch a connection), is not the object of cenſure or ridicule; for every emotion that *reſembles* this amiable virtue betokens a goodneſs of nature, which the paſſions allied to anger frequently do not. The plank that brought the mariner on ſhore from a ſhipwreck we ſhould not blame him for taking particular care of, refuſing to part with for any pecuniary conſideration, and even ſheltering from the injuries of the weather: we might ſmile at the circumſtance; but it would be a ſmile, not of ſcorn, but of kindneſs. Dogs and horſes have been inſtrumental in ſaving mens lives. Particular good-will towards ſuch a dog, or ſuch a horſe, would be laudable; and to ſhoot the one for running

ning down a ſheep, or to haraſs with toil the old age of the other, would be cruel, and without any violent figure of ſpeech might even be termed ingratitude. However, what is properly, and without a figure, called Gratitude (and the ſame thing is true of Anger) has for its object a being that acts, or ſeems to act, with ſome degree of intention. We are grateful, not to the medicine, but to the phyſician, that cures us; and angry, not at the knife which wounds, but with the perſon who intentionally or negligently wielded it. Gratitude is due to every benefactor, and ought to be ardent in proportion to the magnitude of the favour, and the benevolence of thoſe who confer it. Perſons of ſmall ability confer great favours, when what they do proceeds from a high degree of good-will: by him, who ſaw the generoſity of the giver, the widow's mite was accounted a great ſum.

381. To the Supreme Being, who freely gives us life and every other good thing, our higheſt gratitude is due; and ſhould be continually offered up in ſilent thankſgiving,

giving, and often expreſſed in words, that it may have the more powerful effect on our own minds, and on thoſe whoſe devotion we wiſh to direct, or to animate. Parents are in the next degree our benefactors, at leaſt in ordinary caſes: for to an attentive and affectionate parent, who muſt have done ſo much for us when we could do nothing for ourſelves, and watched ſo long and ſo anxiouſly, and ſo frequently and fervently prayed, for our welfare, we are more indebted than to any other fellow-creature. A ſtranger who relieves us, though he never ſaw us before and may never ſee us again, is alſo intitled to peculiar acknowledgements of gratitude, on account of the diſintereſtedneſs of his virtue. But we muſt not think ourſelves exempted from the obligation of this great duty, even when our benefactor is a perſon on whom we may have conferred many favours. A parent ought with thankfulneſs to receive what a dutiful child offers for his relief. "This is nothing more than I was "well intitled to," would be an improper ſpeech on ſuch an occaſion. It would intimate,

timate, that the parent, in taking care of his child, had been actuated, as much at leaſt by the hope of recompenſe, as by natural affection, and a ſenſe of duty.

SECT. VI.

The Subject continued.

Paſſions and Affections.

382. I Have now given a brief account of ſome of our more remarkable paſſions, but have not gone thro' the ſubject, and could eaſily have proceeded further, if there had been time for it. Hints have been occaſionally thrown in, with reſpect to the government of particular paſſions: I ſubjoin ſome brief remarks of a more general nature.—The government of the paſſions is a difficult work; but abſolutely neceſſary, if we wiſh to be happy either in the next world, or in this. And as it is the more difficult the longer it is delayed, it is the part of prudence, as well as matter of

of duty, to begin it without delay. The difficulty of this duty may appear from the concurring teſtimony of wiſe men in every age; from the earneſtneſs with which all moraliſts, particularly the inſpired writers, recommend it; from what we may feel in ourſelves of the unmanageableneſs of our paſſions, eſpecially of thoſe to which we are moſt inclined by nature or by habit; and from what we muſt have obſerved in the world around us, where we ſee men, of good underſtanding in other reſpects, enſlaved to criminal inclinations, and led on to ruin, with their eyes open, by the ſtrength of prevailing appetites.

383. Temperance, and an active life, are of the greateſt benefit in preſerving the health of both the body and the mind; and in giving us at all times the command of our thoughts, and conſequently of our paſſions. Savages are much addicted to intemperance and idleneſs; and their paſſions are proportionably outrageous. As the paſſions depend in a great meaſure upon the imagination, whatever tends to regulate that faculty tends alſo to make them

regular. And imagination is kept regular by cultivating habits of induſtry and ſoberneſs, piety and humility, and by cheriſhing the love of nature, ſimplicity, and truth. The paſſions alſo depend in part on the bodily conſtitution, and in ſome men are naturally ſtronger than in others. But every man may govern his paſſions, if he will take the neceſſary pains. The more the body is pampered, the greater ſtrength will every evil paſſion acquire: and therefore a hardy, as well as buſy life, tends to keep them manageable. Intemperance puts us off our guard, and diſqualifies us for that ſtrict ſelf-government, which is at all times incumbent on us as moral and accountable beings. A very ſlight degree of it has this effect.

384. The regulation of the paſſions ought to begin as early in life as poſſible. Then indeed they are ſtrong, but then the mind is docile, and has not contracted many evil habits. They, therefore, who have the care of children ſhould be very attentive to their paſſions and opinions, as ſoon as theſe begin to appear; rectifying the latter

latter if erroneous, and of the former repreſſing ſuch as ſeem to partake of malice, pride, vanity, envy, or ſuſpicion. The benevolent and pious affections cannot be indulged too much; and joy, hope, and fear, are uſeful when moderate, and properly directed. As a reſtraint on the paſſions of childhood, a ſenſe of honour and ſhame, if cheriſhed from the beginning, will be found to have better effects than bodily puniſhment; which ought never to be had recourſe to, till all other means have been tried and found ineffectual. But nothing in a teacher or parent has more ſalutary conſequences, than to ſet a good example, of candour, moderation, good-nature, humanity, and modeſty. "Let no "viſible or audible impurity," ſays Juvenal, "enter the apartment of a child; for "to children the greateſt reverence is due." See his fourteenth ſatire; in which are many excellent remarks to the ſame purpoſe. It is pity that author was in this reſpect ſo very inattentive to his own precepts.

385. Let no evil paſſion impoſe on us by aſſuming a falſe name; for this often

happens, and is often fatal to virtue. Men are apt to miſtake their own avarice for frugality, profuſion for generoſity, ſuſpicion for cautious diſcernment, pride for magnanimity, oſtentation for liberality, detraction for the love of truth, inſolence for plain-dealing, revenge for reſentment, envy for emulation, and ſenſuality for neceſſary amuſement. We muſt carefully guard againſt theſe and the like errors, by ſtudying our own character with impartiality, and attending to what is ſaid of us, not only by our friends, but alſo by our enemies, and by the world in general. For though our faults and infirmities are ſometimes magnified by malicious miſrepreſentation, it does not often happen, that a man is univerſally blamed for a fault from which he is altogether free.

386. Even from lawful gratifications we ſhould accuſtom ourſelves frequently to abſtain; for we ought always to have our paſſions and appetites in our power, remembering that the preſent is a life of trial, and was never intended for a ſtate of complete happineſs. Nor will this abſti-

nence

nence take away from our ſum of worldly enjoyment; on the contrary, it will add to it. As temperance, and even faſting ſometimes, may not only contribute to health, but alſo by quickening appetite increaſe the pleaſure of eating and drinking, ſo it is with our other appetites. Continual indulgence makes them unruly, and leſs ſenſible to pleaſure; abſtinence quickens them, and keeps them manageable.

387. Reſtrain needleſs curioſity; nor inquire into that buſineſs or thoſe ſentiments of other men in which you have no concern; nor puzzle yourſelves with intricate and unprofitable ſpeculation. There is in ſome people a reſtleſs and captious ſpirit, which is perpetually finding fault, and propoſing ſchemes, and contriving arguments for the ſupport of paradox, and meddling with matters that are not within their ſphere. Hence ariſe anxiety, vexation, diſappointment, miſanthropy, ſcepticiſm, and many paſſions both unruly and unnatural, which we may eaſily avoid, if we take the apoſtle's advice, and "ſtudy

"to

" to be quiet, and to mind our own buſi-
" neſs."

388. Avoid all companies, all books, and all opportunities of action, by which you may have reaſon to apprehend that irregular paſſions may be raiſed or encouraged. How much good manners may be corrupted by evil communication, the ſad experience of every age, I had almoſt ſaid of every man, can abundantly teſtify. The world judges of men from the company they keep; and it is right that it ſhould be ſo. No man will chooſe for his companion the perſon whom he either deſpiſes or diſapproves. He therefore who aſſociates with the wicked and the fooliſh gives proof of his own wickedneſs and folly. We may be the better, as long as we live, for having converſed one hour with a wiſe and good man; and the ſame time ſpent with thoſe of an oppoſite character may give our virtue an incurable wound.

389. Conſider all thoſe books as dangerous, by which criminal paſſions may be inflamed, or good principles ſubverted; and I again warn you to avoid them as

you

you would the peſtilence. To take pleaſure in ſuch things is a mark of as great corruption of mind, and ought to be accounted as diſhonourable, as to keep company with pickpockets, gamblers, and atheiſts. Study the evidence of your religion, ſo as to be able to give a reaſon to thoſe who may have a right to queſtion you concerning your faith; and ſteadily, though calmly, defend your principles, if you ſhould have the misfortune to fall into the company of thoſe who controvert them: but do not raſhly engage in this ſort of altercation; nor chooſe for your friend or companion the man who takes pleaſure in the books of infidelity. Such a man you will hardly convert by reaſoning, as his unbelief is founded not in reaſon but in prejudice; and you need not expect to receive from him much uſeful information in theſe matters, as you will find, (at leaſt I have always found), that he has attended to one ſide only of the queſtion.

390. Games of chance, where money is the object, are dangerous in the extreme. They

They cheriſh evil paſſions without number; as avarice, anger, ſelfiſhneſs, diſcontent; and give riſe to altercation and quarrelling, and ſometimes, as I am well informed, to the moſt ſhocking impiety: they occaſion, as long as they continue, a total loſs of time and of all the *rational* pleaſures of ſocial life: they are generally detrimental to health, by keeping the body inactive, and encroaching on the hours of reſt: they produce a feveriſh agitation of the ſpirits as hurtful to the mind, as habitual dram-drinking would be to the body: they level all diſtinctions of ſenſe and folly, vice and virtue; and bring together, on the ſame footing, men and women of decent and of the moſt abandoned manners. Perſons who take pleaſure in play ſeldom fail to become immoderately attached to it; and neglect of buſineſs, and the ruin of fortune, family, and reputation, are too frequently the conſequence. Savages are addicted to gaming; and, in this reſpect, whatever difference there may be in the dreſs, or colour of the ſkin, the characters of the gentleman gambler

gambler and gambling ſavage are not only ſimilar, but the ſame. The ſavage at play will loſe his wife and children and perſonal liberty; the other will throw away in the ſame manner what ſhould ſupport his wife and children, and keep himſelf out of a jail; and it is well if he ſtop ſhort of ſelf-murder. Is it poſſible to keep at too great diſtance from ſuch enormities? and can the man, who once engages in this dreadful buſineſs, ſay when he will ſtop, or how far he may go? LET NO SUCH MAN BE TRUSTED.

391. Our thoughts, as well as the real occurrences of life, may draw forth our paſſions; and one may work one's mind into a ferment of anger, or ſome other violent diſcompoſure, without having been expoſed to any temptation, and merely by ruminating on certain objects. When we find this to be the caſe, let us inſtantly give a new, and if poſſible an oppoſite, direction to the current of our thoughts. If any evil paſſion get hold of us, and will not yield to reaſon, if for example we be very angry with an injurious neighbour,

let us ceaſe to think of him, and employ ourſelves in ſome other intereſting and more agreeable recollection; let us call to mind ſome happy incident of our paſt life; let us think of our Creator, and of his goodneſs to mankind and to us in particular; let us meditate on the importance of our preſent conduct, and of that tremendous futurity which is before us: or, if we be not at this particular time well prepared for ſerious thought, let us apply to ſome book of harmleſs amuſement, or join in ſome entertaining converſation: and thus we ſhall get rid of the paſſion that haunts us, and forget both its object and its cauſe.

SECT. VII.

Of the Paſſions, as they diſplay themſelves in the Look and Geſture.

392. PASSIONS being commotions of the body as well as of the mind, it is no wonder that they ſhould diſplay themſelves

ſelves in the looks and behaviour. If they did not, our intercourſe with one another would be much more difficult and dangerous than it is; becauſe we could not ſo readily diſcover the characters of men, or what is paſſing in their minds. But the outward expreſſion of the paſſions is a ſort of univerſal language; not very extenſive indeed, but ſufficiently ſo to give us information of many things which it concerns us to know, and which otherwiſe we could not have known. When a man is even at pains to conceal his emotions, his eyes, features, complexion, and voice will diſcover them to a diſcerning obſerver; and when he is at no pains to hide or diſguiſe what he feels, the outward indications will be ſo ſignificant, that hardly any perſon can miſtake their meaning: his anger, for example, though he ſhould not utter a word, will contract his brows, flaſh in his eyes, make his lips quiver, and give irregular motions to his limbs. Salluſt ſays of Catiline, that his eyes had a diſagreeable glare, that his complexion was pale, his walk ſometimes quick and ſome-

times ſlow, and that his general appearance betokened a diſcompoſure of mind approaching to inſanity.

393. It muſt be remarked here, that all are not equally quickſighted in diſcerning the inward emotion by means of the outward ſign. Some have great acuteneſs in this reſpect, ſome very little: which may in part be owing to habits of attention or inattention. If there be men, as I believe there are, who ſtudy almoſt every countenance that comes in their way, whether of man or of beaſt, and if there be others who ſeldom mind things of that nature, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the former will have more of this acuteneſs than the latter. The talent I ſpeak of is ſometimes called *ſkill in phyſiognomy*, or *phyſiognomony*; which laſt form of the word is more ſuitable to its Greek original. Ariſtotle, and other ancient philoſophers, wrote of it; and there were in ancient times perſons whoſe profeſſion it was to judge of the character from the outward appearance. One of theſe, having ſeen Socrates, without knowing who he was, pronounced him

to

to be a very bad man, and enſlaved to ſome of the worſt paſſions in human nature. This was reported to Socrates, as a proof of the preſumption and folly of the phyſiognomiſt. But Socrates told them, that the man had diſcovered uncommon penetration; for that he was by nature ſubject to all thoſe paſſions, though with the aid of reaſon and philoſophy he had now got the better of them.

394. I remark, ſecondly, That as all human minds are not equally ſuſceptible of warm emotion, ſo all human bodies are not equally liable to receive impreſſions from the mind. There is an awkwardneſs in the geſtures of ſome people, and a want of meaning in their faces, which make the outward appearance pretty much the ſame at all times, unleſs they be under great agitation. This may be in part conſtitutional and partly the effect of habit. That uniformity of feature which the Stoics affected, and in which they ſuppoſed the dignity of man in a great meaſure to conſiſt, was no doubt in many of them aſſumed and artificial. But when

we ſee the looks of one child continually varying as his thoughts vary, and thoſe of another rarely undergoing any ſenſible change, we muſt impute this diverſity to conſtitution, as we cannot ſuppoſe there is art or affectation in the caſe. In the countenance of Garrick there was more variety of expreſſion than I ever ſaw in any other. This, after he became a player, he ſtudied and practiſed with extraordinary application: but the ſame thing was obſervable in him from his earlieſt years; as I have been aſſured by thoſe who knew him when a boy.

395. I remark, thirdly, That all ſtates of ſociety do not allow equal ſcope to the outward and viſible diſplay of the paſſions. People in civilized life, from the awe in which they ſtand of the faſhion and of one another, are at pains to curb, or at leaſt to hide, their more violent emotions: whereas among ſavages, and perſons little acquainted with decorum, there is hardly any reſtraint of this ſort. Hence the intercourſe of the latter is always more boiſterous than that of the former, whether the

the converſation lead to joy or ſorrow, merriment or anger; and their countenances are more deeply impreſſed with the traces of their predominant paſſions. Artiſts, too, as I have elſewhere remarked, who employ themſelves in the nicer parts of mechanics, have generally a fixedneſs of feature ſuited to the earneſt attention which they are obliged to beſtow on their work: while thoſe who can ply their trade and amuſe themſelves at the ſame time with diſcourſe, have for the moſt part ſmoother faces, and features leſs ſignificant.

396. Though there are many who, from inattention or other cauſes, are not acute in diſcerning human characters, yet almoſt every man is to a certain degree a phyſiognomiſt. Every one can diſtinguiſh an angry from a placid, a chearful from a melancholy, a thoughtful from a thoughtleſs, and a dull from a penetrating, countenance. Children are capable of this; and ſoon learn to fear the frowns, and take encouragement from the ſmiles, of the nurſe; to participate in her joys or

ſorrows,

ſorrows, when they ſee the outward ſigns of thoſe emotions; and to ſtand more in awe of an acute than of a liſtleſs obſerver. The faces of the more ſagacious brutes are not without expreſſion. A curſt cur and a well-natured dog, a high-mettled and a ſpiritleſs horſe, are known by their countenance and carriage; and one might perceive intuitively, that wolves, foxes, polecats, and bull-dogs, are dangerous animals, and that from aſſes, ſheep, calves, lambs, and kids, one has nothing to fear. He who acknowledges theſe facts, and has obſerved what varieties of expreſſion may be diſplayed in pictures and ſtatues, will admit, that phyſiognomy is a ſort of ſcience, and not deſtitute of truth; and that by a careful obſerver conſiderable progreſs may be made in it.

397. But obſerve, that it is not from the countenance alone that phyſiognomiſts form their opinions. They muſt hear a man ſpeak, and ſee him move, and act, and ſmile; they muſt be acquainted with his general carriage, before they can decide upon his character. Painters have obſerved,

obſerved, that the poſition of the head is particularly expreſſive. Humility and ſorrow appear in its hanging down; arrogance, in lifting it up, and toſſing it back; ſome of the gentler affections, in its inclining to one ſide; and ſteadineſs, in its riſing erect between the ſhoulders. Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, Intreaty, Threatening, Mildneſs, as well as Admiration, Anger, and Scorn, have viſible effects on the attitudes of the head. The hands too, which it is difficult to move gracefully, and which thoſe who have not been accuſtomed to elegant ſociety ought to move but ſeldom, and with caution,—the hands, I ſay, by their motions and geſtures, expreſs various ſtates of the mind, as Admiration, Hope, Conſent, Refuſal, Fear, Intreaty, and many others. But to deſcribe thoſe motions with accuracy is hardly poſſible; and, in a matter of this kind, inaccurate rules are worſe than no rules at all, as they lead to affectation, and conſequently to ungracefulneſs.

398. Some people ſhow their characters more ſlowly than others. With one you

think yourſelf acquainted at firſt ſight; of another, after long trial, you can make nothing, and, if he is very cautious, he may elude your acuteſt obſervation for years. Hence let the phyſiognomiſt learn to be rather ſlow than haſty in forming a judgement. Let him be on his guard, though appearances are favourable; and let charity incline him to moderation, even when he may think he has certainly detected a dangerous or diſagreeable aſſociate. We are often diſſatisfied with a man at his firſt appearance, whom we afterwards find worthy of high eſteem. In ſhort, Phyſiognomy is, in moſt caſes, a conjectural ſcience, and muſt not be implicitly truſted; for objections may be found to almoſt every one of its principles. Marſhal Turenne, the greateſt commander and one of the beſt men of his time, had ſo unpromiſing a look, that when meanly dreſſed, as he often was, ſtrangers were apt to miſtake him for a ſimpleton. The ſame thing is recorded of another illuſtrious commander, Philopemen: and our Charles II. though a man of great pleaſantry

ſantry and good nature, had a ſtern and forbidding countenance.

399. Though I have long been ſtudious of phyſiognomy, and ſometimes flattered myſelf that I had ſkill in it, I dare not venture to treat of it in any other way, than by offering a few ſlight obſervations: well knowing, that on ſuch a ſubject people are apt to run into wild theories more likely to miſlead than to inform. The opinions of Ariſtotle and other old writers have been collected by Joannes Baptiſta Porta; whoſe book, tho' formerly in ſome eſteem, will give little ſatisfaction to the unbiaſſed and inquiſitive obſerver. He, and ſome others, have amuſed themſelves with fancying likeneſſes between the faces of men and of brutes, and aſſigning that character to the man which predominates in the beaſt he reſembles. They have alſo, from the proportions of particular parts of a human body, drawn concluſions with reſpect to the virtues or vices of the ſoul with which it is animated. And ſome would eſtimate the powers of a man's underſtanding by

the ſhape of his ſkull, and the outline of his brow and noſe. I have neither time nor inclination to enter into theſe inquiries; though I will not take it upon me to ſay, that they are wholly without foundation.

400. Of all the phyſiognomiſts I know, ancient or modern, the moſt eminent is John Gaſpard Lavater, a clergyman of Zurich in Switzerland. He has publiſhed two or three magnificent volumes, and adorned them with many curious drawings. The work has noble ſtrains of eloquence, and proves the author to be a man of great piety and goodneſs of heart; and many of his remarks, on the human and other figures which he preſents to his reader, are ſuch as, I think, no perſon of obſervation can refuſe to acquieſce in. But he is frequently whimſical, and in affirmation too poſitive. His ſtyle, though beautiful in particular paſſages, is upon the whole diffuſe, incoherent, and declamatory, to ſuch a degree, that I believe it would be a difficult matter to digeſt his notions into a ſyſtem. Some perſons in his neighbourhood

bourhood having been poiſoned with the wine in the Euchariſt, Lavater, ſuppoſing it had been done intentionally, preached a ſermon with extraordinary vehemence; in which was this remarkable ſaying, which I mention, to ſhow his confidence in his art, "I would not adviſe the per-"petrator of this horrid deed to come in "my way; for I ſhall certainly know "him by his look, if ever I ſet my eyes "upon him." Lavater is a man of genius and penetration, and a good deal of entertainment may be found in his book. But I am afraid it will not teach ſagacity to thoſe on whom nature has not beſtowed that talent; nor form to habits of minute attention thoſe who are habitually inattentive. And if it ſhould encourage the unſkilful to form raſh judgements, there is reaſon to apprehend that it may do more harm than good. I ſhall not attempt to give a more particular account of it; for that would lead me too far from my preſent purpoſe.

401. Every body knows, that virtuous and innocent affections give an agreeable expreſſion

expreſſion to the countenance, and criminal paſſions the contrary. Anger, diſcontent, deſpair, disfigure the features, diſtort the limbs, and give diſſonance to the voice; while good humour, contentment, hope, joy, benevolence, have a pleaſing effect in ſetting off the body to advantage. Emotions that are innocent, and at the ſame time in ſome degree painful, as pity and rational ſorrow, diſcompoſe the features; but ſuch diſcompoſure, far from being unſeemly, may be even captivating: beauty in tears has been found irreſiſtible. When a paſſion becomes habitual, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that thoſe muſcles, of the brows, eyes, noſtrils, cheeks, and mouth, over which it has influence, will, by acting continually in the ſame way, produce traces in the countenance, and fix upon it a viſible character. This appears even in early life. A peeviſh or good-humoured, a chearful or melancholy, boy, ſoon contracts what we call a peeviſh or good-humoured, a chearful or melancholy, look. And if theſe diſpoſitions continue to predominate in him, the lines produced by

by them in the ſeveral parts of the face will in time become as permanent as thoſe which are ſeen in the palm of the hand. What it may be, which connects certain emotions of the ſoul with certain configurations of the muſcles of the face and certain attitudes of the head and limbs, I cannot determine; Des Cartes and others have inquired into this matter, but without ſucceſs; and, till the union of the ſoul and body be underſtood, this will probably remain a myſtery impenetrable to man.

402. In order to form ſome idea of the expreſſion of the countenance, we are deſired to ſuppoſe four parallel lines to be drawn acroſs it; one in the direction of the eyebrows, another in that of the eyes, a third in that of the lower part of the noſe, and a fourth in that of the mouth. It is not meant, that theſe muſt be right lines, or parallel in the geometrical ſenſe of the word; they are only ſuppoſed to have the ſame direction nearly, and to extend from the one ſide of the face to the other. While they remain parallel, and with little or no incurvation upwards or downwards,

downwards, the countenance will indicate tranquillity, that is, a compoſed ſtate of mind without emotion. If they ſeem depreſſed in the middle of the face, and elevated towards the ſides of it, the expreſſion will incline to chearfulneſs; if raiſed in the middle and depreſſed towards the ſides, the effect will be contrary, and convey an idea of melancholy, or at leaſt of ſedateneſs. I do not ſay, that this holds invariably; I mean, that it is ſo for the moſt part: and every thing muſt be underſtood to be thus limited that relates to the preſent ſubject.

403. The raiſing of the line of the mouth at the two extremities is ſo well known to expreſs chearfulneſs, that unſkilful painters, in order to give that meaning to their portraits, turn up the corners of the mouth, even when the reſt of the countenance betokens compoſure, as the features of thoſe who ſit for their picture commonly do. But this contrivance produces a ſmirk or affected grin, rather than a ſmile, becauſe the reſt of the face is not conformable to it. When the lines

lines above mentioned, eſpecially that of the eye-brows (the moſt expreſſive of them all) are twiſted, or irregularly bent, it generally intimates diſcompoſure of mind, and, when much twiſted, violent diſcompoſure. There is expreſſion too, as every body knows, in the colour of certain features. A bright and ſparkling eye, and increaſed ruddineſs in the cheeks and lips, accompany keen emotions, as languid eyes and pale lips and cheeks betoken the contrary.

404. Admiration, as formerly obſerved, elevates the eye-brows, opens the mouth and eyes, fixes the attention upon the admired object, raiſes the hands, and ſpreads the fingers: aſtoniſhment opens the mouth and eyes ſtill wider, and gives a greater and more irregular elevation to the brows. If to aſtoniſhment fear be added, both rows of the teeth will appear, and thoſe ends of the eye-brows which are next the noſe will be much wrinkled, and drawn downward ſo as to hide the upper eye-lid. Eſteem compoſes the countenance, elevates the pupils of the eyes, draws the eye-brows

down towards the noſe, contracts the noſtrils, opens the mouth a little, and gently depreſſes the corners of it. Veneration ſometimes aſſumes the ſame appearances a little heightened, elevating the pupil of the eye till it almoſt diſappear under the eye-lid; and ſometimes ſhuts the mouth and eyes, inclining the face towards the ground, and ſpreading the hand upon the breaſt.

405. Contempt elevates and draws back the head, wrinkles and pulls down the brows, diſtends and raiſes the noſtrils, ſhuts the mouth and depreſſes the corners of it, makes the under lip more prominent than the upper, turns away the face from the deſpiſed object, and directs the eyes towards it obliquely. Grief raiſes the brows towards the middle of the forehead, depreſſing them at the temples, gives a ſimilar direction to the line of the mouth, half ſhuts the eyes, hiding the pupils under the upper eye-lids, and frequently draws forth tears. Joy ſmooths the forehead, opens and illuminates the eyes, raiſes the brows and the corners of the mouth, gently diſtends the noſtrils, and heightens the complexion.

plexion. Laughter raiſes the corners of the mouth ſtill higher, giving the ſame direction to the line of the brows, diſcovers both rows of the teeth, moiſtens and almoſt ſhuts the eyes, diffuſes wrinkles over ſeveral parts of the cheeks and forehead, and affects the voice in a very ſenſible and peculiar manner.

406. I need not enter further into the detail of this ſubject; what has been ſaid may ſerve as a ſpecimen, and that is perhaps ſufficient. Deſcriptions of phyſiognomy it is not eaſy to make intelligible without drawings; and if one had a good aſſortment of theſe, little deſcription would be neceſſary. Le Brun's Paſſions are in every print-ſhop, and muſt be allowed to have conſiderable merit; though the features expreſſive of the more violent emotions are perhaps exaggerated into what the Italians call *caricatura:* Chodowiecki has made ſome valuable additions to Le Brun, which may be found in Lavater.—I conclude with obſerving, that ſeveral energies of the *underſtanding*, as belief, doubt, perplexity, denial, &c. do alſo diſplay themſelves

ſelves viſibly in the look and geſture; as may be ſeen in that admirable Cartoon of Raffaelle, which repreſents Paul preaching at Athens.

The End of PSYCHOLOGY.

ELE-

ELEMENTS
OF
MORAL SCIENCE.

PART SECOND.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

407. NATURAL THEOLOGY explains what human reaſon can diſcover concerning the being and attributes of God. It is a ſcience of boundleſs extent; but we muſt confine ourſelves to a few general principles. In reſpect

reſpect of certainty it is equal to any ſcience; for its proofs riſe to demonſtration: in point of dignity it is ſuperior to all others; its object being the Creator of the Univerſe: and its utility is ſo great, that it lays the only ſure foundation of human ſociety and human happineſs.—The proofs of the Divine Exiſtence are innumerable, and continually force themſelves upon our obſervation; and are withal ſo clear and ſtriking, that nothing but the moſt obſtinate prejudice, and extreme depravity of both heart and underſtanding, could ever bring any rational being to diſbelieve, or doubt of it. With good reaſon, therefore, it is, that the Pſalmiſt calls the man "a fool, who ſaith in his "heart, There is no God."—Without belief in God, a conſiderate perſon (if it were poſſible for ſuch a perſon to be without this belief) could never poſſeſs tranquillity or comfort; for to him the world would ſeem a chaos of miſery and confuſion. But where this belief is eſtabliſhed, all things appear to be right, and to have a benevolent tendency; and give encouragement

couragement to hope, patience, ſubmiſſion, gratitude, adoration, and other good affections eſſential to human felicity.

408. That men, from education or from nature, might have ſome notion of duty, even though they were to harden themſelves into Atheiſts, can hardly be doubted: but that notion would, in ſuch men, be wholly ineffectual. From the fear of ſhame, or of human laws, the atheiſt may be decent in his outward behaviour; but he cannot act from any nobler principle. And if at any time he could promote (what he takes to be) his intereſt, by the commiſſion of the greateſt crime, it is plain that there would be nothing to reſtrain him, provided he could conceal his guilt; which any man might do occaſionally, and which men of great wealth or power could do at any time. Atheiſm is utterly ſubverſive of morality, and conſequently of happineſs: and as to a community, or political ſociety, of atheiſts, it is plainly impoſſible, and never took place in any nation.—They therefore, who teach atheiſtical doctrines, or who endeavour

deavour to make men doubtful in regard to this great and glorious truth, THE BEING OF GOD, do every thing in their power to overturn government, to unhinge ſociety, to eradicate virtue, to deſtroy happineſs, and to promote confuſion, madneſs, and miſery.

409. On what human reaſon diſcovers of the Divine nature is partly founded the evidence even of revelation itſelf. For no pretended revelation can be true, which contradicts what by human reaſon is demonſtrable of the divine perfections. We do not prove from Scripture, that God exiſts; becauſe they who deny God deny the authority of Scripture too. But when, by rational proof, we have evinced his being and attributes, we may then aſcertain the truth of divine revelation, or detect the falſehood of a pretended one. When we have, from the purity of its doctrine, and the external evidence of miracles, prophecy, and human teſtimony, ſatisfied ourſelves of the truth of the Chriſtian revelation, it becomes us to believe even ſuch parts of it as could

could never have been found out by human reaſon. And thus it is, that our natural notions of God and his providence are wonderfully refined and improved by what is revealed in holy writ: ſo that the meaneſt of our people, who has had a Chriſtian education, knows a great deal more on theſe ſubjects, than could ever be diſcovered by the wiſeſt of the antient philoſophers. That many things in the divine government, and many particulars relating to the divine nature, as declared in Scripture, ſhould ſurpaſs our comprehenſion, is not to be wondered at; for we are daily puzzled with things more within our ſphere: we know that our own ſoul and body are united, but of the manner of that union we know nothing. A paſt eternity we cannot comprehend; and a future eternity is an object by which our reaſon is aſtoniſhed and confounded: yet nothing can be more certain, than that one eternity is paſt and another to come.

410. In evincing the being of God, two ſorts of proof have been employed; which are called the proofs *a priori* and *a poſterio-*

ri. In the former, the being of God is proved from this conſideration, that his exiſtence is neceſſary, and that it is abſurd and impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he does not exiſt. This argument is fully diſcuſſed by Dr Clarke, in the firſt part of his excellent book on the evidence of natural and revealed religion. The proof *a poſteriori* ſhows, from the preſent conſtitution of things, that there is and muſt be a Supreme Being, of infinite goodneſs, power, and wiſdom, who created and ſupports them. This laſt is the moſt obvious proof, and the moſt eaſily comprehended; and withal ſo ſatisfying, that the man muſt be mad who refuſes to be convinced by it. I ſhall therefore give a brief account of this argument; referring to Dr Clarke for the other.—Natural Theology conſiſts of two parts. In the firſt, we demonſtrate the exiſtence of God; in the ſecond, his attributes. Theſe parts however are ſtrictly connected; for the ſame arguments that prove the firſt prove alſo the ſecond.

CHAP.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Divine Existence.

411. THAT we ourſelves and innumerable other things exiſt, may be taken for granted, a a firſt principle, as evident as any axiom in Euclid. Hence we infer, that ſomething muſt always have exiſted. For if ever there was a time when nothing exiſted, there muſt have been a time when ſomething began to be; and that ſomething muſt have come into being without a cauſe; ſince, by the ſuppoſition, there was nothing before it. But that a thing ſhould begin to exiſt, and yet proceed from no cauſe, is both abſurd and inconceivable; all men, by the law of their nature, being neceſſarily determined to believe, that whatever begins to exiſt proceeds from ſome cauſe. Therefore ſome being muſt have exiſted from eternity.—This being muſt have been either dependent on ſomething elſe, or not dependent on any thing elſe. Now an eternal ſucceſſion of depend-

ent beings, or a being which is dependent and yet exiſts from eternity, is impoſſible. For if every part of ſuch a ſucceſſion be dependent, then the whole muſt be ſo; and, if the whole be dependent, there muſt be ſomething on which it depends; and that ſomething muſt be prior in time to that which depends on it; which is impoſſible, if that which is dependent be from eternity. It follows, that there muſt be an eternal and independent being, on whom all other beings depend.

412. Some atheiſts ſeem to acknowledge a firſt cauſe, when they aſcribe the origin of the univerſe to *chance*. But it is not eaſy to gueſs what they mean by this word. We call thoſe things *accidental*, *caſual*, or the *effects of chance*, whoſe immediate cauſes we are unacquainted with; as the changes of the weather, for example; which however every body believes to be owing to ſome adequate cauſe, though we cannot find it out. Sometimes, when an intelligent being does a thing without deſign, as when a man throwing a ſtone out of his field happens to ſtrike a man whom he did not ſee; it is called *accidental*. In affirming

ing that the univerſe proceeds from chance, it would appear, that atheiſts mean, either that it has no cauſe at all, or that its cauſe did not act intelligently, or with deſign, in the production of it. That the univerſe proceeds from no cauſe, we have ſeen to be abſurd. And therefore, we ſhall overturn all the atheiſtical notions concerning chance, if we can ſhow, what indeed is eaſily ſhown, and what no conſiderate perſon can be ignorant of, that the cauſe of the univerſe is intelligent and wiſe, and in creating it, have acted with intelligence and wiſdom.

413. Where-ever we find a number of things, complex in their ſtructure, and yet perfectly ſimilar, we believe them to be the work of deſign. Were a man to find a thouſand pairs of ſhoes, of the ſame ſhape, ſize, and materials, it would not be eaſy to perſuade him that the whole was chance-work. Now the inſtances of complex and ſimilar productions in nature are ſo very numerous as to exceed computation. All human bodies, for example, though each of them conſiſts of almoſt an infinite num-

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ber of parts, are perfectly uniform in their ſtructure and functions; and the ſame thing may be ſaid of all the animals and plants of any particular ſpecies. To ſuppoſe this the effect of undeſigning chance, or the production of an unintelligent cauſe, is as great an abſurdity as it is poſſible to imagine.

414. Further: a compoſition of parts mutually adapted we muſt always conſider as the work of deſign; eſpecially if it be found in a great variety of inſtances. Suppoſe a body, an equilateral priſm, for example, to be formed by chance; and ſuppoſe a certain quantity of matter accidentally determined to reſolve itſelf into tubes of a certain dimenſion. It is as infinite to one, that theſe tubes ſhould have orifices equal to the baſe of the priſm; there being an infinity of other magnitudes equally poſſible. Suppoſe the orifices equal, it is as infinite to one that any of the tubes ſhould be priſmatical; infinite other figures being equally poſſible. Suppoſe one of them priſmatical, there is, for the ſame reaſon, an infinity of chances, that it ſhall

not

not be equilateral. Suppoſe it equilateral, there are ſtill infinite chances that the tube and priſm ſhall never meet. Suppoſe them to meet, there are innumerable chances that their axes ſhall not be in the ſame direction. Suppoſe them to have the ſame direction, there are ſtill many chances that the angles of the priſm ſhall not coincide with thoſe of the tube: and ſuppoſing them to coincide, there are innumerable chances that no force ſhall be applied in ſuch a direction as to make the priſm enter the tube.

415. How many millions of chances, then, are there againſt the *caſual* formation of one priſm inſerted in a priſmatic tube! which yet a ſmall degree of deſign could eaſily accompliſh. Were we to find, in a ſolitary place, a compoſition of this kind, of which the tube was iron and the priſm of wood, it would not be eaſy for us to believe, that ſuch a thing was the work of chance. And if ſo ſmall a thing cannot be without deſign, what ſhall we ſay of the mechaniſm of a plant, an animal, a ſyſtem of plants and animals, a world, a

ſyſtem

ſyſtem of worlds, an univerſe! No perſon, who has any pretenſions to rationality, and is not determined to ſhut his eyes againſt the truth, will ever bring himſelf to believe, that works ſo ſtupendous could be the effect of undeſigning chance.

416. To ſet this argument in a proper light, it would be neceſſary to take a ſurvey of the works of nature; in which the vaſt number of ſyſtems, the artful union of parts, the nice proportions eſtabliſhed between every part and ſyſtem and its reſpective end, the innumerable multitudes of ſpecies, and the infinite numbers of forms in every ſpecies, are ſo conſpicuous as to prove, beyond all doubt, that the Creator of the world is infinitely wiſe, powerful, and good. Let a man examine only a grain of corn, by cutting it open and viewing it with a microſcope; and then let him conſider another grain as planted in the earth, and by the influence of heat, ſoil, air, and moiſture, ſpringing up into a plant, conſiſting of a great number of veſſels that diſperſe the vital ſap into every part, and endowed with the

the power, or ſuſceptibility, of growing in bulk, till in due time it produce a number of other grains of the ſame kind, neceſſary to the exiſtence of man and other creatures;—let a rational being attend to this fact, and compare it with the nobleſt efforts of human art; and if he is not ſtruck with the infinite ſuperiority of the one to the other,—what can we ſay of him, but that he is void of underſtanding! And yet the mechaniſm and growth of a vegetable ſeems an inconſiderable thing, when we think of the wiſdom and power diſplayed in many other works of nature.

417. What a fabric is our ſolar ſyſtem! wherein bodies of ſuch enormous magnitude accompliſh their revolutions through ſpaces immenſe; and with a regularity, than which nothing can be more perfect. The diſtance of the planets from the ſun, and their ſeveral magnitudes, are determined with the utmoſt wiſdom, and according to the niceſt geometrical proportion. The central orb, whether we conſider its glorious appearance, its aſto-

niſhing greatneſs, or the beneficial influence of its light and heat, is ſuch an object as no rational being can contemplate without adoring the Creator. We have good reaſon to believe, that there are thouſands of other ſuns and ſyſtems of worlds, more glorious perhaps and more extenſive than ours; which form ſuch a ſtupendous whole, that the human ſoul, labouring to comprehend it, loſes ſight of itſelf and of all ſublunary things, and is totally overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment and veneration. With ſuch thoughts in our view, we are apt to forget the wonders that lie immediately around us, and that the ſmalleſt plant or animal body amounts to a demonſtration of the divine exiſtence. But God appears in all his works, in the leaſt as well as in the greateſt; and there is not, in the whole circle of human ſciences, any one truth confirmed by ſo many irreſiſtible proofs, as the exiſtence of the Deity.

418. The diurnal motion of the planets is the eaſieſt way poſſible of expoſing all their parts to the influence of light and heat.

heat. Their globular form is the fitteſt for motion, and for the free circulation of atmoſphere around them; and at the ſame time ſupplies the moſt capacious ſurface. The principle of gravitation, prevailing through the whole ſyſtem, and producing innumerable phenomena, is a moſt amazing inſtance of unbounded variety united with the ſtricteſt uniformity and proportion.—But it is impoſſible in a few pages to give ſuch an enumeration of particulars, as would do any juſtice to the ſubject. The man, who ſhould ſuppoſe a large city, conſiſting of a hundred thouſand palaces; all finiſhed in the minuteſt parts, and furniſhed with the greateſt elegance and variety of ornament, and with all ſorts of books, pictures, and ſtatues, executed in the moſt ingenious manner; to have been produced by the accidental blowing of winds and rolling of ſands, would juſtly be accounted irrational. But to ſuppoſe the univerſe, or our ſolar ſyſtem, or this earth, to be the work of undeſigning chance, is an abſurdity incomparably greater.

419. And now,—from a particular ſurvey of the terraqueous globe; of the atmoſphere, ſo neceſſary to light and life and vegetation; of the different productions of different countries, ſo well adapted to the conſtitution and uſe of the inhabitants: from the variety of uſeful minerals to be found in all parts of the earth; from the wonderful mechaniſm and ſtill more wonderful growth of vegetables, their vaſt number and variety, their beauty and utility, and the great abundance of ſuch as are moſt uſeful, particularly graſs and corn; from the ſtructure, life, motion, and inſtincts of animals; from the exact correſpondence of their inſtincts to their neceſſities; from the different kinds of them and of vegetables having been ſo long preſerved; from the ſimilitude between all the individuals of each ſpecies; from the body and ſoul of man ſo replete with wonders; from his intellectual and moral faculties; and from innumerable other particulars that come under the cognizance of man;—we might proceed to ſet the Divine Exiſtence in a ſtill clearer light,

if

if that were neceſſary: but the ſubject is ſo copious that we cannot enter upon it. We ſhould injure it by a brief ſummary; and a full detail would comprehend aſtronomy, geography, natural hiſtory, natural philoſophy, and ſeveral other ſciences. I therefore refer you to what has been written on it, by Xenophon, in the fourth chapter of his firſt book of *Memorabilia*; by Cicero, in his ſecond book *De natura deorum*; by Derham, Ray, Fenelon, Niewentyt; by Clarke, Bentley, Abernethy, &c. in their ſermons; and by other ingenious authors.

420. Some have urged, that there are in the univerſe many marks of irregularity and want of deſign, as well as regularity and wiſdom; and that therefore we have no evidence, that the being who made all things is perfectly good and wiſe. —But though we were to admit the fact, the inference would not be fair. The wonderful contrivance which appears in the arrangement of the ſolar ſyſtem, or even in the human body, abundantly proves the Creator to be infinitely wiſe. That he has

has not thought fit to make all things equally beautiful and excellent, can never be an imputation on his wiſdom and goodneſs: for how abſurd would it be to ſay, that he would have diſplayed more wiſdom, if he had endowed all things with life, perception, and reaſon! Stones and plants, air and water, are moſt uſeful things, and would have been much leſs uſeful if they had been percipient beings; as the inferior animals would have been both leſs uſeful and leſs happy, if they had been rational. Their exiſtence, therefore, and their natures, are proofs of the Divine goodneſs and wiſdom, inſtead of being arguments againſt it.

421. Beſides, no man of ſenſe accounts himſelf a complete judge of any work, even of a fellow-creature, unleſs he underſtand its end and ſtructure, as well as the workman himſelf does. When we wiſh to know with certainty the value of a ſhip, or a houſe, or any complex machine, we conſult thoſe who are ſkilled in ſuch things; for them only we hold to be competent judges. In a complex contrivance there

there may be many parts, of the greateſt importance, which an unſkilful obſerver would not perceive the uſe of, or would perhaps declare to be uſeleſs. Now in the courſe of Providence, a vaſt number of events and objects may be employed to accompliſh one great end; and it is impoſſible for us to pronounce reaſonably of any one event or object, that it is uſeleſs or improper, unleſs we know its tendency, and connection with other things both paſt and future; which in caſes innumerable we cannot do. For of the paſt we know but little, the preſent we know imperfectly, and of the future we have no certain knowledge beyond what is revealed. The ſyſtem of Providence relating to us and to our final deſtination, extends through thouſands of years, as we have good reaſon to believe; but our life is ſhort, and our views are bounded by our experience, which is very limited. That therefore may be a moſt wiſe and beneficent diſpenſation, which to a captious mind and fallible judgement may appear the contrary.

422. More-

422. Moreover, the Deity intended, that the nature of all created things ſhould be progreſſive. Many years paſs away before a man arrives at maturity; and many days, before a plant can yield good fruit. Every thing is imperfect, while advancing to perfection; and we cannot ſay of any thing, whether it be well or ill-contrived for anſwering its end, till we know what its ſtate of maturity will be, and what the effects are whereof it may be productive. Phyſical evils may, as will be ſhown by and by, be improved into bleſſings; and it will alſo be ſhown, that Moral evil is a conſequence of that law of nature which makes us capable of virtue and happineſs. Even in this world, Providence often brings good out of evil; and every man of obſervation muſt have perceived, that certain events of his life, which when they happened ſeemed to be great misfortunes, have been found to be great bleſſings in the end.

423. If, then, that which ſeems evil may really be good, for any thing we know to the contrary; and if that which

is really evil often does, and always may, produce good: how can man be ſo preſumptuous as to ſuppoſe, becauſe he cannot diſtinctly ſee the nature and uſe of ſome things around him, that therefore the Creator of the world is not ſupremely good and wiſe! No man can draw this concluſion, unleſs he believe himſelf infallible in his knowledge of all things paſt, preſent, and future; and he who believes ſo, if there be any ſuch, is a fool.

CHAP. II.

Of the Divine Attributes.

424. OUR knowledge of the Divine Nature, tho' ſufficient to raiſe within us the higheſt adoration and love, muſt needs be very imperfect; for we cannot form a diſtinct idea of any moral or intellectual quality, unleſs we find ſome trace of it in ourſelves. Now God muſt poſſeſs innumerable perfections, which neither we, nor any created being, can comprehend. When we aſcribe to him every

good quality that we can conceive, and conſider him as poſſeſſed of them all in ſupreme perfection, and as free from every imperfection, we form the beſt idea of him that we can: but it muſt fall infinitely ſhort of the truth. The attributes of God, which it is in our power in any degree to conceive, or to make the ſubject of inveſtigation, have been divided into NATURAL, as *Unity*, *Self-Exiſtence*, *Spirituality*, *Omnipotence*, *Immutability*, *Eternity*; INTELLECTUAL, as *Knowledge* and *Wiſdom*; and MORAL, as *Juſtice*, *Goodneſs*, *Mercy*, *Holineſs*.

425. That God is, has been proved already. That there are more gods than one, we have no evidence, and therefore cannot rationally believe. Nay even from the light of nature we have evidence, that there is one only. For in the works of creation there appears that perfect unity of deſign, which naturally determines an attentive ſpectator to refer them all to one firſt cauſe. Accordingly, the wiſeſt men in the heathen world, though they worſhipped inferior *deities*, (I ſhould rather ſay *names which they ſubſtituted for deities*), did yet

yet ſeem to acknowledge one ſupreme God, the greateſt and beſt of beings, the father of gods and men. It is probable, that belief in one God was the original belief of mankind with reſpect to Deity. But, partly from their narrow views, which made them think that one being could not, without ſubordinate agents, ſuperintend all things; partly from their flattery to living great men, and gratitude to the dead, diſpoſing them to pay divine honours to human creatures; partly from fanciful analogies between the Divine Providence and earthly governments; and partly from the figures of poetry by which they ſaw the attributes of the Deity perſonified, they ſoon corrupted the original belief, and fell into polytheiſm and idolatry. And no antient people ever retained long their belief in the one true God, except the Jews, who were enlightened by revelation; and even they were frequently inclined to adopt the ſuperſtitions of their neighbours. We ſee then, that, in order to aſcertain and fix mens notions of the

Divine *Unity*, Revelation ſeems to be neceſſary.

426. Self-exiſtence or Independence is another *natural* attribute of God. If he depended on any thing, that thing would be ſuperior and prior to him, which is abſurd; becauſe he himſelf is the ſupreme and the firſt cauſe: therefore his exiſtence does not depend on any thing whatever. The attribute of ſelf-exiſtence is ſomething that ſurpaſſes our comprehenſion; and no wonder; ſince all the beings that we ſee around us in the world are dependent. But, as already obſerved, there are many things which we muſt acknowledge to be true, notwithſtanding that we cannot comprehend them.

427. We ſee the material univerſe in motion; but matter is inert, and, ſo far as we know, nothing can move it but mind. Therefore God is a ſpirit. We do not mean that his nature is the ſame with that of our ſoul: it is infinitely more excellent. But we mean, that he poſſeſſes intelligence and active power in ſupreme perfection; and as theſe qualities do not belong to matter,

matter, which is neither active nor intelligent, we muſt refer them to that which is not matter, but mind.—Some of the ancients thought, that God is the ſoul of the univerſe, and that the univerſe is, as it were, his body. But this cannot be; for where-ever there is body, there muſt be inactivity, and conſequently imperfection. He is therefore a pure ſpirit. Nor can we conceive, that he is confined within the limits of creation, as a ſoul is within its body; or that he is liable to impreſſions from material things, as the ſoul is from the body; or that material things are inſtruments neceſſary to the exertion of his attributes, as our bodies are to the exertion of our faculties. It muſt be as eaſy for him, to act beyond the bounds of creation, as within them; to create new worlds, as to ceaſe from creation. He is every where preſent and active; but it is a more perfect preſence and activity, than that of a ſoul within a body.—Another notion once prevailed, ſimilar to that which has been juſt now confuted, that the world is animated, as a body is by a ſoul, not by the Deity himſelf,

himſelf, but by an univerſal ſpirit, which he created in the beginning, and of which the ſouls of men and other animals are parts or emanations. This I mention, not becauſe a confutation is neceſſary; for it is mere hypotheſis, without any ſhadow of evidence; but becauſe it may be of uſe in explaining ſome paſſages of ancient authors, particularly of Virgil, who once and again alludes to it *.

428. In order to be ſatisfied, that God is omnipotent, we need only to open our eyes, and look round upon the wonders of his creation. To produce ſuch aſtoniſhing effects, as we ſee in the univerſe, and experience in our own frame; and to produce them out of nothing, and ſuſtain them in the moſt perfect regularity, muſt certainly be the effect of power which is able to do all things, and which therefore nothing can reſiſt. But the divine power cannot extend to what is either impoſſible in itſelf, or unſuitable to the perfection of his nature. To make the ſame thing at the ſame

* Æneid. vi. 724. Geor. iv. 220.

time

time to be and not to be, is plainly impoſſible; and to act inconſiſtently with juſtice, goodneſs, and wiſdom, muſt be equally impoſſible to a being of infinite purity.

429. That God is from everlaſting to everlaſting, is evident from his being ſelf-exiſtent and almighty. That he was from all eternity, was proved already; and it can admit of no doubt, that what is independent and omnipotent muſt continue to all eternity.—In treating of the eternity of God, as well as of his omnipreſence, ſome authors have puzzled themſelves to little purpoſe, by attempting to explain in what manner he is connected with infinite ſpace and endleſs duration. But it is vain to ſearch into thoſe myſteries; as they lie far beyond the reach of all human, and moſt probably of all created intelligence. Of this we are certain, for upon the principle juſt now mentioned it may be demonſtrated, that the Supreme Being had no beginning, and that of his exiſtence there can be no end.—That which is omnipotent and eternal, is incapable of being changed by any thing elſe; and that which is infinite-

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ly wiſe and good can never be ſuppoſed to make any change in itſelf. The Deity, therefore, is unchangeable.

430. As he is the maker and preſerver of all things, and every where preſent, (for to ſuppoſe him to be in ſome places only, and not in all, would be to ſuppoſe him a limited and imperfect being), his knowledge muſt be infinite, and comprehend at all times whatever is, or was, or ſhall be. Were his knowledge progreſſive, like ours, it would be imperfect; for they who become more wiſe muſt formerly have been leſs ſo.—Wiſdom is the right exerciſe of knowledge: and that he is infinitely wiſe, is proved inconteſtably by the ſame arguments that prove his exiſtence.

431. The goodneſs of God appears in all his works of creation and providence. Being infinitely and eternally happy in himſelf, it was goodneſs alone that could move him to create the univerſe, and give being and the means of happineſs to the innumerable orders of creatures contained in it. Revelation gives ſuch a diſplay of the divine goodneſs, as muſt fill us with the

moſt

moſt ardent gratitude and adoration. For in it we find, that God has put it in our power, notwithſtanding our degeneracy and unworthineſs, to be happy both in this life and for ever; a hope which reaſon alone could never have permitted us to entertain on any ground of certainty. And here we may repeat, what was already hinted at, that although the right uſe of reaſon ſupplies our firſt notions of the divine nature, yet it is from revelation that we receive thoſe diſtinct ideas of his attributes and providence, which are the foundation of our deareſt hopes. The moſt enlightened of the heathen had no certain knowledge of his unity, ſpirituality, eternity, wiſdom, juſtice, or mercy; and, by conſequence, could never contrive a comfortable ſyſtem of natural religion; as Socrates, the wiſeſt of them, acknowledged.

432. Laſtly; Juſtice is neceſſary to the formation of every good character; and therefore the Deity muſt be perfectly juſt. This, however, is an awful conſideration to creatures, who, like us, are immerſed in error and wickedneſs, and whoſe

conſcience is always declaring, that every ſin deſerves puniſhment. It is reaſonable to think, that a being infinitely good muſt alſo be of infinite mercy: but ſtill, the purity and juſtice of God muſt convey the moſt alarming thoughts to thoſe who know themſelves to have been, in inſtances without number, inexcuſably criminal. But, from what is revealed in Scripture concerning the divine diſpenſations with reſpect to man, we learn, that, on performing certain conditions, we ſhall be forgiven and received into favour, by means, which at once diſplay the divine mercy in the moſt amiable light, and fully vindicate the divine juſtice.

433. It is indeed impoſſible to underſtand the doctrines of our religion, and not to *wiſh at leaſt* that they may be true: for they exhibit the moſt comfortable views of God and his providence; they recommend the pureſt and moſt perfect morality; and they breathe nothing throughout, but benevolence, equity, and peace. And one may venture to affirm, that no man ever *wiſhed* the goſpel to be true, who did not

find

find it ſo. Its evidence is even more than ſufficient to ſatisfy thoſe who love it. And every man who knows it muſt love it, if he be a man of candour and a good heart.

The End of PNEUMATOLOGY.

APPENDIX.

Of the Incorporeal Nature of the Human Soul.

434. MAN is made up of a body and a ſoul, intimately connected together, we know not how, or when. In conſequence of this connection, the body lives and moves, is nouriſhed with food and refreſhed by ſleep, and for a certain time increaſes in bulk. When this connection is diſſolved, the body is inſenſible and motionleſs, ſoon becomes cold, and gradually moulders into duſt.—That the ſoul and body are diſtinct and different ſubſtances, was formerly inferred (ſee § 119.) from the general conſent of mankind in regard to this matter. It ſeems to be natural for us to believe, that the ſoul may exiſt, and be happy or miſerable, without the body. This appears from thoſe notions, which in every age and country have prevailed, concerning a future ſtate.

435. But

435. But of the ſoul's immateriality there is other evidence. When two things have ſome eſſential qualities in common, we refer them to one claſs, or at leaſt conſider them as ſomewhat ſimilar in their nature. But when two things are found to have not one quality in common, we muſt conſider them as totally unlike and different. If therefore any piece of matter (or body) appear to have qualities which we know for certain do not belong to matter, we conclude, that to this piece of matter there is joined ſomething which is not matter.—The human frame preſents to our outward ſenſes a certain quantity of matter, divided into various parts of different ſhapes and colours. Now the eſſential qualities of matter we know from experience to be Gravity, Extenſion, Solidity, Inactivity, and ſome others. Theſe qualities are all in the human body. But in the human frame there are many qualities, not only different from theſe, but altogether unlike them. We are conſcious of Perceiving, Remembering, Judging, Imagining, Willing, and of a variety of paſſions, affections, and

and appetites. Surely theſe qualities, which are indiſputably in the human frame, are very different from, and very unlike to, Hardneſs, Softneſs, Weight, Extenſion, and the other qualities of body. There is therefore in man ſomething which cannot be called Body, becauſe from body it is in every reſpect different.

436. Moreover: The further we carry our inquiries into matter, and its qualities, the more we are convinced, that it is eſſentially inactive, or incapable of beginning motion. But in the human frame we know for certain, that there is ſomething eſſentially active, and capable of beginning motion in a thouſand different ways. In the human frame, therefore, there are two things whoſe natures are not only unlike, but oppoſite: the one is Body, which is *eſſentially inactive;* the other, which is *eſſentially active* — ſhall we call it Body too? Then body muſt be ſomething which unites in itſelf qualities directly oppoſite, and deſtructive of each other: that muſt be in it which is not in it; it muſt at once have a certain quality, and not have

that

that quality; it muſt be both active and inactive. Round ſquareneſs, white blackneſs, or red-hot ice, are as natural, and may be as eaſily conceived by the mind, as that one and the ſame thing ſhould be, at one and the ſame time, capable of beginning motion, and incapable of beginning motion.—The human frame is partly material. It follows, therefore, from what has been ſaid, that the human frame muſt alſo be in part *immaterial*, ſpiritual, or not corporeal. That part of it which is material we call our *body;* and that part of it which has been proved to be *immaterial* *, we call our *Soul*, *Spirit*, or *Mind.*

437. Many controverſies have been raiſed about the origin of the ſoul, and the time when it is united with the body. The common opinion ſeems to be the moſt probable; namely, that the ſoul is created and united with the body when

* Till of late there was no ambiguity in this epithet, as here applied. But ſince our language began to decline, *Immaterial* has been licentiouſly uſed to ſignify *Unimportant.* The true Engliſh ſenſe of it is, *Incorporeal, diſtinct from matter.*

the

the body is prepared for its reception. At what time, or in what manner, this union may take place, it is impoſſible for us to determine, and therefore vain to inquire. Let us not ſuppoſe it derogatory from the happineſs or perfection of the Deity, to be always employed (if we may ſo ſpeak) in creation. To omnipotence it muſt be as eaſy, and as glorious, to create, as not to create. The beſt philoſophers have thought, that his continual energy is neceſſary to produce gravitation, and other appearances in the material world. That the divine providence extends to the minuteſt parts of creation, has been believed by wiſe men in all ages; is confirmed by revelation; and is agreeable to right reaſon. For as he is every where preſent, and of infinite power, it is impoſſible that any thing ſhould happen without his permiſſion.

438. When we conſider man's helpleſs condition at his coming into this world; how ignorant he is, and how unfit for action; that all he ever acquires in knowledge is by experience and memory; that we have no remembrance of any thing

previous

previous to the preſent ſtate; and that both revelation and the conſcience of mankind declare the puniſhment which the wicked fear, and the reward which the good hope for, hereafter, to be the conſequence of their behaviour in this life:—when, I ſay, we lay all theſe things together, we muſt be ſatisfied, that the preſent is our firſt ſtate of being. But it is ſaid, that in this world we ſometimes ſuffer evil which we do not deſerve; that the vicious triumph while the virtuous are unſucceſsful; that the infant child may be liable to want or diſeaſe, from the profuſion or debauchery of the parent, and the harmleſs villager to ruin, from the crimes of his ſovereign: and that, therefore, we muſt in a former ſtate have incurred guilt, of which theſe and the like evils are the puniſhment.

439. This leads to an important, and, as many think, a difficult ſubject, the *Origin of Evil*; on which I ſhall make ſome remarks, after I have offered an obſervation or two upon the opinion that introduced it. Firſt, It may be obſerved, that

the unequal diſtribution of good and evil in this life naturally turns our thoughts, not to a former, but to a future ſtate of being; and does in fact, as we ſhall ſee by and by, afford a proof of a future ſtate. Secondly: Of virtues performed, or crimes committed, in a former ſtate, we have no remembrance, conſcioufneſs, or belief: and to puniſh us for crimes which we cannot conceive that we ever committed, and of which we know nothing, is inconſiſtent with divine juſtice. And, thirdly, If we ſinned, or ſuffered, in a former ſtate, the origin of that ſin or ſuffering muſt be as hard to be accounted for, as the origin of preſent evil.

440. Evil is of two ſorts; *Phyſical*, as pain, poverty, death; and *Moral*, or vice.—1. Our being ſubject to phyſical evil puts it in our power to exerciſe Patience, Fortitude, Reſignation to the divine will, Truſt in Providence, Compaſſion, Benevolence, Induſtry, Temperance, Humility, and the Fear of God. If there were no phyſical evil, there would hardly be an opportunity of exerciſing theſe virtues; in which caſe

caſe our preſent ſtate could not be, what both reaſon and ſcripture declare it to be, a ſtate of probation. Beſides: our preſent ſufferings we may, if we pleaſe, convert into bleſſings; which we ſhall do, if we take occaſion from them to cultivate the virtues above mentioned: for thus they will prove means of promoting our eternal happineſs. The exiſtence, therefore, of Phyſical Evil, being neceſſary to train us up in virtue, and conſequently to prepare us for future felicity, is a proof of the goodneſs of God, inſtead of being an objection to it.

441. 2. Without virtue, ſuch a creature as man could not be happy. In forming an idea of a happy ſtate, we muſt always ſuppoſe it to be a ſtate of virtue; the natural tendency of virtue being, to produce happineſs; as vice invariably leads to miſery. Now, man could not be capable of virtue, nor conſequently of happineſs, if he were not free, that is, if he had it not in his power to do either good or evil. And if he have this in his power, he muſt be liable to vice. Vice, therefore, or Moral Evil, is the effect of that

law of Divine providence, whereby man is made capable of virtue and happineſs.—As the poſſibility of falling into error, and miſtaking falſehood for truth, is neceſſary to the improvement of our rational powers, ſo the exiſtence of evil, as well as of good, is neceſſary, at leaſt in this life, to the improvement of our moral nature. And upon our improvement of our moral nature our future happineſs muſt depend.

442. Suppoſing the preſent life to be preparatory to a future and eternal ſtate, the evils we are now expoſed to muſt to a good man appear inconſiderable. What are a few years of ſorrow to an eternity of happineſs? Not ſo much as a headach of an hour is to a thouſand years of good health. And who would ſcruple to ſuffer pain for ſeveral months, if he could thus enſure health for many years?—But, in fact, the evils of life are not ſo great as ſome people repreſent them. There is in human nature a pliableneſs, by which it can adapt itſelf to almoſt any circumſtances: and contentment, and reſignation to the divine will, which are virtues in every perſon's

perſon's power, are ſufficient to render all the evils of life tolerable. And if to theſe virtues there be added a well-grounded hope of future felicity, which is alſo in the power of every perſon who is willing to be good, our preſent afflictions may become not only tolerable, but light. The wicked, indeed, muſt be unhappy both now and hereafter. But they will not ſuffer more than they deſerve; they will be puniſhed according to their works. And ſo far is their ſuffering from being an objection to the Divine character, that it would be a very ſtrong objection if they were not to ſuffer. For he who is perfectly good muſt be perfectly juſt: and a being perfectly juſt muſt puniſh thoſe who deſerve puniſhment.

443. To aſk, why we are not made infallible and perfect, and capable of happineſs without virtue or liberty, is an impertinent and perhaps an impious queſtion. It may as reaſonably be aſked, why there are not twenty planets in the ſolar ſyſtem; why a ſtone was not made a man or an angel; or why the Deity did not make all his creatures

creatures equal to himſelf. Such queſtions deſerve no anſwer, but this; that whatever God has been pleaſed to do muſt be right, whether we can account for it or not. Creatures who have it in their power to be happy, and whoſe happineſs will ever increaſe as they improve in virtue, are ſurely under the greateſt obligations to be thankful to that Providence which has made them what they are.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

444. IT is unneceſſary to prove to a Chriſtian, that his ſoul will never die; becauſe he believes that life and immortality have been brought to light by the goſpel. But, though not neceſſary, it may be uſeful, to lay before him thoſe arguments, whereby the immortality of the ſoul might be made appear, even to thoſe who never heard of revelation, probable in the higheſt degree.—Whether the human ſoul ſhall die with the body, or ſurvive death and live for ever, is an inquiry, which

which may be ſaid to comprehend the three following queſtions. 1. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reaſon to think, that the ſoul of man *may poſſibly* ſurvive the body? 2. Does the light of nature afford any reaſon to believe, that the ſoul *will actually* ſurvive the body? 3. If it does, what may be reaſonably conjectured concerning a future ſtate?

445. SECTION I. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reaſon to think, that the human ſoul *may poſſibly* ſurvive the body?—Firſt: Death deſtroys the body by diſuniting its parts, or preparing them for being diſunited: and we have no reaſon to think that death can deſtroy in any other way, as we have never ſeen any thing die, which did not conſiſt of parts. But the ſoul conſiſts not of parts; having been proved to be incorporeal. Therefore, from the nature of death and of the ſoul, we have no evidence that death can deſtroy the ſoul. Conſequently, the ſoul *may poſſibly*, and

and for any thing we know to the contrary, ſurvive the body.

446. Secondly: The ſoul is a ſubſtance of one kind, and the body of another; they are united; and death diſſolves the union. We may conceive them to exiſt after this union is diſſolved; for we ſee that the body does exiſt for ſome time after; and may by human art be made to exiſt for a long time. And as moſt men have in all ages entertained ſome notion of a future ſtate, it muſt be agreeable to the laws of the human underſtanding to believe, that the ſoul *may* live when ſeparated from the body. Now the diſſolution of the union of two diſtinct ſubſtances, each of which is conceived to be capable of exiſting ſeparate, can no more be ſuppoſed *neceſſarily* to imply the deſtruction of both the united ſubſtances, than the diſſolution of the marriage union by death can be ſuppoſed to imply, of neceſſity, the deſtruction of both huſband and wife. Therefore the union of the ſoul and body is not neceſſary to the exiſtence of the ſoul after death. Conſequently,

quently, the ſoul may poſſibly ſurvive the body.

447. Thirdly: Naturaliſts obſerve, that the particles whereof our bodies conſiſt are continually changing; ſome going off, and others coming in their room: ſo that in a few years a human body becomes, not indeed different in appearance, but wholly different in ſubſtance. But the ſoul continues always the ſame. Therefore, even in this life, the ſoul ſurvives, or may ſurvive, ſeveral diſſolutions of the body. And if ſo, it *may poſſibly* ſurvive that other diſſolution which happens at death.—It is true, theſe diſſolutions are gradual and imperceptible; whereas that is violent and ſudden. But if the union of the ſoul and body be neceſſary to the exiſtence of the ſoul, the diſſolution of this union, whether ſudden or gradual, whether violent or imperceptible, muſt deſtroy the ſoul. But the ſoul ſurvives the gradual diſſolution. Therefore, for any thing we know to the contrary, it *poſſibly may*, and probably will, ſurvive that which is inſtantaneous.

448. Some object, that it is only additional matter joined to our original body, which is gradually diſſolved by the attrition of the parts; whereas death diſſolves the original body itſelf. Though this were granted, it muſt at any rate be allowed, that the ſoul has as much command over this additional matter as over the original body. For a full-grown man has at leaſt as much command of his limbs, as an infant has of his; and yet in the limbs of the former there muſt be a great deal of additional matter, which is not in the limbs of the latter. And the ſoul and body of a full-grown man do mutually affect each other, as much at leaſt as the ſoul and body of an infant. Conſequently, the union between our ſoul and this ſuppoſed additional matter is as ſtrict and intimate as that between the ſoul and its ſuppoſed original body. But we find that the former union may be diſſolved without injury to the ſoul. Therefore the union of the ſoul with its ſuppoſed original body *may* alſo be diſſolved, without endangering the ſoul's exiſtence.

449. Further:

449. Further: admitting the ſame doctrine of an original body, we muſt however obſerve, that living men may loſe ſeveral of their limbs by amputation. Thoſe limbs muſt contain parts of this original body, if there be any ſuch thing. There is, then, a diſſolution of the union between the ſoul and *part* of the original body; and a violent one too; which however affects not the exiſtence of the ſoul. And therefore, for any thing that appears to the contrary, the ſoul *may poſſibly* ſurvive the total diſſolution at death.

450. But it is now time to reject this unintelligible doctrine of an original body. From a ſmall beginning, man advances gradually to his full ſtature. At what period of his growth is it, that the original body is compleated, and the acceſſion of additional matter commences? What is the original body? Is it the body of an embryo, of an infant, or of a man? Does the additional matter begin to adhere before the birth, or after it, in infancy, in childhood, in youth, or at maturity? Theſe queſtions cannot be an-

ſwered; and therefore we cannot admit the notion of an original body, as diſtinguiſhable from the additional matter whereby our bulk is increaſed. Conſequently, the third argument remains in full force; and is not weakened by this objection.

451. Fourthly: If the ſoul periſh at death, it muſt be by annihilation; for death deſtroys nothing, ſo far as we know, but what conſiſts of parts. Now we have no evidence of annihilation taking place in any part of the univerſe. Our bodies, though reſolved into duſt, are not annihilated; not a particle of matter has periſhed ſince the creation, ſo far as we know. The deſtruction of old, and the growth of new, bodies, imply no creation of new matter, nor annihilation of the old, but only a new arrangement of the elementary parts. What reaſon then can we have to think, that our better part, our ſoul, will be annihilated at death, when even our bodies are not then annihilated; and when we have no evidence of ſuch a thing as annihilation ever taking place? Such an opinion would be a mere hypotheſis, unſupported by,

by, nay contrary to, experience; and therefore cannot be reaſonable.—We have then, from reaſon and the light of nature, ſufficient evidence that the ſoul *may poſſibly* ſurvive the body, and conſequently be immortal; there being no event before us, ſo far as we know, except death, which would ſeem likely to endanger its exiſtence.

452. SECTION II. Does the light of nature afford any reaſon to believe, that the ſoul *will actually* ſurvive the body? The following are reaſons for this belief.—Firſt: It is natural for us to think, that the courſe of things, whereof we have had and now have experience, will continue, unleſs we have poſitive reaſon to believe that it will be altered. This is the ground of many of thoſe opinions, which we account quite certain. That, to-morrow, the ſun will riſe, and the ſea ebb and flow; that night will follow day, and ſpring ſucceed to winter; and that all men will die; are opinions amounting to certainty: and yet we cannot account for them otherwiſe than by ſaying, that ſuch has been the courſe

courſe of nature hitherto, and that we have no reaſon to think it will be altered. When judgements of this kind admit of no doubt, as in the examples given, our conviction is called Moral Certainty. I am *morally certain*, that the ſun will riſe to-morrow, and ſet to-day, and that all men will die, &c. The inſtances of paſt experience, on which theſe judgements are founded, are innumerable; and there is no mixture of ſuch contradictory inſtances, as might lead us to expect a contrary event.

453. But it often happens, that the experiences on which we ground our opinions of this ſort, are but few in number; and ſometimes too they are mixed with contradictory experiences. In this caſe, we do not conſider the future event as morally certain; but only as more or leſs probable (or likely) according to the greater or leſs ſurplus of the favourable inſtances. If, for example, a medicine has cured in five caſes, and never failed in one, we ſhould think its future ſucceſs probable, but not morally certain; ſtill more probable, if it has cured in twenty caſes; and more ſtill, if

if in a hundred, without failing in one. If a medicine has cured in ten caſes, and failed in ten, our mind in regard to its future ſucceſs would be in a ſtate of doubt; that is, we ſhould think it as probable that it would fail on a future trial, as that it would ſucceed. If it had cured ten times, and failed only ſix, we ſhould think it more probable that it would cure on a future trial, than that it would fail; and ſtill more probable, if it had cured ten times and failed only once.

454. Theſe remarks, which properly belong to Logic, will help to explain, in what manner our judgements are regulated, in regard to the probability or moral certainty of future events. To make us morally certain of a future event requires, we cannot tell how many, but requires a very great number of favourable experiences, without any mixture of unfavourable ones. It is true, we have heard of two men, Enoch and Elijah, who did not die; yet we expect our own death with abſolute certainty. But theſe inſtances are confeſſedly miraculous; and, beſides, are ſo very few, compared

compared with the infinite number of inſtances on the other ſide, that they make no alteration in our judgement.

455. To apply all this to the preſent ſubject. Our bodies juſt now exiſt, but we foreſee a cauſe that will deſtroy them, namely death; and therefore we believe that they will not exiſt long. Our ſouls juſt now exiſt; but we do not foreſee any poſitive cauſe that will deſtroy them: it having been proved, that they *may* ſurvive the body; and there being no cauſe, ſo far as we know, that will then, or at any other time, deſtroy them. We muſt therefore admit, that our ſouls *will probably* ſurvive the body. It is natural for us to believe this: the rules of evidence, which determine our belief in ſimilar caſes, determine us to this belief. But there are other arguments which prove the ſame thing by evidence ſtill higher.

456. Secondly: We are conſcious of being, in many reſpects, capable of endleſs improvement. The more knowledge we acquire, the greater is our capacity and our reliſh for further acquiſitions. It is not

not ſo with the brutes; for ſuch of them as are at all docile ſoon reach the higheſt improvement whereof they are capable. Diſeaſe may put a ſtop to our improvement as well as curioſity for a time; but when it goes off, we are curious and improveable as before. Dotage is a diſeaſe; from which if we could recover, there is reaſon to think that we ſhould be as rational and ingenious as ever: for there have been inſtances of recovery from dotage; and of perſons who at the cloſe of life have regained the full uſe of thoſe faculties of which they had been for ſeveral years deprived. And it often happens that old people retain all their mental powers, and their capacity of improvement, to the laſt.—Now God, being perfect in wiſdom, cannot be ſuppoſed to beſtow upon his creatures uſeleſs or ſuperfluous faculties. But this capacity of endleſs improvement is ſuperfluous, if man be to periſh finally at death; for much more limited powers would have ſuited all the purpoſes of a creature whoſe duration comprehends no more than ninety or a hundred years. It is therefore unreaſon-

able to ſuppoſe, that the ſoul will periſh with the body.

457. Thirdly: The dignity of the human ſoul, compared with the vital principle of brutes, leads to the ſame concluſion. Brutes have ſome faculties in common with us; but they are guided by inſtinct chiefly, and incapable of ſcience. Man's arts and his knowledge may be ſaid to be, in one ſenſe, of his own acquiſition; for, independently on experience and information, he can do little and knows nothing. But then, he is improveable, as was juſt now obſerved, to an extent to which we can ſet no bounds. He is, moreover, capable of ſcience; that is, of diſcovering the laws of nature, comparing them together, and applying the knowledge of them to the regulation of his conduct and to the enlargement of his power. He has a ſenſe of truth and falſehood, virtue and vice, beauty and deformity. He is impreſſed with a belief that he is accountable for his conduct. He is endowed with the capacity of knowing, obeying, and adoring his Creator; on whom he is

ſenſible

ſenſible that he and all things depend, and to whom he naturally looks up for protection and comfort; and he expects that his being will not end with this life, but be prolonged through eternity. Theſe are principles and ſentiments, whereof the moſt ſagacious brutes are not in any degree ſuſceptible.

458. The inſtincts, appetites, and faculties, which we have in common with them, are neceſſary to our exiſtence and well-being as animals. But for what purpoſe are we endowed with moral and religious principles? Theſe are not neceſſary to the ſupport of our animal nature; theſe are uſeleſs, or at leaſt fallacious, if there be no future ſtate. To thoſe who attend to the economy and analogies of nature, and obſerve how nicely every thing is fitted to its end, it muſt appear incredible, that man ſhould have the ſame final deſtiny with the brutes; conſidering that his mental conſtitution is ſo very different, that his capacities are tranſcendently ſuperior; and that his higheſt happineſs and miſery ariſe from circumſtances whereof the brutes feel no-

thing and know nothing, namely from his virtue and vice, and from his hope of the approbation and fear of the diſapprobation of his Creator.

459. Fourthly: We are poſſeſſed of many faculties which in the preſent life are never exerted. This we know to be the caſe with thoſe who die young or uninſtructed, that is, with the greateſt part of mankind: and we have reaſon to think that this is the caſe in ſome meaſure with all; for we ſeldom proſecute any new ſtudy without finding in ourſelves powers which we were not conſcious of before; and no man, after the greateſt attainments in art and ſcience, and at the end of the longeſt life, could ſay, that he had exerciſed all his powers, or knew the full extent of his own capacity. In moſt men, therefore, we are ſure that there are, and in all men we have reaſon to think that there are, faculties, which are not exerted in this life; and which, by conſequence, muſt be uſeleſs if there is no other. But in the works of creation there is nothing uſeleſs. Therefore,

fore, the ſouls of men will exiſt in a future ſtate.

460. Fifthly: All men have a natural deſire and expectation of immortality. The thought of being reduced into nothing is ſhocking to a rational ſoul. Theſe hopes and deſires are not the effect of education; for, with a very few exceptions, they are found in all ages and countries. They ariſe not from ſelf-conceit, or pride, or any extravagant paſſion; for the conſcience of mankind approves them as innocent, laudable, and right: and they prevail moſt in thoſe who are moſt remarkable for virtue, that is, for the moderation and right government of their paſſions and deſires. They muſt, therefore, take their riſe from ſomething in the original frame of human nature: and, if ſo, their Author is God himſelf. But is it to be ſuppoſed, that he, who is infinitely wiſe and good, ſhould have inſpired his creatures with hopes and wiſhes, that had nothing in nature to gratify them? Is it to be ſuppoſed, that he ſhould diſappoint his creatures, and fruſtrate thoſe very deſires which he has himſelf

ſelf implanted? The expectation of immortality is one of thoſe things that diſtinguiſh man from all other animals. And what an elevating idea does it give us of the dignity of our nature!

461. Sixthly: It is remarkable, that the wiſeſt men in all ages, and the greateſt part of mankind in all nations, have believed that the ſoul will ſurvive the body; how much ſoever ſome of them may have diſfigured this belief by vain and incredible fictions. Now here is a ſingular fact, that deſerves our attention. Whence could the univerſal belief of the ſoul's immortality ariſe?—It is true, that all men have believed that the ſun and ſtarry heavens revolve about the earth: but this opinion is eaſily accounted for; being warranted by what ſeems to be the evidence of ſenſe. It is alſo true, that moſt nations have, at one time or other, acknowledged a plurality of gods: but this is a corruption of an original true opinion; for it is highly probable, nay it appears from hiſtory, that believing in one God was the more antient opinion, and that polytheiſm ſucceeded to it, and was a corruption

corruption of it. Now it is not at all ſurpriſing, that when a true opinion is introduced among mankind, it ſhould in ignorant ages be perverted by additional and fabulous circumſtances.—But the immortality of the ſoul is not a corruption of an original true opinion; nor does it derive any ſupport from the evidence of ſenſe. It is itſelf an original opinion, and the teſtimony of ſenſe ſeems rather to declare againſt it. Whence then could it ariſe?

462. Not from the artifice of politicians, in order to keep the world in awe, as ſome have vainly pretended. For there never was a time when all politicians were wiſe and the reſt of mankind fools: there never was a time when all the politicians on earth were of the ſame opinion, and concurred in carrying on the ſame deſign: there never was a time when all politicians thought it their intereſt to promote opinions ſo eſſential to human happineſs, and ſo favourable to virtue, as this of immortality: and in antient times the intercourſe between nations was not ſo open as to permit the univerſal circulation of this opinion,

nion, if it had been artificial. To which I may add, that mankind have never yet adopted any opinion univerſally merely upon the authority of either politicians or philoſophers.—This opinion, therefore, muſt have ariſen from a natural ſuggeſtion of the human underſtanding, or from a divine revelation communicated to our firſt parents, and by them tranſmitted to their poſterity. In either caſe, this opinion will be allowed to be of the moſt reſpectable authority; and it is highly abſurd and dangerous to reject it, or call it in queſtion. —Another argument is founded upon the unequal diſtribution of good and evil in the preſent life. This will be conſidered by and by.

463. SECTION III. What may be reaſonably conjectured concerning a future ſtate?—Firſt: From the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, we may reaſonably infer, that it will be governed, like the preſent, by eſtabliſhed laws. What thoſe may be, it is not for us to determine; but we may reſt aſſured, that they will be wiſe and good.—Secondly: From the different circumſtances

circumſtances wherein we ſhall then be placed, and from the different beings with whom we ſhall then probably have intercourſe, it may be inferred, that in a future ſtate we ſhall be endowed with many new faculties, or at leaſt that many faculties now hidden and unknown will then exert themſelves. In our progreſs from infancy to mature age, our powers are continually improving; and new ones often appear and are exerted. We may therefore expect that the ſame progreſſion will be continued hereafter.—It is true, we cannot now form any idea of faculties different from thoſe of which we have experience. But this argues nothing againſt the preſent conjecture. A man born blind has no notion of ſeeing, nor has an ignorant man any idea of thoſe operations of the human mind whereby we calculate eclipſes, and aſcertain the periods of the planets. Yet it would be abſurd, in thoſe who want theſe powers, to deny their reality or poſſibility.

464. Thirdly: As the future ſtate will be a ſtate of happineſs to the good, we may reaſonably conjecture, that it will be

a ſtate of ſociety. For we cannot ſuppoſe it poſſible, for ſuch creatures as we are, to be happy in perfect ſolitude. And if we ſhall then have any remembrance of preſent things, which is highly probable, there is reaſon to hope, and good men have in all ages rejoiced in the hope, that the virtuous will then know and converſe with thoſe friends, with whom they have been intimately connected in this world. This, we cannot but think, will be an addition to their happineſs. But painful remembrances of every kind will probably be obliterated for ever.

465. Fourthly: The future ſtate will be a ſtate of retribution; that is, of reward to the good and of puniſhment to the wicked. This is intimated by many conſiderations; which prove, not only that a future ſtate, if there be one, will be a ſtate of retribution, but prove alſo, that there will be a future ſtate. Vice deſerves puniſhment, and virtue reward *: this is

* In what reſpects virtue is meritorious, will be conſidered in the ſecond volume.

clear

clear from the dictates of reaſon and conſcience. In the preſent life, however, the wicked ſometimes meet with leſs puniſhment than they deſerve, while the virtuous are often diſtreſſed and diſappointed. But, under the government of Him, who is infinitely good and juſt, who cannot be miſtaken, and whoſe purpoſes it is impoſſible to fruſtrate, this will not finally be the caſe; and every man muſt at laſt receive according to his works.

466. Further: Good men have a natural hope, and wicked men a natural fear, in conſequence of what they expect in the life to come. Thoſe hopes and fears reſult from the intimations of conſcience, declaring the merits of virtue and the demerits of vice. And therefore, as it is impoſſible for us to believe, that the dictates of conſcience, our ſupreme faculty, are deluſive or irrational, we muſt believe, that there is future evil to be feared by the wicked, and future good to be expected by the righteous. Even in this life there are ſigns of a retribution begun: whence we learn, that we are ſubject to the moral

government of God, and that things have a tendency to retribution. Certain virtues, as temperance and induſtry, are frequently their own reward, and the oppoſite vices ſeldom fail to bring along with them their own puniſhment. Nay ſometimes, even here, the wicked are overtaken with judgements of ſo peculiar a kind, that we cannot help aſcribing them to a juſt Providence. But the retribution here begun is not perfect. Perfect, however, under the government of a juſt and almighty Being, it muſt be in the end. And therefore, there will be a future ſtate of moſt righteous retribution.

467. Fifthly: In a future life, the virtuous will make continual improvements in virtue and knowledge, and conſequently in happineſs. This may be inferred, from the progreſſive nature of the human mind, to which length of time, properly employed, never fails to bring an increaſe of knowledge and virtue even in this world; and from the nature of the future ſtate itſelf, in which we cannot ſuppoſe, that any croſs accidents will ever interfere to prevent

prevent virtue from attaining happineſs, its natural conſequence and reward.

468. Laſtly: In the future ſtate, virtue ſhall prevail over vice, and happineſs over miſery. This muſt be the final reſult of things, under the government of a Being who is infinitely good, powerful, and wiſe. Even in this life, virtue tends to confer power as well as happineſs: many nations of vitious men might be ſubdued by one nation of good men. There is hardly an inſtance on record of a people loſing their liberty while they retained their virtue; but many are the inſtances of mighty nations falling, when their virtue was loſt, an eaſy prey to the enemy. In this life, the natural tendency of virtue to confer ſuperiority is obſtructed in various ways. Here, all virtue is imperfect; the wicked, it is to be feared, are the moſt numerous; the virtuous cannot always know one another; and, tho' they could, many accidents may prevent their union. But theſe cauſes extend not their influence beyond the grave; and therefore, in a future

ture ſtate, happineſs and virtue muſt triumph, and vice and miſery be borne down.

469. This is a very brief account indeed, of the arguments that human reaſon, unaided by revelation, could furniſh, for the immortality of the ſoul. All taken together amount to ſuch a high probability as can hardly be reſiſted by any rational being. Yet we muſt acknowledge, that unaſſiſted reaſon makes this matter only in a very high degree probable. It is the Goſpel, which makes it certain; and which, therefore, may with truth be ſaid to have BROUGHT LIFE AND IMMORTALITY TO LIGHT.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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E R R A T A.

Page 50. *line* 2. *read* hinted at.
60. — 21. —— paſſive participle,
208. — 12. —— for the better or for the worſe,
241. — 3. —— § 190.
246. — 24. —— of much or little knowledge,
255. — 6. —— following arrangement
379. — 5. —— as a firſt
381. — 13. —— muſt have acted
414. — 19. —— made to appear,

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